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There is a substantial body of empirical research on  
institutional arrangements through which financial relationships 
are structured in Africa. Although current  literature on formal 
and informal financial institutional arrangement has advanced 
our understanding of their comparative importance,  there is a 
dearth of empirical investigations on  the implications  of loan 
preconditions on the growth of/adoption of routines in small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs).. Thus, this study investigates the 
impact of formal and informal financial arrangements on SMEs 
growth and routine change in the Nigerian manufacturing 
sector.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
representatives of eleven SMEs that are beneficiaries of loans 
from formal and informal financial lenders were targeted. Nine 
representatives of formal and informal lenders were also 
interviewed. The outcome sheds light on how financial 
arrangements may impact growth and routine change amongst 
SMEs in Nigeria. The growth and routine change experienced 
by SME are shown to vary according to the loan attributes and 
preconditions associated with the type of lender respectively. 
Also, the findings reveal the nature of the interplay between 
formal and informal financial lenders and its consequences; 
such as improved access to loans, better enforcement, savings 
and disbursement; while also helping the government to 
achieve its lending target and easing the challenges of trust and 
quality relationships. These results contribute to the theoretical 
debate regarding the origins of routines and the mechanisms of 
routine change. Furthermore,, it emphasises that  further 
quantitative studies would be essential in investigating its 
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Borrowers: This refers to individuals or group that get money 
from another individual or group such as banks or cooperative 
with the expectation and agreement to pay back with some 
interest at a future date. 
 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC): The corporate affairs 
commission is an agency of the Nigerian government charged 
with the registration of businesses. 
 
Formality: This is a state of being known to the official 
channels. Any activities under a formal arrangement usually 
follow a process created by the government and administered 
by government agencies, parastatals and ministries. Examples 
of the process expected of a formal organisation are 
registration, possession of tax identification number (TIN), and 
payment of taxes. 
 
Formal financial sector: Comprises of business entities 
engaged in licensed financial activities such as lending and 
savings. They are usually regulated and licensed by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria and are registered with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission. 
 
Formal financial lenders: They are the same as formal 
lenders. These are lenders whose activities are regulated by 
the government and usually require a license issued by the 
central government before they can be allowed to operate. 
They include commercial and development banks.   
 
Formal sector: The formal sector represents the economy 
segment where businesses are registered, and they are 
compliant with tax regulations as stipulated by the government. 
 
Formal institutions: These are  set of formal rules created, 
administered, and authorised by the government, primarily 
through their agencies. Example of government agencies 
includes; the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), and Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN). 
 
Fragmentation: The process of breaking something 
into small parts (Dictionary.cambridge.org., 2021).  
 
Habits: A habit is a disposition to engage in previously adopted 
or acquired behaviour (including patterns of thought) triggered 
by appropriate stimulus or context. This is because habits are 
influenced by prior activity and have durable, self-sustaining 




Hard information: is a form of quantitative information, that are 
generally in written form, and are verifiable. For example, 
account statements, credit score, audited report. 
 
Informality: This is a situation whereby some economic 
activities/some businesses are not compliant with government 
legislation, and as such hidden from regulatory scrutiny. For 
example, this can take the form of a registered business, which 
has some employees whose contract of employment do not 
adhere to the law. 
 
Informal financial lenders: They are the same as informal 
lenders. These are lenders whose activities are governed by a 
group of individuals who have prior relationships. The basis of 
their lending is informed by the quality of past behaviours of 
borrowers. This sort of lending arrangement has its basis in the 
culture of the people, and it is not illegal. Informal lenders have 
no obligation to be registered before they could operate. These 
lenders include family and friends, money lenders, Ajo/Esusu, 
and cooperative societies.  
 
Impersonal exchange mechanism: Impersonal mechanism is 
synonymous with a transactional exchange or formal 
exchange. This exchange mechanism is typical of formal 
lenders and is based on hard information about the parties 
involved in transactions. 
 
Informal sector: The informal sector is synonymous with the 
shadow economy. It represents the segment of the economy 
where firms operate under the tax radar and with no 
government registration and control. The activities under the 
informal economy include all market-based legal production of 
goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public 
authorities.  
 
Informal institutions: These are informal rules, for example, 
customs, cultures, norms, and communal practices that 
underlie informal exchanges. These are rules created and 
administered by groups of individuals and communities, with 
little or no government intervention or control.  
 
Institutional Arrangement: Institutional arrangements are the 
structures put in place that frame social and economic 
interactions, i.e. lending preconditions (Hodgson, 2006, b:2).  
   
Legality:  According to the Merriam-webster dictionary, 
Legality is the quality or state of being legal. Legality in this 
study has to do with registering with the Corporate Affairs 





Mechanism of exchange or exchange mechanism: This is 
the process or the approach that determines the economic 
relationship between two or more economic players. The 
mechanism of exchange is the process that guides the 
behaviour of economic players when dealing with each other. 
In the case of formal organisation/lender, it manifests in the 
form of rules and regulations. In the case of informal 
organisation/lender, it manifests in the form of customs, culture, 
and norms. Examples of economic players captured in this 
study include lenders and SMEs. These players (i.e. lenders 
and SMEs) can either be formal or informal lenders. There are 
two mechanisms of exchanges captured by this study. These 
are personal and impersonal exchange mechanism. 
 
Official channels: This represents agencies owned by the 
government, i.e. agencies, parastatals and ministries. For 
example, the corporate affairs commission (CAC) is an agency 
of the Nigerian government charged with business registration. 
Another agency owned by the Nigerian government is the 
federal inland revenue service and state inland revenue 
services (FIRS) – charged with tax administration. 
 
Organisation: This study will treat organisations as players. 
They are referred to as players because they are economic 
actors. The organisations described in this study are formal 
financial lenders (i.e. banks, registered cooperative societies, 
government-regulated or government-owned organisations 
that provide loans).  Meanwhile, informal financial lenders 
include unregistered cooperative societies, family and friends 
and  Ajo (local contributory scheme).   
 
Personal exchange mechanism: Personal exchange 
mechanism is synonymous with informal exchange, relational 
exchange, and reputational exchange. This mechanism of 
exchange is typical of informal arrangement, common among 
informal lenders and is based on soft information relating to 
past relationships or past conducts. 
 
Routines: A routine is here defined as a generative structure 
or capacity within an organisation (Hodgson, 2009). 
 
Registration: This is the process a business entity is expected 
to follow to have their names, nature and composition of their 
businesses captured by the Corporate Affairs Commission. 
This will make their identity and activities are known to the 
government, including their activities  
 
Shadow economy: Shadow economy is similar to the informal 
sector. It comprises of all “economic activities which are hidden 




Soft information: is a form of qualitative information that is not 
in written form and hard to verify. It is usually gathered through 
social or relational activities.  
 
Tax Identification Number (TIN): This is in a numeric form, 
and it is required for all taxpayers to have one; without it 


































1.1 Overview  
Most studies on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in both 
developing and developed economies consistently agree that 
access to finance is important for SME growth (Gherghina et al., 
2020; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006). Many evidences abound 
about the difficulties SMEs encountered to gain access to 
finance in Sub-Saharan African (SSA)1 countries (Shuaibu, 
2021). As a result of the difficulties, according to Mlachila et al., 
(2013) commercial bank lending in Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) 
is generally low, with about 35 borrowers per 1000 people, 
behind 227 borrowers recorded by the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and 
136 global average. The reduced/lack of access leaves the 
affected SMEs with no option other than to patronise informal 
lenders. SMEs' growth enhances economic growth through 
contributions they make via tax payment and employment 
generation. The extent and how SMEs can obtain finance is a 
reflection of the institutional arrangement of the environment, 
where they domicile (Baumol 1990; Boettke and Coyne, 2003; 
North, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt, 2006:2). 
 
In this study, North's (1990:3) definition of an institution is 
adopted. North (1990) suggest that "the term institution is the 
rules of the game in a society or humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction". The term ‘institution’ has been 
 
1 Sub-Saharan African (SSA): According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), out of the 54 





interpreted and described in several different ways by 
researchers. Thus, there is not a standard nor widely used 
definition. Formal institution is considered as the set of rules 
created and administered by the government and through its 
agencies. 
 
Meanwhile, North describes informal institutions as the set of 
rules created and administered by individuals, groups, or 
community. These could be manifested through customs, 
traditions, and culture. Also, North (1990) contends that 
organisations could be considered as players or economic 
actors, e.g., financial institutions (formal and informal lenders) as 
examined in this study. Formal lenders and informal lenders are 
essential players in institutional financing arrangements. 
However, in the case of formal lenders, they are registered and 
regulated by the government (e.g., legislators) whilst informal 
lenders are controlled and managed by groups of individuals 
within the community through shared norms and culture.  It is 
essential to note here that the formal/informal terminology is 
used in different ways, and the author’s definition is not 
necessarily shared by others. Further evaluations/ debates on 
the term, institution; formal and informal lenders are indicated in 
Chapter two, Section 2.3. 
 
It is essential to note that the type of financial institution from 
which SMEs choose to obtain loans may impact their growth and 
routines. SMEs can source loans from either formal or informal 
financial lenders or both.  Indeed, this is a manifestation of the 
dual nature of the Nigerian economy. There are both forward and 
backward linkages between formal and informal sectors. The 
forward linkages entail a twin approach: these include, firstly, 
subcontracting agreements with large domestic companies, 
government agencies and foreign companies on the one hand, 
as well as the supply of consumer goods from informal sector 
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businesses to the formal sector on the other. The backward 
linkages consist of the movement of funds, raw materials, 
equipment, and consumer goods from the formal sector to 
informal sector enterprises (Arimah, 2001).  
 
The formal and informal finance segments within the Nigerian  
economy is characterised by distinct fragmentation that affects 
efficient intermediation (further details indicated in chapter 2). 
Fragmentation is the state of division or broken down into 
fragments. In the case of market fragmentation, this indicates a 
system in which the market is divided or broken into fragments. 
The fragments can be formal sector, e.g., various banks and 
informal sector, e.g., Ajo, money lenders, cooperatives, ROSCA. 
Since this study is about financing, other aspects of the back and 
forward movement between formal and informal lenders will not 
be fully explored. Current research shows the existence of the 
back and forward movement between formal or informal sectors. 
In Nigeria, registered SMEs can access loans from formal and 
informal lenders, and the informal lenders and their members 
can open bank accounts with formal lenders. Although informal 
SMEs cannot get loans from formal lenders, except with informal 
lenders (more details of this are captured under the interplay 
between the two - see section 6.4). 
 
A business has to be registered to become a legal entity. 
Registered businesses have better advantages, e.g., access to 
formal loans and government subsidies (further details 
discussed on page 18).  However, unregistered SMEs are more 
likely to be restricted from accessing loans from formal financial 
lenders. This is because formal lenders would not ordinarily 
provide credit to unregistered businesses. Correspondingly, this 
may partly contribute to the arguments by scholars about the 
reason formal financial lenders have not consistently met the 
credit needs of SMEs. This is mainly due to their stringent 
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preconditions, such as business registration, causing many 
SMEs to shy away from formal financing and opting instead for 
informal financing sources (Atieno, 2001:2).  
 
Although business registration is not the only reason(s) for SMEs 
to opt for informal financing. There are numerous underlying 
causes of informalities—for example, a conscious decision to 
avoid detection by not registering their businesses to avoid 
paying tax. Also, the lack of information on the process of 
business registration or the advantages associated with 
formalisation (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). However, being in 
the informal sector does not make an SME that is in legitimate 
business illegal (see more detail on legality and illegality on page 
96).  
 
Thus, it is common for these SMEs who patronise informal 
lenders not to have processes in place that would make it easy 
for them to meet loan preconditions of formal lenders and most 
times, they can avoid payment of taxes and regulations (Eilat 
and Zinnes, 2002). Data suggest that the core-identifying 
characteristics of informal financing mechanisms are reputation 
and relationship-based approaches. Thus, making it easier for 
SMEs to access loans from informal financial lenders rather than 
relying on formal financial lenders (e.g., Allen et al., 2005; 
Ayyagari et al., 2007). Conversely, transactional and arm’s 
length-based approaches denote the main features of formal 
institutions.  
 
Literature suggests that the institutional arrangement structures 
social and economic interactions and is synonymous with rules, 
constraints, or regulations(Hodgson, 2006b:2). According to 
North (2009:4), “this institutional arrangement could be formal – 
laws, rules, instructions and informal – conventions, customs, 
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codes of behaviours2”. In line with this study, institution is the 
rules of the game, that provides structure to the lending 
relationship between lenders and borrowers.  
 
An indispensable component in all lending relationships is 
information. Information can either be soft or hard and is required 
to be collected, processed, and transmitted between players for 
lending decisions to be made (Liberti and Petersen, 2019). 
Distinguishing between soft and hard information is essential to 
understanding the mechanisms of formal and informal lending 
mechanisms, and it is, explored here in Chapter Two. 
 
There is an ongoing quest to identify an ideal path to achieving 
continuous sustainable financing for SMEs, which will enhance 
their growth and subsequently lead to economic development. 
Currently, the economic policy prescriptions that have been put 
forward have not provided the perfect solution to the problems 
facing developing countries (Easterly, 2002). Scholars, 
policymakers, and politicians, are therefore, more uncertain in 
their economic diagnoses and prescriptive assertions. In 
considering the policy route for developing countries, the 
question of the missing path to development is still open. 
Besides, there is growing recognition that it is no longer realistic 
to argue simply that one remedy can fit all developing countries, 
regardless of history or circumstance (Kasozi, 2008). 
Increasingly, institutional considerations have been put on the 
agenda by scholars, researchers and policymakers who seek to 
be informed by empirical experience and evidence from 







There seems to be a developing consensus that institutions 
matter for economic outcomes, and the research agenda 
increasingly focuses on ascertaining which institutions are 
essential for different economic outcomes while also identifying 
how institutions affect economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 
2005; La Porta et al., 2008; Menard and Shirley, 2008; North, 
1994; North et al., 2009; Shirley, 2008). This thesis attempts to 
understand how formal and informal lending influence SMEs in 
Nigeria. It explores the nature of exchanges such as personal 
and impersonal mechanisms and the type of information shared 
and transmitted, such as soft and hard information. More 
specifically, the loan preconditions associated with each lender 
is evaluated, and their implications revealed.  This chapter 
begins with an overview and a brief background to the study - 
including the summary of SMEs in Nigeria.  Next is a statement 
of the problem, then the aims, objectives and research 
questions, followed by an outline of the research methodology 
and finishing with the scope of the thesis.  
 
Before going on to the next section (section 1.2), it is imperative 
to emphasise that the conceptual definitions of some major 
concepts, e.g., institutions, formal and informal institutions, 
formal sector, and informal sector/shadow economy, are subject 
to debates. Also, other authors may use them in different ways 
to those adopted by the author in this study. For clarity, 
conceptual definitions relevant to this study are presented in the 
glossary and further explanations of major concepts appear in 
section 2.3.  
1.2 Background to the Study 
This study focuses on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). 
The meaning of SMEs differ considerably from country to 
country and are dependent on features such as country, the 
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number of personnel, the fixed assets value, production 
capacity, level of technology usage, capital employed, economic 
development, and the particular challenges experienced by 
SMEs (Enquobahrie, 1997; Harabi, 2005). Many countries and 
international organisations set their guidelines for defining an 
SME, often based on the number of employees, sales, or assets 
(International Finance Corporation, 2010). Some countries 
adopt an SME definition that covers all firms with fewer than 250 
employees, including micro-firms.  
 
The definitional issue is further complicated because individual 
banks in the same country use different definitions of SME for 
their own strategic and risk management purposes. For 
instance, among banks in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), the cut-off between small and medium firms range from 
5 to 50 employees, and the cut-off between medium and large 
firms range from 15 to 100 employees (IFC, 2010). In Nigeria’s 
National Policy on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSMEs), the framework contains the breakdown of what should 
constitute an SME. Accordingly, given the geographical location 
of the targeted population, the definition given by the Small and 
Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN) 
was adopted. SMEDAN is the agency charged with the 
responsibility of developing the small and medium scale 
business sector in Nigeria. It defines “Small and Medium 
Enterprises as small business organisations that employ 10 -199 
employees, or has an asset of USD32, 000 (approx. 
₦10,000,000) to USD1.2 million (₦999,000,000) excluding land 
and buildings” (SMEDAN N.D.). 
 
SMEs are critical to the Nigerian economy. A study by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) shows that 
approximately 90% of Nigerian businesses are SMEs (Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka, 2010).  Small and Medium Enterprises “with 10-70 
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employees constitute 90-per cent of the industrial sector of 
Nigerian economy amounting to 70 per cent of industrial 
development contributing almost 70 per cent of the 
manufacturing sector output and 1 per cent GDP” (Mohammed 
and Teru, 2020). SMEs not only contribute significantly to 
improved living standards, but they also bring about substantial 
local capital formation and achieve high levels of productivity 
and capability. (Gbandi and Amissah, 2014: 329). However, 
even though the “SMEs constitute more than 90% of Nigerian 
businesses, their contribution to the GDP is only about 1% in 
comparison to 40% in Asian countries and 50% in the U.S. and  
Europe” (Gbandi and Amissah, 2014:329, Mohammed and Teru, 
2020).  
 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics survey of 2019 on 
SMEs in Nigeria, there are 41, 543, 028 SMEs. Out of this 
number, it is estimated that micro-enterprises constitute 
41,469,947 (99.8%), small enterprises: 71,288 (0.17%) and 
medium: 1,793 (0.004%). According to business type, the 
composition of MSMEs revealed that education, manufacturing, 
and wholesale/retail trade represent 68% of small enterprises. 
Manufacturing, wholesale/retail trade, and human health and 
social works make up 68% of medium enterprises. In 
comparison, wholesale/retail trade, agriculture, and other 
services activities make up 76.3% of micro-enterprises. The 36 
states of the federation, as well as the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT), shows that Lagos, Osun, and Oyo have the highest 
number of SMEs; these include 8,395 (11.5%), 6,131 (8.4%) and 
3,007 (4.1%) respectively. States with the smallest number of 
SMEs are Yobe with 102 (0.1%), Bayelsa with 300 (0.4%) and 
Borno with 538 (0.7%). Regarding the structure of ownership, 
65% are sole proprietorship, 21% are private limited liability 
company, 6% are faith-based, and 5% are partnerships SMEs 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). This study was carried out 
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in some selected cities in the southwestern part of Nigeria 
consisting of the Lagos, Ogun – Ijebu Ode and Abeokuta. More 
details in section 1.7. 
 
Globally, when considering the informal sector, SMEs account 
for a significant share of employment (Aidara et al., 2021) and 
GDP (Zou et al., 2021). For example, in developed countries, 
SMEs employ an average of 67 per cent of formal employment 
in the manufacturing sector ( International Finance Cooperation, 
2010). On the other hand, in developing countries, this number 
is around 45 per cent (International Finance Cooperation, 2010). 
Similarly, SMEs contribute a sizable share to formal GDP at 49 
per cent on average in high-income countries and 29 per cent 
on average in low-income countries, respectively (International 
Finance Corporation, 2010). The contribution of SMEs to 
employment and GDP in developing countries seems 
comparatively modest. However, estimates suggest that the 
informal sector (which consists essentially of SMEs) accounts 
for up to 48 per cent of the total labour force and 37 per cent of 
GDP in developing countries(International Finance Corporation, 
2010). The corresponding percentages for developed countries 
are much lower, at 25 per cent of the total labour force and 16 
per cent of the GDP (International Finance Corporation, 2010).  
 
Significantly, according to Schneider (2005), the average size of 
the informal sector (another word for informal sector is the 
shadow economy) as a proportion of official GDP in 1999–2000 
in developing countries was 41%, in transition countries 38%, 
and in OECD countries 17%. An increasing burden of taxation 
and social security contributions underlies the shadow economy. 
If the shadow economy increases by 1%, the growth rate of the 
official GDP of developing countries decreases by 0.6%, while 
in developed and transition economies, the shadow economy 
respectively increases by 0.8% and 1.0% (Schneider, 
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2005:598). Boly (2012) reports that most developing countries 
(32 out of 47) are located in sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile, 
fourteen developing countries are located in Asia and one (Haiti) 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are all characterised 
“with low industrial base and significant market distortions that 
policymaking has to address” (Soldatos, 2016:196).  
 
Most of the economic output in Sub-Saharan African countries, 
including Nigeria, is produced by the informal sector/shadow 
economy. Correspondingly, Gbandi and Amissah (2014) affirm 
that finance adds about 25% to the success of SMEs in Nigeria 
and that more than 70% of funds available to SMEs are from the 
informal financial sector. The informal financial sector is a subset 
of the informal sector. Their operations are primarily outside the 
banking system and are majorly unregulated, and loosely 
monitored than formal sources” (Chandavarkar, 1985:4). 
Godfrey (2017) argues that the economic activities taking place 
within the informal sector are traditionally unregulated by law but 
governed by custom and personal ties. Also, operating outside 
the formal financial system does not suffice to make them illegal. 
What constitutes illegality is dependent on the nature of the 
activities, e.g., prostitution, oil racketeering, and armed robbery. 
Details of various activities, i.e. both legal and illegal, are shown 
in Appendix 12. 
 
The informal financial sector is largely characterised by small 
scale financings such as transactions, loans, and deposits 
occurring outside the regulatory remit of a central monetary or 
financial market authority (Adams and Fitchett, 1992). These 
informal financial services include SMEs, money lenders, 
cooperatives, pawnbrokers, Rotating Saving and Credit 
Associations - ROSCA (Mohammed et al., 2015; Kyazze et al., 
2017). The informal financial sector’s operations are marred by 
lack of good governance, unrecognised, unrecorded, 
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unprotected, and unregulated by the public sector (Onwe, 
2013:60). SMEs that remain informal are those whose 
operations and characteristics remain unregulated by the 
government/other public authorities. For example, enterprises 
that are not officially registered and do not maintain a complete 
set of accounts. Also, workers with limited social or legal 
protection and employment benefits. Bank of Industry (2018) 
suggest that other examples of informal employment workers 
include street traders, subsistence farmers, small scale 
manufacturers, service providers (e.g., hairdressers, private taxi 
drivers, and carpenters).  
 
The formal financial sector is comprised of business entities that 
are registered and operate within the scope of the official 
financial system. One of the government's functions is to offer a 
legal framework to provide some degree of structure for 
economic activities. However, when it comes to shadow or 
informal economic activities, they are not covered directly by the 
legal framework. One could argue that this is because they are 
not registered and regulated. Therefore, the legal frameworks 
are easily avoided, and contracts are frequently unenforceable 
and economic relationships can become stained by violence. 
Also, it could become very problematic for businesses to 
experience expansion because they could come to the notice of 
authorities. A large shadow economy could imply that tax rates 
are higher for those in the formal sector (Williams,2013). 
 
SMEs perceive the preconditions of loan attached to formal 
financing, for example, payment of tax and business registration, 
as incurring extensive time and financial cost, and thus do not 
see any incentive to comply, even if they could (Stern and 
Barbour, 2005; Blazic, 2004). Thus, staying unofficial is often a 
deliberate choice based on the “degree of an appeal” of 




Furthermore, formality means registering with the government, 
having a registered place of business and making tax returns, 
amongst other things. Since most SMEs in developing countries 
are operating in the informal sector, it is impossible for them to 
play the developmental role they are meant to play. As their 
activities are not regulated, they do not make tax returns, and 
their accounts are not audited even if they keep proper records. 
Therefore, they are not in any position to make the expected 
contribution to economic development. 
 
As a way to correct this imbalance, financing institutions provide 
a structure that determines how SMEs obtain loans, and in the 
process of paving the way for their operations to become 
formalised (Honohan and Beck, 2007; Gindis, 2013: 210). Like 
most businesses, irrespective of size, require finance for growth, 
they will have to comply with certain loan preconditions3. In 
complying with loan preconditions of lenders, internal processes 
of their operations may experience some changes. These 
changes in operation may not be possible without a change in 
routine.  Evolutionary economists Nelson and Winter (1982) 
notably drew attention to the central role of the routines in 
business organisations, conceiving it as a unit of analysis, a 
pattern of action, DNA of organisation, and source of adaptation.  
While on the other hand, organisational ecologist, and 
organisation behaviour scientist, Hannan and Freeman (1984); 
Stieglitz et al. (2015), Safavi et al. (2020), asserted that routines 
might be a source of inertia indicating that routines could be hard 
to change. 
 
Thus, this study is not suggesting that SMEs seek finance 
because they want to develop new routines. However, they may 
 
3 Loan preconditions are terms and conditions associated to formal and informal lenders. 
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experience a change in routine due to the preconditions they are 
expected to follow. Equally remaining in the shadow economy is 
a decision based on cost and benefit consideration. SMEs may 
lack the desire to transition from a shadow economy to a formal 
one due to the attraction of not incurring the cost associated with 
business registration and tax burden (e.g. default in tax payment 
can expose them to periodical visits by government officials). 
Therefore, one could contend that the limited benefits of going 
formal are likely to be one of the reason(s) some SMEs remain 
informal. 
 
Research demonstrates that compliance with rules is often 
triggered by the external influence of the regulatory environment 
(Holmes et al., 2013). The literature discusses their importance 
and influence on the capacity of organisational routines to 
change (Etienne, 2010: Stieglitz et al., 2016). According to 
Teece et al. (1997:516), firms can integrate, build and 
“reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments”. Nevertheless, routines may 
remain unchanged under other circumstance, especially when 
SME owner can choose not to adapt or comply if the status quo 
is more favourable and vis versa. 
A firm’s responsiveness to increasingly turbulent environments 
is associated with its dynamic capabilities, which have inherent 
strategic relevance to a firm (Teece et al., 1997). SMEs’ 
decisions to adapt or not adapt will be influenced by the 
behavioural dispositions of owners or managers.  Moreover, the 
type of financial lenders they opt for may constrain or enable 
growth and adoption of new routines, which might determine if 
new behaviours can be operationalised. 
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1.3 Statement of the Problem 
There is an emerging agreement that institutions matter for 
various economic outcomes, and the research agenda 
increasingly focuses on ascertaining which institutions are 
important for different outcomes. Furthermore, there is a 
substantial body of empirical research that provides descriptions 
of the institutional arrangements through which financial 
relationships are structured in Africa. This allows for some 
quantification of the comparative importance of various 
institutional arrangements. Lacking, however, from most of the 
There is a dearth of literature on formal and informal lending in 
Africa, particularly on empirical investigation of the impact of 
formal and informal lending on SMEs’ growth and routine 
change. As a result, little is known, about the role of formal and 
informal financial lenders in enabling or constraining SMEs’ 
growth and routine change. Especially, routine change within an 
organisation in the context of various lenders' loan preconditions 
(formal and informal). Using a developing economy like Nigeria 
provides the ideal context through which the impacts of formal 
and informal financial lending on SMEs’ growth and routine 
change will be understood. 
 
In light of the limited knowledge and notable gaps in the literature 
here, the aim of this research is to investigate the impact of 
formal and informal financial institutions on SMEs’ growth and 
routine change. To achieve this aim, three objectives were 
created; 
1. To identify how formal and informal financial 
institutions impact the growth of SMEs through lending 
preconditions. 
2. To explore how institutions (formal and informal 
financial sources) impact the adoption and development of 
new routines in SMEs. 
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3. To investigate the interplay between formal and 
informal financial institutions and its impact on SMEs. 
1.4 Research Questions 
To address the research objectives identified above, the 
following research questions were developed: 
1. To what extent do formal and informal financial 
institutions impact SMEs’ growth? 
2. Do preconditions of loan imposed by formal and informal 
financial institutions affect SMEs’ adoption and 
development of new routines? 
3. What is the nature of the interplay between formal and 
informal financial institutions and its impact on SMEs? 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
To address the research questions above, a qualitative inductive 
study was employed with an interpretivist philosophy considered 
most suitable for surfacing rich insights on the lived experience 
of SME borrowers. A corresponding social constructionist 
epistemology was adopted alongside the case study as the 
research strategy. Semi-structured interviews were the 
instrument used for data collection. A pilot study was first 
conducted focussing only on lenders, followed by the main 
study. Purposive sampling and snowballing techniques were 
used to achieve eleven interviews with borrower SMEs and eight 
with lenders. The sense-making and analysis of data were done 
using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) and 




1.6 Summary of Original Contributions 
 
This study offers brief coverage of the evolutionary framework in 
the literature review and the corresponding useful handling of 
routines with a more suitable definition and categorisation of 
routine change. It drew on the modern evolutionary approach 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010) and routines literature which 
amplifies the information-carrying and adaptive role of routines 
in organisations. The insight gathered include the important role 
of an external trigger, in the form of formal lenders’ loan 
preconditions, which SMEs must adhere to if they desire access 
to loans.  
 
The findings reveal the influence of loan preconditions and loan 
attributes. Indeed, adherence to loan preconditions makes 
access possible. Likewise, loan attributes (i.e. loan tenure, loan 
size and interest rate) were found to influence the growth of 
SMEs that gained access. Furthermore, adherence to loan 
preconditions leads to access to loans and the adoption of new 
routines. This shapes new practices and behaviours and 
ultimately make access to future loan possible.  
 
These findings offer useful empirical insights on routine change 
which remain consistent with routines literature; first, by showing 
how higher and lower organisational levels influence each other 
within the lens of lending preconditions, and second by revealing 
how new, existing and old routines are influenced and shaped 
by owners’ past knowledge and experience.  The study also 
identifies and offers an explanation of the mechanism involved 
in routine change. 
 
In contrast with prior research on routine that focuses on routine 
transfer and replication (Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Larty and 
Friesl,2018), this study focuses on the change in routines within 
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an organisational setting, which was expressed - using three 
dimensions; (a) changing a routine by operating (possibly 
dormant) routine X instead of former routine Y, (b) making 
changes to a particular existing routine, and (c) developing and 
operating an entirely new routine. All these could be described 
as “routine change”.  
 
Lastly, findings uncover the underpinnings and the nature of the 
interplay between formal and informal financial lenders and their 
implications. By illuminating the influence of formal lenders on 
informal lenders and vice versa. Such as formal lenders' role in 
providing banking services to the cooperative societies as a 
whole and helping them allocate loans approved by the 
cooperative management. Equally, formal lenders, i.e. 
commercial banks, rely on cooperative societies to recommend 
their members, who are tested and trusted and can meet the 
necessary loan preconditions. Examples of such loan 
preconditions are business registration, tax identity number. Due 
to these overlaps, the implication that was revealed includes 
improved access to loans, better enforcement, savings and 
disbursement, while also helping the banks achieve their lending 
target and easing the challenges of trust and quality 
relationships.  
 
Overall, these results contribute to the theoretical debates 
regarding routines origin, mechanisms and change, SME 
financing, institutional economics literature, particularly the 
dualistic, and inseparable nature of formal and in formal 
institutions. They also point in the directions that further 
quantitative studies would need to explore to be more relevant 
for policy.  
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1.7 The Scope of the Thesis 
This study focuses on the impact of formal and informal financial 
lenders on SME growth and routine change in the Nigerian 
manufacturing sector. Theories and perspectives on concepts of 
institutions, culture, routines, and trust informed the theoretical 
foundations. The study also drew on research in cognitive 
psychology on habits and studies of growth in developed and 
developing economies. Having observed the gaps in the 
literature, the research focus was determined, and the aim, 
objectives and research questions were formulated. 
 
The research participants are loan experts, lenders and SMEs. 
The experts are expected to have at least five years of 
experience in SME lending(SMEs  with prior loan access).  
 
There was no specific basis for choosing the study locations 
other than relying on the referral from friends and families. The 
referral led the researcher to four locations. These locations are 
three state capital cities: Lagos, Ilorin and Abeokuta and one 
town - Ijebu ode.  These cities are situated in the southwestern 
part of Nigeria, except Ilorin, located in the middle belt of Nigeria. 
Ijebu ode is not a capital city but a big town located in the south-
west of Nigeria. Most of the cities can boast of having a 
concentration of various sizes of SMEs and are made up of 
different types of lenders, i.e. commercial, development and 
microfinance banks, including registered and unregistered 





CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
The conceptual, theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this 
thesis are presented in this chapter. First, the Nigeria context, 
followed by an evaluation of the several conceptual definitions 
of institutions linked to various scholars, are explored; next, the 
theoretical foundations of formal and informal institutional 
exchange approaches are discussed. Third, perspectives on the 
role of culture, trust, routines and habits, and routine change are 
reviewed. Fourth, the relationship between formal and informal 
rules/sector, and their implications are reviewed.  Using Helmke 
and Levitsky's (2004) typology model, the relationship between 
formal and informal rules is then presented. Next is an 
empirically informed discussion on the effects of formal and 
informal institutions on financing. This is followed by a review of 
the literature on routines, the role of institutions and the 
relationships between them, which is contextualised in a modern 
evolutionary perspective which are at the forefronts of the role of 
routine change. Lastly, the effect of lending practices on growth 
is examined. 
2.2 The Nigerian Context 
In most societies, business activities depend on the smooth 
functioning of the legal system. The legal system provides 
guidance and regulates interactions between business entities. 
The key members of the Nigerian legal system are judges. They 
make decisions and dispense justice on economic issues 
involving SMEs operations. Equally important are the legislators 
in the national and state assemblies and the legal officers in the 
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Attorney General’s office. They are charged with legal duties to 
enhance the efficiency of SMEs through the enactment of 
business-friendly laws and policies. Ufua et al. (2020) contend 
“that the Attorney General is the legal adviser to the government. 
Likewise, “the Director of Public Prosecutions supports the 
Attorney General’s office in the prosecution of criminal cases 
against SMEs and their directors in the event of frauds or 
deviation from rules governing their activities" (pg. 3).  
Also, Ufua et al. (2020) suggest that the Nigerian legal system is 
an integral part of the institutional arrangement that structures 
the operations of business activities (e.g., SMEs). The current 
relevant law governing the operations of SMEs and other 
business entities in Nigeria is called the Company and Allied 
Matter Act (CAMA), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (7th of 
August 2020). Part A of the Act emphasises clauses relevant to 
the registration of all SMEs in Nigeria before carrying out their 
businesses (pg. 3). Part B provides for the registration of 
business names, the categories most SMEs must abide by 
(pg.3). Meanwhile, Section 1 of the Act establishes the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) with the responsibility of 
registering and regulating companies and business names (as 
stated under section 7 of the Act). The act provides the capability 
to directly probe into the affairs of SMEs especially where the 
investment of the populace is at stake. 
Moreover, to undertake other activities that are expedient for the 
effective implementation of the Act. The commission can protect 
and enhance SMEs business operations through the ease of 
doing business reforms. However, there are some challenges 
with the legal framework discussed above, e.g., weak 
enforcement by the regulatory agencies, inefficiencies, and 
corruption by the SMEs (Olujobi, 2017). 
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The Nigerian economic sector has different types of organisation 
in operation. The first types are companies with formalised and 
well-organised operations, e.g., oil companies, banks, 
government ministries and parastatals. The second type is the 
mid-level players who are also formalised. For example, 
professional services and smaller registered organisations, 
namely, formal SMEs. The next; are informal by nature. They 
include one-person or even partnership business comprising of 
petty traders, informal lenders, small personal services, e.g., 
barbers, tailors, carpenters.  
La Porta and Shleifer (2014) suggest that many SMEs in 
developing countries operate in the informal sector. This is not 
surprising because most businesses in Africa are traditionally 
communal, relational and reputationally inclined. Also, there is 
an interdependent world view, and people within these settings 
place more importance on relationships and nurture rather than 
on an individualist approach (Triandis, 2005; Hofstede, 1980a). 
Therefore, by their characteristic, they do not follow any formal 
legal framework for their operations. More so, they do not pay 
tax, and neither do they keep proper records. The Nigerian 
informal sector is not an exception. See further details on  SME 
and the informal sector and its legality in section 2.11. Informal 
lending happens in this sector, e.g., via cooperative societies, 
ROSCA, moneylending, Ajo, and loans from friends and family. 
The advent of colonisation led to laws and regulations fashioned 
along the lines of those assimilated from countries like Britain 
and France. Gradually, widespread practise of formality is 
becoming more prevalent; thus, more regulations with the aim of 
formalising more businesses. However, the informal sector is 
still in existence and operates side by side with the formal sector. 
Hence, the existence of the dual approached (formal and 




According to Benhassine (2018), there are two main reasons 
why governments usually consider high levels of informality as 
problematic. The first was prompted by the work of De Soto 
(1989), i.e. the idea that informality is costly for the firms 
themselves, who are unable to access bank financing, public 
contracts, or government intervention programs and suffer from 
low productivity as a result. The other reason is the assumption 
that a large informal sector represents lost tax revenues for the 
government. In response, many countries have introduced 
business entry regulation reforms intended to make it easier for 
firms to become formal (World Bank, 2016). However, even after 
these regulatory reforms, most firms remain informal in many 
developing countries, including Nigeria (Bruhn and McKenzie, 
2014), leading to whether governments should venture into 
inducing informal firms to formalise (Benhassine, 2018). 
 
The Nigerian formal financial sector ecosystem, within which all 
economic actors operate, serve as a vehicle for policy 
intervention programmes. Monetary measures are constantly 
used to improve access to finance for underserved SMEs and 
lure businesses out of the shadow economy. This has led the 
Nigerian government to create organisations such as the 
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI), National 
Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND), the Peoples Bank 
of Nigeria (PBN). PBN has been referred to as government 
social lending, the Community Banks (CB) now microfinance 
banks, Nigerian Export and Import Bank (NEXIM), and the 
Nigerian Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (Soludo, 2008; 
Gbandi and Amissah,, 2014). Others are the Small and Medium 
Equity Investment Scheme (SMEEIS) which was actually a 
voluntary initiative in 1999 by the bankers’ committee through 
CBN’s’ moral suasion, to assist in providing finance to the small 
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enterprises, the small and medium enterprises credit guarantee 
scheme (SMECGS). 
 
All these policies and programmes are geared towards opening 
up the economy, providing more access to finance to the 
underserved. However, they come with preconditions. The 
typical conditions for an SME to get access to formal financing 
in Nigeria are; evidence of incorporation, a business plan, 
evidence of tax payment, demonstrating that they are 
enterprises with a high employment generation capacity, 
enterprises with good management set-up and proper 
accounting procedures, enterprises promoted by female 
entrepreneurs, six-months account statements showing the 
current exposure, amongst others (Central Bank of Nigeria, 
2014; Bank of Industry, 2018). 
  
Notwithstanding numerous efforts through financial sector 
reforms, the Nigerian financial markets remain largely 
fragmented, with substantial gaps in the financing of economic 
activities by formal lenders. Based on surveys of formal and 
informal financial institutions and their customers in Ghana, 
Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania; the continuous poor performance 
of financial systems could be partly explained by the 
excessiveness of regulations. Also, this has led to continuous 
fragmentation of the market (Roe, 1991; Aryeetey et al.,1997; 
Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998).  
 
Again, putting a ceiling on deposit and loan rates have the 
disposition to increase/decrease the demand and the supply of 
funds. However, unsatisfied demand for investible funds 
necessitates financial intermediaries to limit the allocation of 
credit by means other than the interest rate. One the other hand, 
“an informal market develops at unrestrained rates” (Aryeetey et 
al., 1991:198). Thus, a fragmented credit market emerges in 
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which favoured borrowers obtain funds at subsidised rates from 
formal sources. Those unfavoured may have to seek credit from 
“often highly negative, and expensive informal markets” 
(Aryeetey et al., 1991:198). This fragmentation is discernible 
through different risks and cost characteristics, interest rate 
disparities with regard to the differences in cost of funds, 
transaction costs, and risk associated with each lender i.e. 
formal and informal lender (Aryeetey et al., 1997). The cause of 
these fragmented markets is due to the wide differences in risk-
adjusted returns. “This may occur because funds and 
information, do not always flow between segments, and clients 
have limited access to different financial instruments, resulting 
in low substitutability” (Aryeetey et al., 1997:196). Where poor 
information and contract enforcement make it too costly for 
formal financial institutions to serve small businesses and 
households, informal financial lenders become their only hope 
(see more on exchange mechanism in section 2.4) may have an 
important role to play in serving these financial market 
segments.  
 
Mohammed et al. (2015) argue that Nigerian SMEs find these 
loan preconditions too stringent, making satisfying them 
challenging. Also, funds are not often easily available to SMEs 
and this tends to increase the activities of informal financial 
lenders, e.g., Ajo, pawnbrokers, ROSCA and cooperative 
societies (Adeyemi, 2008). They often provide a less restrictive 
lending service to the informal sector widely considered to be 
‘underserving of it’. 
 
The dynamics of the dual economy and the basis of the 
underlying lending arrangements between economic actors is 
rooted in the theory of institutions. Hence, the next section will 
explore institutions, vis a vis various conceptual and theoretical 




As mentioned in section 1.1, the conceptual meaning of an 
institution attracts several definitions and various descriptions. 
Despite years of continuous debates, there is no agreement 
about what could be described as a generally accepted 
definition. A less complicated approach would be to focus on 
examining the functions of institutions and how they do it (their 
mechanics). It is not unusual for various researchers to rely on 
numerous key conceptual and theoretical terms. After all, such 
differences may encourage healthy competition of ideas. Also, 
Hindriks and Guala (2015) argue that heterogeneous 
understandings of fundamental concepts may affect 
communication, making mutual criticism and cross-fertilisation 
difficult. The lack of agreement and the heterogeneous views are 
not what this thesis is designed to investigate. Therefore, to 
manage the divergence of views and diverse understanding 
revolving around various terms and the theoretical basis of 
meanings require a definitional stance. Before exploring the 
definitional stances adopted here, various definitions of the term 
institutions from different relevant authors will be evaluated. 
 
Ostrom (1986) concludes that institutions are regulations 
consisting of a set of rules that are used to determine who 
qualifies for what and the conditions applicable. This type of 
actions could either permits or constrains behaviour. Also, it 
determines the set of rules to be combined and applied, the 
measures to be employed, the kind of information to be made 
available or not, and what benefits will be assigned to persons 
as an outcome of their actions. Meanwhile, North (1990) suggest 
that institutions represent every code of conduct and beliefs 
collectively instituted by society. Again, North (1990: 97) 
indicated that "institutions are formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights) and informal rules (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
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traditions, and codes of conduct and are humanly devised 
constraints”. North views institutions as restrictions that manage 
political, economic, and social relations and represent every 
code of conduct and beliefs collectively instituted by the society. 
Furthermore, North (2005:3) argues that "institutions are the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, they are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". 
Therefore, institutions could be seen as the framework that 
defines the outcome of actions and inactions of economic 
players. 
 
Similarly, the increasing acknowledgement of the role of 
institutions in social life involves the recognition that much of 
human interactions and activities are structured in terms of overt 
or implicit rules (Hodgson, 2006). The structuring of human 
interaction, as designed by institutions, creates a stable 
expectation of the behaviour of others. As a result, institutions 
enable the pattern of thoughts, expectations, and actions by 
imposing form and consistency on human activities. Therefore, 
it is  essential to state that institutions are like a two-edged 
sword; they constrain and enable behaviour. Indeed, they can 
open up possibilities. These possibilities, as dictated by the 
institutional arrangement, may "enable choices and actions that 
otherwise would not exist" (Hodgson, 2006:2). Players would 
consider their interest when making decisions based on the 
choices and actions open to them. Decisions on adherence to 
rule are simply a matter of projected benefits or gains and 
anticipated costs, where no profit or gain is assumed from legal 
compliance itself. It is analogous to sacrificing something that 
one has to give up, for a particular outcome to be experienced.   
 
Therefore, if institutions are labelled as cost, for instance, in 
terms of lending/borrowing, such cost includes doing what it 
takes to comply with rules by paying to register a business, 
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keeping records, and paying taxes. Also, the cost might include 
what the business owner gave up. For example, instead of 
becoming formal, by putting necessary things in place to qualify 
for a formal lender’s loan; a borrower could opt for an informal 
lender’s loan. The motivation behind which lender to go for is 
informed by the expected reward compared to the associated 
cost of accessing the loan. 
 
Menard and Shirley (2008:1) in their view define "institutions as 
written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints that humans 
devise to reduce uncertainty and control their environment; 
these include (i) written rules and agreements that govern 
contractual relations and corporate governance, (ii) 
constitutions, laws and rules that govern politics, government, 
finance, and society more broadly, and (iii) unwritten codes of 
conduct, norms of behaviour, and beliefs." Menard and Shirley's 
perspective are more focussed on the institution as a way of 
controlling actors within an environment and determining the 
type of behaviours they would take place. This definition does 
not precisely view it from a cost vs benefit perspective as 
Hodgson's. This is not to devalue any of the descriptions, as both 
viewpoints are of great relevance to the concept of institutions 
and have relevance to this study.  
 
Further debates on definitions can also be attributed to North 
and Hodgson. Hodgson in 2004, argued that North's (1990) 
definition sees institutions from only the macro lens but fails to 
consider that within an organisation, institutions, rules and 
constraints are present. Organisations are a special kind of 
institution that contain, firstly, standards to establish their 
boundaries and to distinguish their members from non-
members, principles of sovereignty concerning who is in charge, 
and lastly, chains of command delineating responsibilities within 
the organisation (Hodgson, 2007:8). Hodgson argued that the 
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existence of these internal rules within organisations constrains 
individual employees' behaviour (Hodgson, 2010). This is 
because organisations are made up of groups of individuals 
bound together by some common purpose to achieve specific 
objectives. However, in Hodgson's alternative explanations, he 
queries North's definition that views organisations as "players", 
having a problem that involves an unnecessary combination of 
separate agency and organisation (Hodgson, 2007). This 
argument signifies a further distinction between the agency and 
the organisation, instead of being submerged under the same 
conceptual description. 
 
According to Hodgson, astonishingly, the conditions that 
continuously allow institutions to be treated as players 
necessitate the comprehension of organisations as social 
systems with restrictions and rules (Hodgson, 2006).  It is 
possible for organisations to be treated like players in some 
circumstances and seen as institutions in another. Individual 
agents act within the organisational rule-system. In turn, under 
some conditions, organisations may be treated as players within 
other encompassing institutional rule-systems. There are 
multiple levels in which organisations provide rules for 
individuals, and possibly, in turn, these organisations can also 
be treated as players within broader institutional frameworks. 
For example, the individual acts within a nation, but in another 
situation, a nation can sometimes be treated as an actor within 
an international framework of rules and institutions (Hodgson, 
2006).  
 
Nevertheless, to avoid being caught up in the controversy as to 
the definitive agreement on important terms, Hodgson (2004, 
2006) suggests institutions can be legal (a system of rules which 
is enforced by the state, i.e. courts, law enforcement agents) and 




To clarify the confusion that emerged as a result of his earlier 
definition, North redefined institutions as the rule limit that 
determines the level of instability by providing a structure to 
every operation (North, 2009); in effect, they are structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic. According to North's classic proposition, political 
institutions can be "any form of constraint that human beings 
devise to shape human interaction," and can work through "both 
formal constraints—such as rules that human beings devise—
and informal constraints such as conventions and codes of 
behaviour."  
 
According to Williamson (2009: 372), “the critical difference 
between formal and informal institutions is that formal 
constraints are centrally designed and enforced”. However, 
informal institutions remain in the private realm. Similarly, 
Helmke and Levitsky (2006) define informal institutions as 
socially shared rules, usually unwritten (but not in all 
circumstances), that are created, communicated and enforced 
outside officially sanctioned channels. One could emphasise 
based on data that, formal institutions represent government-
defined and imposed rules, while informal institutions capture 
private rules stemming from norms, culture, and customs that 
emerge spontaneously (Williamson, 2009). On the other hand, 
Helmke and Levitsky's (2004) distinction between formal and 
informal institutions, suggest that informal institutions lay 
emphasises on socially shared rules and in most cases, 
individuals. Also, some organisations could have relationships 
with formal and informal institutions at the same time or different 
intervals. 
 
Hindriks and Guala (2015) managed the definitional problem 
encountered with institution by addressing it from three 
30 
 
perspectives. Firstly, in their study, they conceived institutions 
from the rule-based conception. This is the perspective that 
views behavioural rules as guides and constrains on behaviours 
during social interaction. Secondly, the equilibrium-based 
conception of institution as equilibria of strategic games. Thirdly, 
they evaluated the concept as the system of constitutive rules 
that assign statuses and functions to physical en tities, e.g., how 
money was assigned with a status that adds economic value to 
it from being just a paper. 
 
They further argue “that the equilibrium-based and rule-based 
accounts are individually inadequate, but that jointly they provide 
an adequate conception of institutions as rules-in-equilibrium. In 
the second part of their paper, they show that constitutive rules 
can be derived from regulative rules through the introduction of 
theoretical terms” (Hindriks and Guala, 2015:459). They reduced 
the theory of the constitutive rules to the rules-in equilibrium 
theory and suggested it accounts for how names are assigned 
to social institutions (pg. 459). 
 
Considering the above, the debate surrounding the meaning and 
the differences between formal and informal institutions remains 
unresolved. Different scholars use these terms differently. 
Therefore, it would not be out of place if this study adopts 
definitions consistent with the phenomenon under study – which 
centres on loan preconditions. Thus, for the purpose of this 
investigation, North's (1990: 3) definition of institutions is 
adopted, i.e., "the rules of the game in a society or humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction". The 
definition adopted for formal institutions is the rules devised by 
the government, which are administered through its agencies. 
While informal institutions are those rules governed by 
individuals, groups, or a community. This could be informed by 




Similarly, the meaning this study will adopt for organisations 
such as financial institutions follows North's distinction as well by 
referring to organisations as players within an encompassing 
institutional rule-systems. Likewise, for further clarity and to 
avoid unnecessary confusion that may occur, when referring to 
organisations as players, a concise explanation of what 
organisation the study will be referring to will be needed. Hence, 
the organisations referred to in this study are formal financial 
lenders (i.e. banks, registered cooperative societies, 
government-regulated or government-owned organisations that 
provide loans); and informal financial lenders (i.e. unregistered 
cooperative societies, Ajo (local contributory scheme). In 
addition, SMEs will also be referred to as players or economic 
players. 
 
Likewise, the understanding of institution encompasses formal 
rules and informal rule. Therefore, the preconditions pertaining 
to each of the lenders will simultaneously be referred to as formal 
and informal rules or loan preconditions or preconditions of loan. 
The definitions chosen are due to the nature of this study, as 
preconditions of loan are more like devised constraints that 
shapes lenders and borrowers’ relationships. In addition, it can 
also enable and constraint behaviours.  
 
To emphasis, it is worth reiterating that all definitions of; 
institutions, and its components, i.e. formal and informal 
institutions, and organisations have different meanings to 
different scholars. The definitions chosen are only adopted for 
the purpose of this study, and not necessarily shared by others. 
The next section explores the meaning and theoretical 
foundations of personal and impersonal exchange. 
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2.4 Theoretical Foundations of Personal Vs Impersonal 
Exchange 
Reviewed literature suggests that institutions could either be 
formal or informal. The distinction between them is  hard to 
make, and there are overlaps in-between. Different authors use 
these terms to mean different things. The purpose of making a 
distinction is to enable an easy understanding of the direction of 
this study. The underlying approaches have their basis in the 
people's culture (See more on culture in 2.5). Distinctions are 
made along the lines of attributes/mechanisms of operation of 
formal and informal institutions. The distinctions made are not 
designed to justify that both formal and informal institutions are 
different in reality, but just to create slight demarcations for this 
study to be understood with little or no confusion for readers. 
Understanding the basis of formal and informal financial lenders' 
mechanisms of exchange requires the help of relevant theories. 
Therefore, this section details the theoretical basis, underpinning 
the context of this study. It covers the theory guiding the origins, 
nature of exchanges of formal and informal financial lenders, 
and the information types applicable to each type of lenders. The 
subsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 below explain the theoretical basis 
of personal exchanges and impersonal exchanges. 
2.4.1 Personal Exchanges 
 
Personal exchanges are transactions that are based on social 
and reputational recognition. For example, if a person lives in a 
community and the person is known to be of good conducts, i.e., 
the person pays their dues as and when it is supposed to be 
paid. Equally, if the person has no record of the prior incidence 
of debt or financial default, then, there is a higher probability that 
33 
 
members of that community would be inclined to recommend or 
do business with a person of such standing.  
 
Personalised approaches or exchanges are based on informal 
relationships. This prevails in emerging economies and 
compatible with their cultural disposition (McMillan and Woodruff 
2002; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). In relational contract theory, 
five prevailing contractual norms are adopted in defining 
personalised or relational approaches (Macneil's, 2000; Greif 
2006). These are role integrity, contractual solidarity, flexibility, 
proprietary of means and harmonisation within the matrix 
(Macneil, 1983; Blois, 2002). Personal exchanges do well in an 
environment where there is a weak legal system (Zhou and 
Peng, 2010). Most developing economies have a weak legal 
system, and this makes personal approaches favourable.  
 
As explained above in the last paragraph of 2.1, an informal 
institution is analogous to informal rules, or informal mechanism 
of exchange, which guides informal financial lenders. The 
informal mechanism of exchange is embedded in personalised 
approaches as engrained in the customs and culture of a given 
society. It is worthy to note that even though personal exchanges 
are linked to informal lenders, it could occur in formal lending or 
registered organisations. Individuals within formal organisations 
can influence economic exchanges with people they know. This 
may decrease the time it takes for a transaction to be completed. 
For example, an individual who has a relationship with someone 
in a position of authority can use their relationship to obtain a 
contract with or without following the prescribed rules. It is a form 
of corruption, especially when someone enjoys an unmerited 
advantage. If this happens in a formal setting, it will definitely be 
concealed and not stated in the books or reports of the formal 
organisation. For instance, a commercial bank will never inform 
the central bank in their periodic report that certain loans were 
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issued based on the relationship between one of the bank’s staff 
and a customer. The reason for this is that the reliance on the 
reputation and the past relationship is not the official or expected 
economic exchange mechanisms for formal lenders. Also, an 
informal lender has no obligation to report to anyone.  
 
Under personal exchange, parties trade rights and duties with 
respect to each other (Greif, 2006). Transactions based on 
relationships would prevent objectivity as exchanges are more 
of reciprocity and value of friendship. This type of exchange is 
characteristic of a weak legal system, and this may limit business 
opportunities and weaken competition (Zhou et al., 2008).  
Personalised exchanges do well when transactions are 
conducted with people who are geographically close to one 
another. Parties can protect themselves by ascertaining the 
likelihood of potential counterparties to fulfil their obligations, 
leading them to gather information on their wealth, reputation, 
and moral traits (Arruñada, 2016). However, if business 
transactions are conducted with economic actors who are 
geographically dispersed, a personal exchange approach will 
not be adequate. Therefore, ascertaining the reputation, wealth 
and the likelihood that every party will respect their expected 
contractual obligation will be difficult, if not impossible.  
 
For example, empirical studies of manufacturing firms in Africa 
demonstrate that the absence of effective legal institutions in 
enforcing contracts leads to limited trade and market 
development (Collier and Gunning, 1999). An effective judicial 
system increases confidence in the possibility of exchange 
partners fulfilling legal obligations, thus enhancing the 
willingness to widen one's reach by engaging more business 
partners (Johnson et al., 2002). Low accounting transparency 
and financial disclosure, unavailability of a credit rating system, 
and weak institutions to verify quality, make transactions with 
35 
 
individuals outside relational networks very costly and 
sometimes even impossible (Zhou and Peng, 2010). The growth 
of emerging economies is often impeded by poor information 
dissemination in the economic system. High information 
asymmetry often leads to a reliance on personal relationships to 
reduce uncertainty (Peng and Heath, 1996; Zhou et al., 2003).  
 
To reduce transaction costs, lenders would require a significant 
amount of trust to offer credit to customers. This usually happens 
particularly in countries with weak contract enforcement 
regulations, e.g., developing countries (Heikkilä et al., 2016). 
Without trust, it will be impossible for any lending to take place. 
That is why knowing those to be involved in a lending transaction 
is a prerequisite for most if not all informal lenders. This means 
that informal financial lenders may depend on social capital and 
the threat of social sanctions to screen potential borrowers 
based on the quantity and quality of their social connections 
(Heikkilä et al., 2016). The reliance on this sort of institutional 
arrangement may require understanding the nature of the 
national culture (details on culture is explored in 2.5) because it 
has a fundamental impact on the transactional cost of relational 
exchanges (Zhou and Peng, 2010).  
 
Unfortunately, literature suggests that the existence of informal 
alternatives may not provide a solution as it cannot substitute for 
weak public contract enforcement (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). 
Thus, rent-seeking is becoming the norm, as exchanges are 
influenced by relational mechanism only. The elites and the well-
connected would benefit the most under such circumstance (pg. 
26). Similarly, poor quality of information increases information 
asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). Without proper information flow, 
product quality, as well as partner credibility outside relational 
networks, may be too costly to verify (Akerlof,1970). Societies 
with informal mechanism are prone to having more deficient 
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formal contract enforcement mechanisms in place. As a result, 
they tend to depend on social capital and the threat of social 
sanctions. The quest to replace the disadvantages attributed to 
informality led to the advent of impersonal exchange mechanism 
as examined in the next section. 
 
Hence, the reason for the formal sector, where impersonal 
exchanges guided by hard information can bring out objective 
outcomes. 
 
2.4.2 Impersonal Exchanges 
The expansion of an economy on a large scale led society to 
establish centralised and "impartial courts that, by the threat of 
coercively imposed sanctions, enable widespread impersonal 
exchange" (North, 1991; Li, 1999; Dixit, 2004). In an impersonal 
exchange situation, an economic player's decision to engage in 
a transaction is not dependent on his customer's reputation 
(Greif, 2006:221). Transactions are conducted without the 
knowledge of the other person's previous conduct, or the 
anticipation of impending trade with him, or the likelihood of 
reporting past misconduct to future business partners. As the 
economy grows, the number and range of partners reachable 
through personal exchanges increases and market transactions 
become complicated (North, 1990; Peng, 2003; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). The expanded transactions demand the 
advancement of rules that could facilitate impersonal 
exchanges. However, the demand for formal institutions does 
not automatically lead to their supply. 
 
Governments and interest groups often play a significant role in 
designing and building institutions (Ring et al., 2005). The 
process within each country may differ, stall or reverse because 
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of political, economic, and social conflicts (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003). Countries vary significantly in the initial quality of legal 
institutions, market economy experience, and cultural values 
and beliefs; this affects their quality, speed and effectiveness to 
build new market supporting institutions. An effective market 
supporting the legal system will have high-quality information 
institutions; this will ease the cost of arm' s-length transactions. 
A high-quality information institution would offer enough flow of 
information to reduce uncertainties associated with impersonal 
exchanges (North, 1990). As a result, transactions are limited 
within the boundaries of those trustworthy network members. 
Once higher quality information institutions development is 
achieved, and the pursuit for price and quality information 
outside networks become reliable and efficient. Firms are more 
likely to exchange with the best offer, instead of being 
constrained to the limited small networks that personal 
exchanges favour. Therefore, to support impersonal exchange 
and the related market expansion, it is necessary to have an 
effective and efficient institution, i.e. legal system based on the 
coercive power of the state that is supported by the government 
(Greif, 2006:222). Achieving an institution that guarantees 
quality information would require the enactment of relevant 
regulation and willingness of the political class.  
 
Recent empirical work shows the importance of well-designed 
credit market regulations and well-functioning court systems for 
debt recovery (International Finance Cooperation, 2010)2010; 
Emenalo, 2014). A detailed review of global bank flows revealed 
evasion of taxes by firms in economies with superior credit 
information was less in comparison with those with weak 
information institutions (Doingbusiness.org 2018:27-28). In a 
multi-economy study, the introduction of collateral registries for 
movable assets was shown to increase firms' access to finance 
by approximately 8% (Doingbusiness.org 2018:29). These are 
38 
 
the sort of mechanism that ensures lenders can mitigate the 
lending risk. The absence of repositories where information is 
kept, i.e. registries, especially in developing countries, adds to 
the stifling of access to SMEs. 
 
According to Doingbusiness.org (2018), most reforms in Nigeria 
are federally driven. Especially, starting a business, and most 
were focused on the efficiency of processes rather than the 
quality of regulations. The foundation of doing business is the 
notion that economic activity, particularly private sector 
development, benefits from clear and coherent rules. These 
rules set out and clarify property rights and smoothen the 
process of dispute resolution. They also enhance the 
predictableness of economic interactions and provide 
contractual partners with essential protections against 
arbitrariness and abuse.  Such rules are much more effective in 
shaping economic agents' incentives in ways that promote 
growth and development. They are reasonably efficient in design 
and are transparent and accessible to those for whom they are 
intended and can be implemented at a realistic cost (De 
Benedetto, 2018). 
 
The quality of the rules also has a crucial bearing on how 
societies distribute the benefits and finance the costs of 
development strategies and policies (Doingbusiness.org 
2018:11). Without adequate legal institutions, the threat of 
opportunism may pose high enforcement costs and deter the 
viability of impersonal exchanges. Therefore, building an 
efficient market system requires institutional development to 
ease the cost of enforcement and compliance.  
 
Historically, economic growth improves when societies improve 
generalised contract enforcement and cease supporting 
intrusions by elites and the privileged few, whose actions had 
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devastated the security of contracts. Most developing societies 
experience weak growth, as there are too many interests 
conflicting with the enforcement mechanism. This indicates that 
contracting institutions are weak and to experience improved 
outcomes, attention needs to be paid to strengthening contract 
enforcement (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). If contract enforcement 
is not strengthened, rules put in place to structure behaviours 
would be bent regularly to suit the elite.  
The role of culture in how society address lending arrangements 
cannot be overemphasised. The next section will explore culture 
in relation to norms and values associated with the mechanism 
of exchanges relating to lending.  
2.5 Culture 
Culture plays an essential role in the way institutions affect 
respective societies (O'Reilly et al., 1991). Also, culture 
manifests/affects the way the preconditions for lending is 
crafted. The culture of African societies in general is relationally 
and communally inclined. Hence, transactions are greatly 
determined by the reputation of the economic players. Different 
countries have practices that are heterogeneous, and it defines 
how they act and do business with each other. 
 
Fukuyama (1996) suggest that national culture defines our way 
of life, including the level of general trust toward strangers.  
Jones et al. (1997) contend that it is the cooperative norms and 
values in a given society. Culture formulates behavioural 
expectations or beliefs about the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
informal relationship-based control of transactions in society. 
Thus, shifting the relative efficiency of relational transactions vis-
à-vis arm’s-length transactions (North, 2005). Several social 
psychologists suggest that social organisations are highly 
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correlated with per capita income in contemporary societies. 
They argue that most developing countries are "collectivist," 
whereas many of the developed countries of the West tend to be 
"individualist” (Lim et al., 2021).  
 
Individualism/collectivism describes the relationship between 
individuals and groups and that collectivism often prevails in a 
given society (Hofstede, 1980a). Hofstede (1980) distinguishes 
between individualistic and collectivistic cultures in that 
individualistic cultures (e.g., The United Kingdom and the United 
States) are relatively less committed to group norms or interests 
than collective cultures (such as China, Japan, and Korea) 
(Zhou and Peng, 2010:362). Individualism on the one hand 
implies a loosely-knit social framework in which people are 
supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate 
families only. While collectivism, on the other hand, is 
characterised by a tight social framework in which people 
distinguish between in-groups and out-groups; they expect their 
in-group to look after them, and in exchange for that they feel 
they owe absolute loyalty to it (Hofstede, 1980b:45). In 
collectivistic cultures with high cooperative norms and values, 
such as Japan, the potential benefits from trading with network 
partners may be relatively higher than that in individualistic 
cultures with low cooperative norms, such as the United States 
(Chen et al., 2002; Hill, 1995). In collectivist societies, the social 
structure is "segregated" in the sense that each individual 
socially and economically interacts mainly with members of a 
specific religious, ethnic, or familial group where contract 
enforcement is achieved through "informal" economic and social 
institutions (Hofstede, 2010).  
 
Members of collectivist societies feel involved in the lives of other 
members of their group (Greif, 1994). Given the relative stability 
of national culture, cooperative norms are likely to remain 
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relatively efficient in constraining opportunistic behaviours for a 
reasonably long period. At the same time, legal means are often 
the last resort for conflict resolution. This might explain why 
personal and relational transactions are still pervasive in Japan, 
even though the effectiveness of its legal institutions is relatively 
high (Hill, 1995 in Zhou and Peng, 2010:362).  
 
In the early days of market development, economic activities 
used to be personal and supported by reputation and society 
relied more on personal exchanges (Erdkamp, 2005; 
Bransbourg, 2012). One could expect an individual reputation to 
play a more significant role and personal sanctions to be 
harsher. For example, in Rome, in the very early days, informal 
social norms strongly motivated people to fulfil their personal 
obligations. What is most important for understanding the role 
played by the Roman state is that both formal rules and 
organisationally supported institutions were well suited, and 
seem to have evolved, not only to enhance the enforcement of 
personal obligations but also to prevent them from interfering 
with the impersonal exchange. Roman friends made claims on 
each other which would cause a modern ‘friend’ to break off the 
relationship without delay” (Schulz, 1951:555) and vertical 
bonds amounted to several layers of patronage by people of 
higher status, who acted as patrons for their lower-status 
“clients,” the clientele.  
 
In the early Republic, “the situation was close to serfdom but 
survived later mainly for the relationship between patron and 
freed man” (Crook, 1967:93). Horizontal bonds meant that 
substantial mutual help was customarily provided by people 
equal in status, mainly under the informal bond and obligation of 
friendship. Friendship (amicitia) gave rise to serious and 
substantial duties. Therefore, “fulfilling contractual obligations 




Nigeria, with a score of 30, is considered a collectivistic society. 
This is manifested in a close long-term commitment to the 
member ‘group’: a family, extended family, or extended 
relationships. Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount and 
over-rides most other societal rules and regulations. This society 
fosters strong relationships where everyone takes responsibility 
for fellow members of their group. In collectivist societies, 
offence leads to shame and employer/employee relationships 
are perceived in moral terms (like a family bound). Hiring and 
promotion decisions take account of the employee’s in-group 
and management is the management of groups (Hofstede, 
1996).  
 
Watanabe and Kanazawa (2021) and Huff et al. (2003) suggest 
a link between collectivism/individualism and trust. In fact, many 
imply that trust is high in collectivist and low in individualist 
societies (Idemudia et al., 2021). A common theme is that 
because collectivists have a more interdependent world view, 
they place more importance on relationships and nurture them 
with more care than individualists. The view above is also 
supported by Triandis (1989 and 2005); Chen et al. (1998); 
Hofstede (1980a and 1980b). More so, Japan is frequently cited 
as a cultural model for fostering trust and cooperation (Hagen 
and Choe, 1998; Casson, 1991; Rayamajhee and Bohara, 
2020). Tanaka (2020) concluded that the Japanese concept 'Wa' 
or harmony involves sharing, cooperation, warmth, and 
fellowship leading to trust in a working relationship. Achieving 
Wa, and ultimately trust is crucial in Japanese culture (Hazama, 
1978). Ouchi (1981) praised Japan for its between-firm relations, 
in contrast to the United States, where firms rarely trust each 




Dyer and Singh (1998:673) noted that Japanese firms incur 
lower transaction costs than U.S. firms and generate higher 
relational rents. One could argue that it is a country-specific 
institutional environment that fosters goodwill, trust, and 
cooperation (Dore, 1983; Dyer, 1996; and Sako, 1991). 
Similarly, African societies, including Nigeria, have a similar 
collectivism ideology. This is evident in the large size of the 
informal sector whose activities are influenced by relational and 
reputational principles. 
 
A theoretical discussion associating national culture and trust by 
Doney et al. (1998) indicates the general belief that when trust 
is high, relationships are strong, and motives are benevolent in 
collectivist cultures. Conversely, when trust is low, relationships 
are weak, and motives are calculative in individualist cultures 
(Huff et al., 2003:81). Borrowers within an informal setting are 
aware of the importance of their reputation and the implications 
of damage/default on their established reputation. Any default 
that cannot be reasonably defended could lead to 
embarrassment. Therefore, care is always taken by borrowers 
to judiciously utilise the credit borrowed. The continuous 
economic exchanges among players in such an environment are 
based on personalised mechanism, which is highly influenced 
by trust.  
 
The relational constructs that surfaced in the way both formal 
and informal lending routines operate are attributes influenced 
by the culture prevalent within African societies. Although formal 
lenders are not exclusively based on relational approaches but 
there are indications of loan officers gathering soft information 
from their relationships with customers (Uchida et al., 2012). 
 
There are other concepts like habits, norms and artefacts that 
serve as the constituents of culture. There are reflected in the 
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preconditions and relational constructs that surfaced within 
formal and informal lending. A stream of research recommends 
that relational exchanges or personalised transactions based on 
informal relationships— are a dominant strategy for firms 
situated in emerging economies (Boisot and Child, 1996; 
Johnson et al., 2002; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Peng and 
Heath, 1996). 
2.6 Trust 
The literature indicates “that informal lending is based on trust 
and relationships and it is experiential and culturally informed” 
(Fukuyama, 2002:32). For example, the coming together of 
individuals to form a cooperative society is analogous to the 
formation of a network for social capital reasons. The definition 
given to social capital encapsulates the concept of generalised 
trust. It provides access to membership in various types of 
networks, and permit acting within the norms of reciprocity. The 
attitudinal aspects of the concept, such as generalised 
interpersonal trust, are the most critical part of social capital 
(Rothstein and Stolle, 2017). The reason is that individuals can 
be members of networks that consist of untrustworthy agents, 
who play a destructive role in the spirit and the idea of trust. 
Thus, there is no logical reason why membership in networks 
per se should be a desired social value. Attitudes of generalised 
trust extend beyond the boundaries of face-to-face interaction 
and incorporate people who are not personally known to each 
other (Stolle and Rochon (2001).  This chiefly translates to 
informal lending relationships and may indirectly be related to 
formal lending, especially when formal financial lenders rely on 
informal financial lenders to allow access to their members. 
 
Some researchers pointed out that trust facilitates transactions 
among organisations by reducing transaction costs, such as 
45 
 
information searching, negotiation, monitoring and enforcing 
transactions. Similarly, the perception of partners' 
trustworthiness depends on the amount and accuracy of the 
information, the degree of cooperation and other factors 
associated with transaction costs (Liberti and Petersen , 2019). 
 
Transaction costs lean towards zero if the information provided 
is perfect and balanced among parties (North, 1990). North 
stated that "costliness of information is the key to the costs of 
transacting. This consists of the costs of measuring the valuable 
attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting 
rights and policing and enforcing agreement" (pg. 220). Various 
scholars interested in network relationships have recognised the 
knowledge dimension of networks and its link with competitive 
success (Baum et al., 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 2000; Nishiguchi, 1994). A key argument is 
that membership in a network and the resulting repeated and 
enduring exchange relationships have the potential for 
knowledge acquisition by the network members. Knowledge 
about each other's businesses can be shared, with information 
that would be helpful to businesses revealed over the course of 
such relationships. 
 
In his review, Portes (1998) identifies Pierre Bourdieu's (1986) 
analysis as the first systematic analysis of social capital. 
Bourdieu (1986:248) defined the concept as "the aggregate of 
the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession 
of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition". As the 
concept evolved, through the work by Coleman (1988), Burt 
(1997), and others, a consensus emerged that social capital 
represents the ability of players to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership in social networks or other social structures 
(Portes, 1998; Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993), 
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suggesting social capital to be an attribute of a social unit, rather 
than an individual. As a public good, social capital is available to 
and benefits not only those who create it but also group 
members at large (Kostova and Roth, 2003). Social capital was 
defined as the “aggregate of resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or organisation” (Inkpen and Tsang, 
2016). This definition accommodates both the private and public 
good perspectives of social capital (Inkpen and Tsang, 2016). 
From the social capital, various benefits, such as preferential 
knowledge access, may flow to the SMEs.  
 
Individual social capital originating from an individual's network 
of relationships can be distinguished from organisational social 
capital derived from an organisation's network of relationships. 
The former has the property of a private good, whereas the latter 
takes on the nature of a public good. With social capital as a 
public good, members of an organisation can tap into the 
resources derived from the organisation's network of 
relationships without necessarily participating in the 
development of those relationships (Kostova and Roth, 2003). 
These two levels of social capital are often interrelated. For 
example, a cooperative society leader or representative through 
his or her social relationships and personal connections can help 
his or her members set up a business relationship with another 
organisation. In this case, organisational social capital is created 
based on individual social capital. Equally, a business owner can 
link up with others to create a group, and the ensuing 
relationship will form the basis of social capital. Through this, 
values and goals are defined, guiding how rules are 
administered and how goals are attained in a manner that brings 




On the one side scholars  argue that variations in the amount 
and type of social capital can be explained primarily by societal-
centred approaches (Rothstein and Stolle, 2017). The capacity 
of a society to produce social capital among its citizens is 
determined by its long-term experience of social organisation, 
anchored in historical and cultural experiences that can be 
traced back over very long periods (Savage et al., 2012). The 
society-centred approach views regular social interaction, 
preferably through membership in voluntary associations, as the 
most critical mechanism for the generation of social capital.  
 
Following the "Tocquevillian tradition, formal and informal 
associations and networks are seen as creators of social capital 
because of their socialising effects on democratic and 
cooperative values and norms" (Newton, 1999). A second issue 
is that, even if the importance of voluntary membership is 
upheld, not all associations serve a normatively desirable 
purpose. Many groups are established to create distrust. An 
example was suggested by Alan Brinkley (2002), who refers to 
parochial communities that are not open to every member of the 
public but as an alternative to manifest and foster an inward-
looking and isolating culture. From such extreme cases, some 
voluntary associations may use their power, perhaps as 
producer organisations, to extract resources from society in a 
way that is similar to blackmailing others, giving unmerited or 
disproportionate advantages to their members to the loss of the 
rest of society (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003).  
 
The challenge of having good and bad relationships among 
group members surfaced in social capital research. It also 
promises new analyses to differentiate groups by the degree of 
face-to-face interaction members have with individuals unlike 
themselves. This distinction in social interaction has been 
labelled as bridging (contact with many dissimilar people) versus 
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bonding (contact with people like oneself) (Rothstein and Stolle, 
2008:445). The relationship between lenders to lenders and 
SMEs to SMEs may qualify as bonding, while the relationship 
between lenders and borrowers/SME may qualify as bridging. 
 
Social capital shapes the observance of the behaviour of fellow 
citizens, as institutional fairness sets the tone. The message of 
corrupt systems is, for instance, put in place to get what one 
needs without following the due process. Hence the individual 
agent will witness the use of corruption amongst fellow citizens 
and will feel obliged to engage in corrupt practices to get what 
they deem necessary in life. Studies are indicating that some 
state indirectly intervenes in the economy through the capital 
provision, favouritism, and participation in corporate governance 
(e.g., political appointments to upper echelons) (Boyer 2005; 
Kang and Moon, 2012; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014). This 
situation was referred to by Fainshmidt et al. (2018) as an 
indirect intervention in the private sector. For instance, according 
to Estrin et al. (2006), Russian oligarchs acquire their wealth, not 
as a result of their attainment of privatised means of production, 
but because Putin is the current president of Russia – enabled 
the accumulation of assets by these individuals. In many 
developing countries, corruption is rampant and often makes the 
state a vital actor in how organisations allocate resources. Those 
individual's businesses would continue to thrive as long as their 
relationships with those in power are intact. 
 
However, there can be no generalised trust in those who just 
take advantage of others and the system. Corrupt and unfair 
practices, for example, might lead to experiences of 
discrimination and injustice, thereby negatively influencing 
generalised trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008:456, Sønderskov 
and Dinesen, 2016:181). In lending, the existence of corrupt 
practices may put ineligible borrowers in a position of advantage 
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while honest borrowers may see their application rejected. 
Against this background, the rules of lending set out the 
procedures and conditions borrowers have to abide by to qualify 
for finance. This is a sort of structure: in the case of informal 
finance, qualification for finance is hinged on trust resulting from 
existing prior relationships.  
 
Meanwhile, in the case of formal finance, it is hinged on 
transactional or impersonal mechanisms. However, there is an 
element of trust in both. The loan officer of a bank may not be 
inclined to approve a borrower's loan application if he/she has 
doubts about the individual's integrity, even if all other 
preconditions have been met. An empirical explanation done in 
Sections 4.2.1 and 6.2.1, informed by participant's narratives, 
corroborates this line of argument. Where loan officers 
recommend worthy SMEs for a loan, this is done by drawing 
from information at their disposal based on what they know from 
various interactions and visits to SMEs places of business.  
 
2.7 How Institutions may influence Habits and Routine 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) conclude that institutions draw much 
from culture and creates expectations that determine 
appropriate actions for organisations. Also, the arrangement 
informs the judgement by which regulations, laws, and 
presumed behavioural prospects seem normal, natural and 
abiding (Zucker, 1987). An institution is defined as what is 
appropriate in an objective sense, and thus render other actions 
unacceptable or even beyond consideration (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991).  Institutional theory is thus concerned with 
regulatory, social, and cultural influences that promote survival 
and legitimacy of an organisation rather than focusing solely on 
efficiency-seeking behaviour (Roy, 1997). As Alan Wells 
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(1970:3) put it, "Social institutions form an element in a more 
general concept, known as social structure." The original 
institutional economists, in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen and 
John R. Commons, understood institutions as a distinct type of 
social structure with the potential to change agents, including 
changes to their purposes or preference. 
 
Granovetter (1985) emphasise that one of the classic questions 
of social theory is how behaviour and institutions are affected by 
social relations; the adoption of an institutional lens may help to 
unravel it. Institutions both constrain and enable behaviour. The 
existence of rules implies constraints. However, such a 
constraint can “open up possibilities: it may enable choices and 
actions that otherwise would not exist” (pg.481). For example, 
the rules of language allow us to communicate; traffic rules help 
traffic flow more easily and safely; the rule of law can increase 
personal safety. Regulation is not always the opposite of 
flexibility or freedom; it can be its enabler (Hodgson, 2006). It 
must either be written or verbal, and that make transmission 
possible. Language aids cognitive processes by serving as a 
reasonable basis for understanding (Mayer, 1977). 
 
In a continued changing human landscape, ‘humans’ are 
preoccupied to find ways to gain control of their lives. In doing 
that, they are continuously confronted with new challenges and 
problems that require a solution. North (2005) deduce that 
institutions become necessary to enable individuals to reduce 
the uncertainty or transform uncertainty into risk and enhance 
activities that bring about the development of new behaviours. 
In effect, Veblen agrees that continuous repetition of this 
enhancement activity is analogous to acquiring new habits, and 
behaviours occasioned by institutional dictation (Veblen, 
1909:186). There are layers within which an institution operates, 
such as higher and lower levels (Campbell, 1974b). Campbell 
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states that every single process that exists on the lower levels of 
hierarchy are curtailed and shaped in a manner harmonious with 
the laws of higher levels (pg. 180), equally in the agreement is 
Veblen (1899). Therefore, organisations' behaviour is a product 
of what has been fostered down to it by the institutional structure. 
This relates to the idea of downward causation. 
 
Kim (1992) view downward causation as the relationship 
between the whole and the functional parts. In other words, it is 
about a whole-part relationship. Chen (2010) queried this and 
labelled Kim's argument as invalid but instead favoured the 
relationship between levels. Similarly, Hodgson (2004) 
argument against the downward causation idea of Kim that her 
notion is weak and reducing higher-level influence  on individual 
behaviours alone.  According to Hodgson (2003:165), “all 
processes at the lower levels of an ontological hierarchy are 
restrained by and act in conformity to the laws of the higher 
levels”. While, a stronger idea, which can be explained as 
"reconstitutive downward causation," encompasses changes 
exerted on individuals as well as populations as a consequence 
of causal powers connected with higher levels (Hodgson, 2003, 
Sperry, 1991:230-1) also suggests a strong interpretation of 
downward causation. He recognises, for example, that "higher 
cultural and other acquired values have the power to control the 
more immediate, inherent humanitarian traits downwardly. 
The above disagreements do not nullify the downward impact of 
institutions on organisation and individual. Most of their 
argument is hinged on the fact that individuals and organisations  
influence higher-level constraints with variations through social 
actions, parliaments, and protests. The theory about strong 





According to Hodgson and Knudsen (2006:21) “through 
structuring, constraining, and enabling individual behaviour, 
institutions have the power to mould the capacities and 
behaviour of agents in fundamental ways”. For example, they 
could change aspirations instead of merely enabling or 
constraining them. Because institutions simultaneously depend 
upon the activities of individuals and constrain and mould them, 
through this positive feedback, they have strong self-reinforcing 
and self-perpetuating characteristics. Institutions are 
perpetuated not merely through the convenient coordination 
rules they offer; they are perpetuated because they confine and 
mould individual aspirations and create a foundation for their 
existence (pg.7). Hodgson (2006) describes and relates the 
foundation of the behavioural impact of the institution to routines 
and habit (Routines and habit are explained in section 2.8 and 
2.9).  
 
Hodgson (2007) opined that institutions are social structures that 
involve “reconstitutive downward causation ”, acting to some 
degree upon individual habits of thought and action, including 
organisational routines. Rules and structures imposed from the 
higher level will certainly influence lower levels of behaviour, and 
it will command adherence for the purpose of reward or sanction. 
In effect, the continuous adherence to those rules will 
automatically lead to the new acquisition of new habits or 
routines. Zollo and Winter (2002) asserted that organisations 
develop, stabilise, and follow routines over extended periods 
and adapt to a changing environment by reconfiguring routines, 
creating new ones and using them consistently across the 
organisation.  
 
The “general term for all regular and predictable behavioural 
patterns of firms is regarded as routine "(Nelson and Winter, 
1982:14). Cohen et al. (1996:684) define routines as "an 
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executable capability for repeated performance in some context 
that has been learned by an organisation in response to 
selective pressures". In essence, rules play a significant role in 
shaping the habit of players. This view was referred to as 
downward causation by Sperry (1969, 1976, and 1991). When 
confronted with the need to decide on a course of action, 
individuals consider their beliefs about the likely consequences 
of available alternatives (Hogdson,2004). As a result of these 
beliefs, outcomes formed by the attitudes toward a given 
behaviour, subjective norms concerning the behaviour, and 
perceived behavioural control, which influence behavioural 
intentions and actual behaviour are experienced.  
 
Cultural values as macro-level (societal) concepts and social 
beliefs as micro-level (individual) concepts, which are identical 
to the interactional psychology perspective, in which both 
individual factors and contextual factors combine to influence 
behaviour (O'Reilly et al., 1991). Although "the relationship 
between them is hard to understand" (Fu et al., 2004:285). 
Cultures are linked to beliefs. Literature specifies that stability is 
linked to values, as it is more of a long-lasting belief about what 
is essential (Sagie and Elizur, 1996). The individuals have both 
beliefs and values, nonetheless in Fu et al. (2004)'s paper, 
"social beliefs refer to those held by individuals, whereas cultural 
values are defined as 'cultural criteria or evaluative standards for 
judgment, not motives, beliefs, or attitudes of the individuals" 
(Hayden, 1988: 416). This has implications on how societies 
allocate resources and the quality of the rules that guides that 
process (Doingbusiness.org 2018). 
Also, SMEs operating within the Nigerian manufacturing sector 
may have to deal with those institutional pressures ingrained 
within their culture. Again, they have to influence what forms part 
of the relationship they share. No economic player could survive 
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in isolation, but by interacting and negotiating that relationship 
and making the best of it. Both formal and informal institutions 
define what is acceptable and discipline nonconforming 
behaviour, they allow individuals to form expectations about the 
actions and commitments of exchange partners, enable 
equilibrium practices to emerge (Greif, 1994), and support the 
conduct of exchanges (Redding, 2005). Thus, a social 
relationship defined by the institutional arrangement may lead to 
routine change and may present implications addressed in 
subsequent sections. 
2.8 Habits  
Hodgson (2010) explains that to understand the concept of a 
routine, it is essential to appreciate the idea of habit and instinct. 
For each individual, the capacity to ponder on something and 
make a choice depends on habits and instincts inherited 
respectively from nurture and nature. Moreover, there is 
evidence that unconscious brain activities precede an 
individual's thinking (Hodgson, 2010). These indicate "that our 
thoughts process are predisposed towards the choice outcome 
before we are aware of our decision, and show that unconscious 
mental dispositions have sequential priority over associated 
conscious deliberation and decisions" (Hodgson 2010: 2). This 
argument may have consequences on business, economics, 
and the social sciences (Hodgson, 2009). 
 
Often, humans repeatedly follow others' behaviour because of 
an instinctive or acquired disposition to conform (Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2006). Behaviour can also be formed by inducements 
or restrictions, providing motives to attain specific customs, 
follow a particular dressing convention and use specific linguistic 
terms (pg. 21). In following others, individuals develop the habits 
connected with these behaviours. “Behaviours are copied, and 
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also the habits giving rise to them are imitated” (Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2006:21). This is because habits are socially acquired, 
not genetically transmitted. In this respect, they are 
distinguished from instincts (pg.2). Instincts are blunt 
instruments to deal with changing, complex and unpredictable 
circumstances. Instincts are not static behaviours; they are 
dispositions that can often be suppressed or diverted 
(Robertson, 1978). Studies show that the expressions of feelings 
or dispositions depend on the social context. In some, 
circumstances, it can trigger inherited instincts such as fear, 
imitation or sexual arousal. Many of our characters and much of 
our behaviour are moulded after birth. The critical role of 
socialisation does not undermine the decisive role of instinct. 
Both instinct and habit are vital for the development of an 
individual. The work of socialisation can only begin  after the 
inherited dispositions had played their part. Visualising the 
manifestation of instinct cannot be experienced without the help 
of culture and socialisation. Instinctive behaviour and 
socialisation are not always rivals but often complements: they 
interact with one another. The degree to which SMEs are 
affected by their social circumstances is immense, but 
understanding the process would involve knowing more of the 
critical underlying concepts such as instinct and their role in 
social theory. 
 
Contextual triggers are required for instinct to be operational. 
Nonetheless, it can still be subjected to being suppressed or 
diverted. Comprehending “human behaviour may necessitate 
the understanding of the interplay between (inherited) instincts 
and (acquired) habits” (Hodgson, 2010:4). Outcomes cannot be 
explained only based on instincts (pg. 4). Therefore, “humans 
can acquire the capacity to develop habits alongside the 
development of the cultural apparatus that enable adaptive 
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solutions to problems of survival to be maintained and 
transferred” (Veblen, 1914:6-7; Richerson and Boyd, 2001). 
 
According to the philosopher James Dewey (1922), habit is the 
acquired predisposition to ways or forms of response. As 
Hodgson (2004) explains, “All skills, from the knowledge of 
finance through competence with languages to the ability to play 
a musical instrument, depend on habits”. As affirmed in recent 
research in cognitive psychology (Tulving and Schacter, 1990; 
Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994), habit is acquired through incentive 
or constraint. These can provide reasons for individuals to 
acquire specific customs, i.e. following a traffic convention and 
using specific linguistic terms (Hodgson, 2004:3).  To avoid the 
conceptual problems of an account-based mostly on 
intentionality, Hodgson (2006:8) suggests “that it is better to 
accept the foundational role of habit in sustaining rule-following 
behaviour”. It is from this point, he argues, that an alternative 
ontology of institutions and routines can be built. Before 
reviewing the evolutionary approach and the concept of routine 
as a replicator4, we turn first to work in cognitive psychology on 
habits. This helps to understand the relationship between habits 
and routines, how routines emerge and change and why they 
can be difficult to change.  
 
All habits comprise thoughts or mental activity, and thought is a 
form of behaviour (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010). For ease of 
understanding, habits expressed as visible behaviour can be 
referred to as corporeal habits and habits that are restricted to 
the mind as habits of thought (Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2010:137). Nonetheless, a change in habits of thought is less 
straightforward. Because they are unobservable, they cannot 
 
4 Replicator was defined by Hull (1988: 408) as “an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive 




replicate straightforwardly through imitation (pg. 80). 
Necessarily, habits do not replicate directly by making copies of 
themselves, unlike DNA or a computer virus, and they replicate 
indirectly using behavioural expressions (pg. 137). People 
imitate one another, and eventually, the copied behaviour 
becomes rooted in the habits of the person from whom they 
copied it from, thus transmitting an imperfect copy of the habit 
(pg. 80).  
 
It is noteworthy to state that an individual’s present habits of 
thought tend to persist indefinitely, except if  circumstances 
enforce a change (Veblen 1899). Literature suggests that habits 
and routines have strong inertial tendencies and stickiness 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Also, they argue that frequent 
directional changes may have an undermining effect on 
organisation survival. Therefore, an element of inertia was 
encouraged. Thus, as an organisation age, they slowly enhance 
their reliability with which routines are applied (Hannan and 
Freeman (1984). Inertia may have “distinct advantages over 
adaptive strategies where environments are uncertain, 
characterised by rapid change and where change is dramatic” 
(Wholey and Brittain, 1986: 523). Sculanski (1996) connects 
knowledge-related factors such as the recipient's lack of 
absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity, and difficult relationship 
between the source and the recipient to inertia (Sculanski, 
1996). For Collinson and Wilson (2006) and Huang et al. (2013) 
inertia is an outcome of inheriting previous processes, rules, 
norms and experience. This may translate to sticking to what is 
known without thinking or seeking a solution outside the box. 
 
Meanwhile, Peng (2003) and Chavance (2008) recognise that 
the inertia inherent in habits and suggested that institutional 
change does not have a mechanistic effect on entrepreneurial 
behaviour because of inertia. This could act as a behavioural 
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constraint in the face of institutional change. Stieglitz et al. 
(2016:1865) summarised that “inertia is a function of age”, “it 
may become a source of obsolescence relative to the demands 
of the firm's environment if it persists”. Also, Dollimore (2016) 
also corroborates the view on resistance to change inherent in 
habits and routines. Akunyumu et al. (2020) suggest that an 
organisation success is determined by innovation, but lack of 
readiness creates inertia. Nevertheless, despite the perceived 
inertia, characterising habits and routines, there have been 
arguments suggesting they are still susceptible to change. 
 
Current research in cognitive psychology demonstrates the 
possibility of change in habits and behaviour (Cohen and 
Bacdayan, 1994; Holland et al., 2006; Wood and Neal 2007; 
Zhao and Wang, 2020).  Other studies elaborate on how ongoing 
change is influenced by; firstly, past influences, historical 
scripting and mental models. Secondly, heritage, habits, 
learning and experience (Hodgson, 2000; 2001; Sugden, 1989; 
Zhao and Wang, 2020). Thirdly, beliefs and expected payoffs 
(Greif and Laitin, 2004; Axelrod, 1986); and lastly, societal rules 
at different levels (Ostrom 2000). Other scholars, for example, 
Veblen (1899), have suggested external factors concerning how 
change can occur. According to Veblen, for any change to be 
experienced, external coercion must be enforced.5 Borrowing 
from evolutional theory, an individual phenotype6  develops 
according to the instructions in its genotype7 and the influence 
of environmental conditions (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010). 
 
5 “The readjustment of  men’s habits of  thought to conform with the exigencies of  an altered 
situation is in any case made only tardily and reluctantly, and only under the coercion exercised 
by a stipulation which has made the accredited views untenable. The readjustment of  institutions 
and habitual views to an altered environment is made in response to pressure f rom without; it is 
of  the nature of  a response to stimulus” (Veblen, 1899:89).  
 
6 Phenotype is the actual character of an interactor, including its behavioural propensities and capabilities” 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006:4).  
 
7 Genotype is the genetic constitution of an organism. It is a biological example of the more general class of 
replicators, which includes genotypes and replicators at the social and other levels.  
59 
 
Hence, practically, interventions in the form of external influence 
from lenders, whom SMEs may have decided to approach for a 
loan may require them to implement specific changes. 
 
Wood and Neal (2009) in their research on cognitive psychology, 
highlighted the incentivising role of goal orientation. Depending 
on what strategy SMEs will be adopting, as determined by their 
goal orientation, an appropriate decision would have to be made. 
Some of the key factors that would influence SMEs choice in 
determining what strategy to adopt in manoeuvring and surviving 
their changing environment may include the cost associated with 
the decision to be chosen; such as the opportunity cost, 
associated benefits, the risks associated with the different 
alternative courses of actions. 
 
This study acknowledges that routines are not the only things 
governing organisational choices. In explaining an alternative 
basis for organisational choices, the theory of demand and 
supply can be borrowed.  The theory was developed by Adam 
Smith. He opined that when the cost of purchasing a product 
increases, the demand for that product (except for a few 
incomprehensible circumstances) decreases and vice versa. 
Furthermore, when deciding to obtain a loan, a prospective 
borrower should have different options to consider. These 
options may include alternatives or substitutes. In terms of 
lending, a substitute or alternative to borrowing from a formal 
lender is to obtain such loan from an informal lender. Each of 
these lenders has conditions that may be considered either 
stringent or generous by a borrower. If the conditions are 
stringent, it may indicate it is costly and hard to obtain, but if it is 
generous, it may indicate it is less costly and easier to obtain. A 
rational borrower would be more inclined to go with the lender 




Based on the context of this study, i.e., focussed on finance, and 
its attendant preconditions, SMEs would be faced with decisions 
about what loan and which lender to approach. Also, factors 
such as costs, risks, penalties, and possible benefits attached to 
the lending options may have to be considered. Thus, the 
accruable benefits such as loan size, how easy to meet the 
preconditions, amongst others, would serve as incentives. 
While, high interest, risks of rejection may serve as 
disincentives. Furthermore, suppose the cost of putting things in 
place outweighs the expected benefit. In that case, this may 
influence prospective SMEs in deciding which loan source, i.e. 
formal or informal lender they may patronise. 
 
This would prompt necessary decisions to be made, and such 
decisions could lead them to lenders, who would subject them 
to certain preconditions. The subjection to loan preconditions is 
necessitated by the regulations/regulators who have oversight 
on lenders activities. Both regulators and lenders are external to 
the SME, and their influence is crucial to lending. Without 
complying with such preconditions of loans, the possibility of 
obtaining access will be zero. Hence, SMEs would have no 
choice but to comply to become a beneficiary of such loans. The 
attendant implication(s) of such compliance to various types of 
lenders may have an effect on routines and subsequently may 
influence the way SMEs operates. This does not mean they 
wanted to deliberately change their routines, but based on this 
study's outcome, change of routine becomes inevitable as it is 
more like a by-product of adherence to preconditions of loan. In 
other words, one could deduce that routine change is triggered 
by external pressures. 
 
To corroborate the higher level versus lower level influence, 
Dollimore (2016) findings show that external triggers play a 
significant role in shaping the routines of founders of the 
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business. Her finding reveals variation in founders’ capacity to 
change habits of thought and negotiate new routines, which she 
linked to their experience and capacity for self -awareness. This 
is consistent with research in cognitive psychology interventions 
that discuss how altered “environments and environmental 
‘triggers’ or ‘cues’ can bring about altered behavioural outcome” 
(Kilpinen, 1999; Lipsey et al., 2005)  
 
To evolutionary economists, habits are the fundamental 
individual-level building blocks of which organisational routines 
are comprised and from where they emerge (Knudsen, 2008). 
Habits relate to individuals, whereas routines relate to groups or 
organisations (Cohen et al., 1996; Dosi et al., 2000). Individuals 
have habits; groups have routines. Routines are the 
organisational analogue of habits. However, routines do not 
merely denote habits that are common to individuals in an 
organisation. If this were the case, there would be no need for 
the additional concept of a routine. “Routines are not analogous 
to habits only, but they are organisational meta-habits, existing 
on a substrate of habituated individuals in a social structure” 
(Hodgson, 2004). Routines are one ontological step ahead of 
habits (pg.3). At this juncture, having explained the concept of 
habit, it is logical to proceed to the concept of a routine. 
However, before doing so, determining the definition that would 
guide this study is essential. Hence, this study will adopt the 
definition indicated below.  
 
A habit is a disposition to engage in previously 
adopted or acquired behaviour (including patterns of 
thought) that is triggered by appropriate stimulus or 
context. This is because habits are influenced by prior 
activity and have durable, self-sustaining qualities 




Going by the definition, Habits are dispositions rather than 
expressed behaviour. If we acquire a habit, we do not 
necessarily use it all the time. It is a propensity to behave in a 
particular way based on the situation at hand. 
 
In Darwin’s Conjecture (2010), Hodgson and Knudsen set out 
the meta-theoretical framework of Generalised Darwinism (GD) 
and the generalisable terms for the concepts of routines and 
organisations, namely replicator and interactor8.  As a 
foundational information-carrying entity, in the modern 
evolutionary perspective, habits are conceived as elementary 
social replicators9 (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010).  
 
The idea of GD provides a “framework in which particular (non-
universal) evolutionary patterns and mechanisms can readily be 
considered” (Aldrich et al., 2008:11). The adoption of GD should 
not be confused with the assumption that the proposition that the 
detailed mechanisms of social and biological evolution are the 
same. Thus, the idea of generalising Darwinism depends on a 
degree of ontological commonality is at a highly abstract level 
(pg. 13). This “commonality is apprehended by the broad idea of 
a complex population system and the formulation of a highly 
general concept of selection and replication (pg. 13). In social 
and biological domain, these core Darwinian principles are not 
sufficient, but they are not invalid (pg. 15). Additionally, with the 
complexity characterising population systems in both nature and 
society, a generalised Darwinism is the only over-arching 
framework that can be used as it allows explanations to be 
provided to understand evolution in complex systems (Blute, 
1997; Hodgson, 2001). In any case, using the GD framework 
 
8 Interactors are defined as an entity that directly interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way 
that this interaction causes replication to be differential‟ (Hull , 1988:408). 
Social replicators, “are not inherited biologically, which act as stores of social dispositions, rules, and knowledge, and 
which can guide the development of human patterns of behaviour and social structures, depending on the overall 




does not mean overlooking the differences in mechanisms of 
evolution in biology and society; however sufficient explanations 
of the particular mechanisms that occur in specific cases is 
required ((Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006:15).  
 
In line with GD, “Darwinian principles, for instance; variation, 
inheritance and selection are appropriate to complete social and 
business-related explanations” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2006a:6). Importantly, entities are presumed to possess some 
capacity to “retain and transfer on to other practical solutions to 
complications they face in the everyday struggle (Aldrich et al., 
2008). The advantages of retaining such problem solutions or 
adaptations are obvious in avoiding the risks and costs of 
learning them anew (Aldrich et al., 2008). They assume that the 
entities possess some capacity to pass on to others information 
about such workable solutions, providing the foundation for a 
trans-generational cumulative growth of problem-solving 
knowledge” (pg. 5). Business organisations can be “referred to 
as social interactors10, and individual habits and organisational 
routines can be referred to as replicators” (Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2010:86).  
As in biology, replicators and interactors play a role also in the 
evolution of socio-economic systems. Replicators are 
mechanisms carrying a “set of encoded instruction that is passed 
on to the next generation by more or less copying exactly or by 
reproduction” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2007: 356). In biology, 
DNA and genes are the adaptive mechanisms by which adaptive 
solutions are copied or passed on (Hodgson and 
Knudsen,2006:5). Similarly, in a socio-economic context, habits 






duplicate and transmit the adaptive answers (Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2010). 
 
Prior to Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), Cohen and Bacdayan  
(1994) explained the role of memory in the routine change 
process, by borrowing from cognitive psychology. The latter 
study distinguished cognitive psychology between procedural 
and other, more cognitive forms of memory, such as semantic, 
episodic or declarative memory. The domain of procedural 
memory is behaviour, whereas that of semantic and episodic 
memory is cognition or thought. Their work helps us to 
understand how routines work by allowing us to consider how 
any tacit or other information associated with a routine is 
preserved and replicated. Cognitive memory systems have the 
capability of modelling the external world – that is, of storing 
representations of objects, events, and relations among them. In 
contrast, procedural memory does not have this capacity. Past 
events and stimuli trigger procedural memory, leading to 
behavioural responses, which has a major tacit component. 
“Procedural knowledge is less subject to decay, less explicitly 
accessible, and less easy to transfer to novel circumstances” 
(Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994:557). 
 
Routines depend upon a structured group of individuals, each 
with habits of a particular kind, where many of these habits 
depend upon procedural memory (Hodgson, 2007:110). The 
behavioural cues by some members of a structured assembly of 
habituated individuals trigger specific habits in others (pg. 110). 
Hence, the organisation or group offers a structured social and 
physical environment for each individual, including rules and 
norms of behaviour, in an unambiguous and informal form 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010). This environment consists of 
other individuals, the “association between them and the 
physical artefacts and technological artefacts that they may 
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employ in their discussions and dealings” (Hodgson , 2007:111). 
On the one hand, the environment - either social or physical 
enables, stimulates and channels individual activities. On the 
other hand, it helps trigger the behaviour of others, produce or 
modify some artefacts, and help to change or replicate parts of 
the social and physical environment (Hodgson, 2007). 
 
The explanation above may help in understanding the genotypic 
or phenotypic status of a routine. Phenotypic development is a 
product of both the genotype and the environment. The 
environment in which the SMEs in this study operate, comprise 
of regulators, lenders, and other SMEs. The change that any 
SME would experience will be determined by the habits of the 
managers/owners and the environment in which they domicile.  
 
In this study, rules about lending will be formulated by regulators 
and passed on to lenders to administer. This represents the 
environment side of things. The intrinsic side of things, for 
example, involves genotype (in biological term), which is 
analogous to routine are the host to the instruction carried in the 
memory of the replicating individual, such as SME owner or 
manager. These people may have existing knowledge of 
solutions to current challenges. Otherwise, it is their 
responsibility to seek the right information dependent on their 
mindset, past experience, level of education and access to 
information.  
 
If an SME owner is knowledgeable about the rules guiding 
borrowing, the knowledge on its own is abstract, until an actual 
step is taken to operationalise it. The phenotypical side of things 
is visible when the habits manifest or become operationalised. 
This is what (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010:137), referred to as “ 
corporeal habits, which is expressed as visible behaviour”. For 
instance, knowing (knowledge) that a business must be audited 
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annually is abstract. The acquisition of the knowledge and the 
willingness of the actor i.e. SME owner may be interpreted as 
disposition, which is more of an abstraction. The disposition is 
synonymous with the concept of the habit of thought. This can 
become operationalised when the individual puts in the right 
effort by including it as part of the firm’s policies and produce an 
audit report for onward submission to regulators when required. 
This is an example of how a habit is operationalised. 
Furthermore, when such activity is being practised by a group of 
employees, who work together periodically to carry out the 
auditing task for the whole organisation, by making the 
necessary contribution, i.e. providing records, collating data, 
verifying figures, filling receipts. Then auditing would be said to 
be a behaviour.  
 
Habits of thoughts are invisible. Dollimore (2016) reported 
marked variation in the capacity of entrepreneur to change 
habits of thought and negotiate new routine. This is because 
individuals such as managers and business owners are vested 
with decision-making responsibilities. The extent of their 
knowledge would determine the nature and extent of adaptation  
of their organisation experiences. This is in line with a recent 
study in psychology on cognitive interventions, where the 
business success of managers are associated with their 
awareness and readiness to change mind-set (Tushman et 
al.,2011). In most businesses, founders or business owners may 
have the disposition towards acting in a certain way. In line with 
the explanation in the preceding paragraph, disposition 
becomes routine when the knowledge has been passed on to 
members of the organisation. Hence, this resonates with habits 
and routines as replicators because they preserve and transmit 
social roles, interpretations, attitudes, knowledge, and skills and 
act as the relatively durable substrate of all beliefs and 




Also, Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), argue that the traits of an 
entity develop according to the instructions in its replicator and 
the influence of environmental conditions. The instructions for a 
character can be entirely open-ended, allowing multiple 
conditional responses or a gradual fixation through learning 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006:27). A social relationship can 
qualify as a vehicle through which a new routine is learnt, 
transmitted or diffused.  For instance, SME operations involve 
interaction between different units within the context of the 
organisational goals.  
 
The importance of habits and routines cannot be 
overemphasised. Scholars such as Penrose (1959), Nelson and 
Winter (2002) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) in evolutionary 
economics, describe routine as a replicating entity. Hodgson 
(2006) and Felin et al. (2012) broke routine down to its micro 
foundational basis connecting it to habits, behaviour and notion 
of dispositions. From an evolutionary perspective, “through the 
intertwined mechanisms of variation, selection and information 
transfer (inheritance) they both sustain and transform the 
organisations of which they are a part and come to explain the 
diversity of the industry to which they belong”. (Dollimore, 
2016:3). 
 
Cohen and Backdayn (1994) proposed that routine enables the 
capacity to transfer knowledge and absorb capabilities. As 
captured in various definitions, they are the mechanism by which 
organisations can change, adapt, and maintain stability over 
time (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 
Becker et al., 2005; Pentland et al., 2012). They are referred to 
as managerial and organisational processes, the way things are 
done in the firm, or patterns of present practice and learning. 
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Learning may be synonymous with the transfer of knowledge. 
Similarly, as noted by Feldman, and Pentland (2003), it aids the 
dynamism of capability due to its flexible nature. A point also 
observed by Dollimore (2016) who showed a link between 
routine flexibility and cognitive. 
2.9 Routine Change 
Before discussing the different types of routine change, this 
section will begin with a review of the nature of routines and the 
definition adopted here.  
 
Most scholars consistently treat routine as an organisational 
capacity and generative structure (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Zollo and Winter 2002), analogous to biological genes or 
computer programs, but having distinctive features of their own 
(Hodgson, 2004). Another useful description of a routine as a 
potentiality or capability, rather than behaviour, is found in the 
discussion in Cohen et al. (1996:683). “A routine is an 
executable capability for repeated performance in some context 
that an entity has learnt in response to selective pressures”. 
Again, this points to the importance of distinguishing between 
capacity or disposition, on the one hand, and behaviour on the 
other. Capacity is the ability to operationalise a task, while 
disposition is the willingness to act towards something. 
Literature suggests that human behaviour has an observable 
pattern of routines. However, Cohen (2007:775) argues that 
routines are not observable. But rather an active disposition and 
as “an acquired propensity or disposition, which may or may not 
be actually expressed in current behaviour” (Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2004:286). Hodgson (2008), defines routines not as 
behaviour but as dispositions. In his view, "a routine is a 
generative structure or capacity within an organisation. 
Furthermore, routines are organisational dispositions to 
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energise conditional patterns of behaviour within an 
organisational group of individuals, involving sequential 
responses to cues" (Hodgson, 2008:25). At the same time, other 
scholars have focused on the interpretation of routines as actual 
patterns of behaviour (Iannacci and Resca, 2021; Gersick and 
Hackman, 1990). 
 
Therefore, literature is inundated with several definitions of 
routines. To ensure the elimination of confusion, as stated above 
this study will adopt Hodgson ’s (2009) view of routines as 
capacities or propensities. This is because routines are 
organisational dispositions to energise conditional patterns of 
behaviour within an organised group of individuals, involving 
sequential responses to cues (Hodgson, 2007). This is a 
process that may involve the disposition of top managers or 
owners to act in a particular direction for the betterment of their 
organisation. 
 
Also, this corresponds with Pentland and Feldman’s (2008) 
ostensive aspect of the routine, which they note makes routines 
challenging to observe, distinguish, compare and count. This 
study does not attempt to observe routines but instead relies on 
the narratives of SME owners who discuss their thinking, habits 
and experience of routine change.” Becker et al. (2005) and 
Pentland and Feldman (2005a) submission underlie the 
invaluable value of routines to change within an organisation.  
 
Nelson and Winter (1982) illuminated the importance of routine; 
they describe it as a unit of analysis, a pattern of action, DNA of 
organisation, and adaptation enabler. Cohen et al. (1996) 
describe routines as “an implementable competence for 
repetitive performance in some context that has been learned by 
an organisation in reaction to selective pressures”. Feldman and 
Pentland (2003) view it as a source of flexibility and change, and 
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repetitive, recognisable patterns of interdependent actions 
carried out by multiple actors. According to Feldman (2000), the 
disposition of individuals within an organisation will determine 
their attitudes toward routine change. The evaluation of various 
options would be required, guided by specific criteria in decision 
making. In rational terms, options that fulfil the right criteria and 
bring the desired value might be the choice for managers.  
 
Winter (1995:149-50) distinguishes between a ‘‘routine in 
operation at a particular location, as a network of coordinating 
relationships connecting specific resources” and the ‘routine per 
se, which is the abstract activity pattern ’’. Nevertheless, the term 
routine cannot apply to both the web of coordinating 
relationships and the activity pattern that is the outcome of the 
coordinating structure and its environmental triggers; it cannot 
usefully denote both potentiality and actuality (Hodgson, 2004). 
It has to denote one or the other, but not both (Hodgson, 2004).  
 
From various definitions provided on a routine by different 
scholars, it is evident that changing of routines is believed by 
some as difficult (Szulanski, 1996; Szulanski and Jensen, 2004 
and Hannan and Freeman (1984, 1989) are key supporters of 
the opinion that the capacity for organisation routines to change 
is somewhat limited. They argued that changes in routines 
population within an environment is a product of the need to 
survive or extermination of specific organisations and the 
consequence of persistence or exit of the routines they convey, 
rather than through alterations in the routines themselves. 
Jensen and Szulanski (2004) suggest that the stickiness and the 
inertia tendencies (Zhao and Wang, 2020) characterising 
routines may explain why organisation routines persist, leading 
to failures of many organisations. They further argue that if 
routines cannot be changed, there should be room or 
opportunity for it to be replaced. This is because routines, not yet 
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in place, maybe introduced if that will delay or prevent the 
extinction of an organisation.  
 
Changes in routine can take different forms. Firstly, changing a 
routine by operating (possibly dormant) routine X instead of 
former routine Y. Adoption of a dormant routine is possible in 
some cases, as reflected from narratives. This is similar to a 
partial routine change. This may occur when the routine in 
question is not practised. Some registered businesses, instead 
of paying taxes regularly either do it once or manipulate their 
statements to reflect tax payments. This routine could be 
considered a dormant one because it is not being practised in 
reality. For example, having a bank account is one of the 
prerequisites for a loan from a formal lender. This could be the 
case whereby a borrower has a bank account, but funds from 
business transactions are not regularly paid into this account. 
Another instance is when funds are deposited, but they include 
other income from different sources and withdrawals are made 
for other non-commercial purposes. This shows a situation 
where there is no demarcation between business and personal 
funds.  The need to adhere to loan preconditions for the present 
or future requirement encourages SMEs to become more 
meticulous, organised, and mindful of how they manage their 
business account. This is essential because audited financial 
statements are required for DFI loans. Also, it could imply that 
they must present an account that is solely for business 
purposes. The importance of getting it right cannot be over 
emphasised because every figure is likely to be scrutinised. 
During this process, if a questionable transaction is found on the 
statement, the consequence might be a rejection of the loan 
application.  
 
The second meaning of routine change relates to changes to a 
particular existing routine. This involves improving an existing 
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routine, e.g., bookkeeping. Reasonable and generally accepted 
bookkeeping follows standard bookkeeping principles. In some 
cases, the borrower adheres to those principles but in a manual 
version, which might lead to delays in preparing reports. For 
operational efficiency and/or presentational reasons, some 
changes could be made, e.g., changing from physical 
bookkeeping to electronic bookkeeping. This might result in 
having neatly and standard produced reports, that could easily 
be presented to lenders when seeking a loan.  
 
Lastly, routine change could occur when developing and 
operating an entirely new routine. This could occur if an SME 
that is serious about getting access to formal loans, is not 
keeping records at all. Thus, it has to commence the practice of 
record keeping. Whatever be the case, all the different types of 
changes could be described as “routine change” because it does 
not occur if there are no trigger(s) that prompt any such 
change(s). 
 
Baum and Singh (1994:4), “classify routines as hereditary 
entities that pass on their information largely intact in successive 
replications and that is concerned with the conservation and 
transfer of production and organising skills and knowledge". 
Nonetheless, these entities are influenced by a variety of factors 
in the organisational context. Routines are affected by changes 
in jobs and changes in the incumbents of these jobs and by the 
ideas and mistakes of these incumbents (pg. 4).   
 
From the above, in most cases averting or managing a particular 
unfavourable occurrence or impending doom may prompt 
routines to change. Burgelman (1994) suggests the various 
source of change in organisational routines. He illustrates the 
evolution of the product mix at Intel due to mid-level managers 
following internal rules, rather than decisions taken by top-level 
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management. Echoing Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) on 
knowledge creation that change in organisations does not simply 
consist of responses to the external environment, but also 
consists of internally generated knowledge. New beginnings and 
a period of significant transitions were argued by (Feldman, 
2003) as providing the window of opportunity to change. In a 
similar approach, the points of view offered in this research add 
to the routines literature by simultaneously focusing on the role 
of external influence caused by formal and informal lending 
rules. In the process of adhering to those rules, there may be a 
likelihood of change in routine and growth. 
 
Sociologists have long documented the complex ways that rule 
influences organisational action (Dobbin et al., 1988; Fligstein, 
1990; Powell, 1996; Edelman and Suchman, 1997; Heimer and 
Staffen, 1998; Scott, 2001). Top managers in organisations may 
adopt new formal programs to signal compliance to external 
audiences but decouple these formal programs from everyday 
work practice (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Silbey, 1984; Oliver, 1991; Sauder and Espeland, 2012; 
Scott, 2008). This usually takes place when the status quo is 
deemed favourable. Sometimes regulations run counter to the 
interests of influential organisation members (Edelman, 1990), 
and often regulations provide only ambiguous criteria to identify 
compliance (Silbey, 1981). Similarly, in Dietz et al. (2003) 
financial instruments were mentioned as incentives to trigger 
change due to compliance with environmental rules, although 
the context of their argument was based on the environmental 
rule. However, a rule is a rule irrespective of context.  
 
Equally, Ilegbinosa and Jumbo (2015) argue that compliance 
with regulations is a trigger that could lead to organisational 
change. The way the trigger influences SMEs might vary. For 
instance, small businesses are at a disadvantage with respect 
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to large enterprises. This is due to “high compliance costs, that 
can exacerbate the resources and cash-flow constraints often 
experienced in the early stages of business development and 
may act as a deterrent to seeking a loan from formal financial 
lenders and thus may hinder the adaptation or renewal of 
existing processes” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 2018:7). D’Adderio (2008) acknowledges the 
role of human interference in a rule-following context. He 
emphasised their influence and scope in framing11 standard 
operating procedures (SOPs), templates and other forms of 
rules.  
 
Daft and Weick (1984) stipulate that human actors can always 
apply discretion in interpreting the rule or procedure and assign 
meanings. According to Spender (1989), the inherent flexibility 
and adaptability of human practices implies that rules may 
attempt to guide organisational behaviour in a manner in which 
goals and purposes can be achieved and ultimately decide 
whether, how and when to abide by, sidestep, or altogether 
reject them. Flexibility in disposition is analogous to the work on 
cognitive dexterity. This signals the extent of flexibility inherent 
in the dispositions of SMEs. Some SMEs might be more inclined 
to informal lending, while some are more disposed to formal 
lending, while some are disposed to both. Their dispositions are 
grounded in past experiences, i.e. past work-related exposure, 
and education. Dollimore (2016) maintains that there is a strong 
link between cognitive dexterity and successful 
entrepreneurship performance. Similarly, any decision adopted 
(either to accept or reject a specific) set of habits/routines would 
attract consequences. Therefore, SMEs might perform better if 
 
11 Framing is often describe as a rationalist, cognitivist or mechanistic view (Tsoukas, 1996), which focuses on 
power of objective structures to define, prescribe and shape actions. It is commonly used in AI, computer science 
and positivist management literature (Taylor, 1911). 
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they are flexible enough to move between lenders or to 
accommodate both. 
 
Also, most compliance theorists argue that regulatees’ 
responses as purposeful action, considered as a satisfactory 
approximation for actual action processes (Etienne, 2010). The 
best-known example of studies to address this problem is the 
study conducted by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). They combine 
rational choice theory (game theory) with an ‘idealist’ theory of 
empowerment, predicting that norm internalisation in trust 
relations would overcome temptations to defect. This 
compromise between ‘a logic of appropriateness’ and logic of 
consequences’ (Mitchell, 2007) is typical of many significant 
contributions to the regulation literature (Gunningham and 
Grabosky, 1998; Kagan and Scholz, 1984). Disposition to 
adherence may not be far off from rationalism. As the expected 
benefit accruable as a result of compliance to loan preconditions 
may be one of the key reasons SMEs would comply. 
 
Also, Beck and Levine (2005) demonstrated that law could play 
an important role in guiding and transforming the informal credit 
market into a semi-formal or formal financial system. Also, they 
deduced that a lack of a proper legal framework that fits the 
reality on the ground is a menace to the economy. In a bid to 
survive, every business, irrespective of size, interacts with its 
environment. The decision to receive a loan is based on a need 
identified, and compliance/adherence is a means to that end. 
This is analogous to the rational theory. 
 
Within this environment, there are forces, and any SMEs 
desirous of survival must be adaptable to enhance and sustain 
their competitive advantage. Some studies refer to the response 
as the process of adaptation or alignment. Hamel and Prahalad 
(1993) opined that alignment is a dynamic process that 
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inevitably stretches resources and capabilities from time to time. 
As the alignment shifts over time, a firm must be capable of 
reinterpreting its environment and incorporating its 
understanding into new products, processes, strategy, and 
structure. According to Boisot and Li (2005) contend that a firm 
may respond in a rational and predictable way to market forces 
(Boisot and Li, 2005).  This is aimed at surviving the competitive 
processes of selection. Thus, rational firms placed in similar 
positions would respond in similar ways (Porter, 1980). Some of 
the factors in a business environment include regulation, which 
comes under the economic factor (Grant and Jordan, 2015). 
Changes may likely occur when responding to forces in a 
business environment. 
 
Change occurs when learning has taken place. Learning begins 
when individuals discover that the status quo will not deliver a 
desirable outcome (Hodgson, 1998). Organisational learning 
“involves a process of inquiry, reflection and evaluation in which 
the model is revised and becomes embedded in the regular 
practices of the organisation” (Hodgson, 1998:190). Similarly, 
borrowers would research, reflect, and evaluate various loan 
preconditions and explore how best their organisations can 
adapt/adopt them in a manner that guarantees access to loans.  
 
According to Lant et al. (1992:603) “organisational learning is a 
complex process and with no room for trial and error, which  is 
often emphasised in the organisational learning literature”. Barr, 
Stimpert and Huff (1992) delve more deeply into the cognitive 
processes of organisational learning. They found that “the 
process of strategic renewal at the railroads they studied ‘was 
more complex than the two-tiered models of organisation 
learning (single-loop and double-loop) usually found in the 
management literature” (pg. 32). They concluded that “renewal 
hinges not so much on noticing new conditions, but on being 
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able to link environmental change to corporate strategy and to 
modify that linkage over time’’ (pg. 15). Their research suggests 
the need for a more in-depth model of the organisational learning 
process to understand how interpretation affects strategy 
changes.  
 
Learning is key to routine change, and the knowledge developed 
resides in the organisation memory. Argote and Ingram (2000) 
argue that the receiving organisation should strive for flexibility 
to usefully absorb and accommodate new routine. This is similar 
to absorptive capacity or dynamic capability, which touches on 
how knowledge is retained and sourced within and outside 
organisational boundaries (Teece, 2012).   
 
According to the framework of McGrath and Argote knowledge 
is embedded in three basic elements of organisations—
members, tools, and tasks. Members are the human 
components of organisations. Tools, including both hardware 
and software, are the technological component. Tasks reflect the 
organisation’s goals, intentions, and purposes (Argote and 
Ingram, 2000). Knowledge forms part of the experience that may 
inform future decision making and aid the competitive advantage 
of firms. 
  
Likewise, in the field of strategy, the Resource-Based View 
(RBV) claims that competitive advantage originated inside the 
firm. It takes the form of valuable, rare, hard to imitate, and 
heterogeneous resources it had accumulated over time in path -
dependent ways (Barney, 1986a, 1986b, 1991; Peteraf, 1993, 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Drawing from the resource-based view, firms 
were not just products of their external conditions. Instead, they 
are a product of the historical and path-dependent choices made 
by their managers, which allows them to be intrinsically different 
from each other (Penrose, 1959, Child, 1972, Porter, 1991). 
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Thus, the choices made would be aided by their knowledge, 
which is determined by their lived experiences. 
 
What makes an organisation unique is the manager’s ability to 
adapt faster than others to achieve a better fit between changing 
situations and their understanding (Boisot and Li, 2005). By 
implication, “the cognitive activities of codification and 
abstraction must be kept plastic and flexible” (pg. 326). At each 
point, an SME owner or manager would draw on their past 
experiences to determine which source of financing is most 
suitable and relevant to the overall goal of the company. 
Individuals have “memory accumulated over the years in the 
form of knowledge that is either embodied in habits, routines, 
behaviours and physical skills or representations – in both 
cases, a by-product of activity” (pg. 326). Moreover, they can 
rely on it for future application. Therefore, determining what is 
suitable and relevant to contemporary issues hinge on past 
knowledge and experience.  
 
Teece et al. (1997) propound that learning processes are 
intrinsically “collective and can occur not only through the 
imitation and emulation of individuals, as with teacher-student or 
master-apprentice but also through joint contributions to the 
understanding of the complex problem”. Learning requires 
standard codes of communication and harmonised search 
procedures. The organisational knowledge generated by such 
activity resides in new patterns of activity, in 'routines,' or a new 
logic of organisation (pg.520). As indicated earlier, routines are 
patterns of interactions that signify successful solutions to 
particular problems. The movement of employee inter and intra-
organisation enabled social interactions and at the same time, 




Routine change is usually necessitated by various factors. As 
emphasised above, sometimes it is as a result of laws or rules 
that emanate from a third organisation, such as the state, or an 
association of employers (Hodgson, 2004). Oliveira and Quinn 
(2015) recognise rules, specifically formal rules, as cognitive 
structures of human actors, which they suggest underlies and 
may precede routines. Rules can act as an external trigger in the 
form of loan preconditions emanating from lenders to SMEs, and 
the SMEs will have to adhere to reap the benefit accruable, i.e. 
access to a loan. SMEs adherence to rules would start from the 
point where understanding is established. SMEs are not 
expected to adhere to a rule they do not understand. 
Understanding is analogous to learning, and learning must have 
taken place within a social context. Adopting a modern 
evolutionary approach would make this analogy easier to 
comprehend. This is because the learning that takes place 
between the point of adherence and the point when SMEs first 
heard about the rules must have involved some level of 
interaction.  
 
Habits and routines are conceived as social replicators, and their 
transmission and adaptation are accomplished through the 
process of variation and selective retention (Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2010; Dollimore, 2014a, 2014b). The role individual 
SME owners may adopt may include employing new employee 
with skillset relevant to the dictates of the requirement for a loan. 
As SMEs adhere to these conditions, their way of doing things 
will be affected, for example, bookkeeping (Adebayo, 2003). 
When this is done, the record-keeping routine would have been 
noted to be changed - mirroring good practice. Another general 
example is driving. When there is a new skill, it will be evident in 
practice. For example, someone who has learnt how to drive 




In line with behavioural research, people are generally thought 
to be effective in pursuing their goals, particularly when they 
have incentives and opportunities to learn from experience. It 
seems reasonable to describe choice as a utility maximisation 
process (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986:273). Borrowing from 
rational theory, an individual will evaluate, adapt and select the 
best option based on what is deemed beneficial. Knowing what 
will bring the best benefit will be determined partly by experience 
and current knowledge. This is possible because, according to 
MacDonald (2003), SMEs know and understand what is 
expected of them. 
 
Similarly, in the context of seeking finance, SMEs may have to 
change their routine in line with the dictates of the lenders. 
Lenders operate within the ambit of formal and informal rules, 
and that defines the relationship they have with other economic 
players such as SMEs. Like other social, institutionalised 
structures, rules can constrain and enable organisational 
behaviours (Fuller et al., 2000), and thus new organisational 
routines emergence. This argument explains the influences 
exerted by the institutional environment and how it relates to 
routine change.  
 
The rules emanating from the higher-level authorities are 
coercive because they comprise of prescriptions that are made 
mandatory by sanctions. Routines provide directions for what to 
do and how to do it (the cognitive dimension). March and Simon 
(1958) first shown that routines (which they referred to as 
“programs”) enhance efficiency through recurring experience. 
There will be an “increase in efficiency when players know which 
activities need to be performed (process) and what output has 
to be attained” (March and Simon, 1958:32). This is analogous 
to learning and knowledge of what is required for a specific goal 
to be attained by applying the right action for its completion. The 
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owners or managers of an SME may have to copy the template 
based on their understanding of the loan preconditions and 
compare available options, i.e. formal financial lenders and 
informal financial lenders. 
 
The work of Miner (1987, 1990, and 1991) and Burgelman 
(1994), however, suggest that policy or rule changes may simply 
be the codification of changes that are already made. Just as 
words are introduced to the dictionary after they have been in 
use for a period of time. Rules or policies may codify changes as 
much as they make them. Pentland and Rueter (1994:48) 
extended the research in routine by observing that routine 
change requires deliberate efforts and new accomplishments. At 
the same time, Feldman (2003) argue that they are not finished 
product but ongoing activities, designating routines as emergent 
accomplishments. Previous observations point to the event that 
is external and can influence the internal activities of 
organisations. This can lead to changes within the organisation, 
such as introducing new technology and changes in how certain 
activities are performed.  
 
The organisation structure is viewed as an adaptive vehicle, 
which is shaped in reaction to the characteristics and 
commitments of participants as well as to influences and 
constraints from the external environment (Miner, 1987). The 
adaptive process is referred to as institutionalisation: "In what is 
perhaps its most significant meaning, “to institutionalise is to 
infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task 
at hand” (Selznick, 1957: 17). Anticipating later work, Selznick 
distinguished between organisations as technically devised 
instruments, as mechanical and disposable tools, and 
organisations that have become institutionalised, becoming 
valued, natural communities concerned with their self-




The institutionalisation process was viewed as being subject to 
conscious design and intervention. The government may want 
to pursue a policy that addresses a societal problem, for 
example, encouraging banks to give out loans to disadvantage 
groups such as SMEs. This is an example of deliberate 
intervention. This kind of policy will make it mandatory for all 
banks to act in a certain to achieve a particular goal. The 
intervention is an example of an exogenous pressure that may 
affect the operations of lower-level economic players connected 
or have to interact with the bank (Campbell, 1974:180; Kim, 
1992). This is an example of downward causation. 
 
Nevertheless, Selznick's (Selznick, 1957: 17) defined and 
described the process but did not explicitly account for it. He 
referred to this “process as institutionalisation”. Since man is a 
social product" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:61), 
institutionalised rules are groupings built into society as 
reciprocated on typifications or interpretations. 
Institutionalisation involves the processes by which social 
processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule like 
status in social thought and action. Since thought comes before 
action, knowing what to do would be determined by several 
factors, such as past knowledge, dispositions, and triggering the 
process of doing may be dictated by the external pressures.  
 
Similarly, SMEs’ external environment is complex and 
contextual. In line with this research, the environment that 
governs financing is more applicable to how firm react to lending 
issues. For instance, Scott and Meyer (1983: 140, 149) defined 
ethe nvironment in a technical context as those within which 
economic exchange takes places.  As a result, organisations are 
compensated for acting within the ambit of control that governs 




Furthermore, Scott and Meyer (1977) argue that there is less 
emphasis on institutionalisation as a distinctive process. 
Organisations do not necessarily conform to a set of 
institutionalised beliefs because they "constitute reality" or are 
taken for granted, but often because they are rewarded for doing 
so through increased legitimacy, resources, and survival 
capabilities. The same applies to SMEs in the Nigerian 
manufacturing; access to finance would be their major impetus 
to adhere to lending rules.  
 
The operations of lenders are defined within the institutional 
arrangements, and they act within the authority of the law. Scot 
(1987) adopted the concept of authorisation, which he likened to 
the one vested on an organisation from a high-ranking authority. 
The sources of authority, as defined by Dornbusch and Scott, 
(1975: 56) is "authorisation as the process by which norms 
supporting the exercise of authority by a given agent are defined 
and enforced by a superordinate unit”. Authority is legitimated 
power; legitimated power is normatively regulated power. When 
an organisation's power is "authorised it is, presumptively, 
supported and constrained by the actions of officials superior to 
it and in a position to oversee its appropriate application” 
(Dornbusch and Scott, 1975:502). The preconditions associated 
with lenders are legitimate and linked to benefits when followed. 
 
In many areas, there are multiple possible sources of 
authorisation. Organisations must determine to which, if any, 
external authority that they have to connect. There are often 
costs as well as benefits associated with such choices. 
Organisations may have to modify their structures and activities 
in various ways to acquire and maintain the support of external 
authorities; and, at a minimum, they must provide information 
and access (Scott, 1987). Based on open system theory, it is not 
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surprising that organisations will tend to map the complexity of 
environmental elements into their structures (Buckley, 1967). 
The mapping of complexities dictated by environmental 
pressures, which is analogous to institutional pressures, may 
suffice as an explanation of the cause of change an SME may 
experience. This is not suggesting there is no alternative 
explanations to causes of changes in an organisation. 
 
In the context of economic players and institutions, it is essential 
to note that efforts to reclaim a less deterministic and more 
historically grounded understanding of institutions have led 
scholars to re‐examine the relationship between institutions and 
actions. The important conclusion, as noted by (Jackson, 
2010:3) is that “institutions both enable and constrain action, but 
considerable indeterminacy and situational ambiguity persist”. 
From the above, the actions of players are determined by what 
has been handed to them consciously and unconsciously. 
Players may interpret or utilise institutions differently, stretching 
their boundaries, adapting them to new contingencies, or 
avoiding them through deviant behaviour (Oliver, 1992; Clemens 
and Cook, 1999). An SME may be deviant to formal rules and 
be obedient to informal rule. This is still acceptable with in the 
dual institutional arrangement existing in Nigeria. This is 
possible because both formal and informal financial lenders 
have different preconditions. 
 
Bell (1973) argues that the formal structures of many 
organisations in post-industrial society dramatically reflect the 
myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands 
of their work activities. Such elements of the formal structure are 
manifestations of powerful institutional rules which function as 
highly rationalised myths that are binding on specific 
organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977:343). Likewise, through 
repeated interactions, groups of organisations develop shared 
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understandings and practices, and institutional entrepreneurs 
can work to form the rules that define the field, and, at the same 
time, these rules shape the ongoing patterns of interaction from 
which they are produced (DiMaggio et al., 1984).  
 
Equally, beneficiaries of loans may develop routines similar or in 
agreement with the type of preconditions they are subjected to 
in the process of gaining access. Specifically, SMEs that have 
adhered to impersonal mechanisms may develop routines that 
mirror formal rules. Likewise, SMEs that adhere to personal 
mechanisms may develop routines that mirror informal rules. 
The occurrence of that corresponds to Hawley's (1968) 
description of isomorphism12 as a constraining process that 
forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face 
the same set of environmental conditions. At the population 
level, such an approach suggests that organisational 
characteristics are modified in the direction  of increasing 
comparability with environmental characteristics. The number of 
organisations in a population is a function of environmental 
carrying capacity, and the diversity of organisational forms is 
isomorphic to environmental diversity (Hawley, 1968). Hannan 
and Freeman (1977) have significantly extended Hawley's ideas. 
They argue that isomorphism could be a result of nonoptimal 
forms which are selected out of a population of organisations.  
 
Also, it could be because organisational decision-makers learn 
appropriate responses and adjust their behaviour accordingly. A 
central tenet of institutional theory is the belief “that 
organisations sharing the same environment will employ similar 
practices and thus become ‘isomorphic’ with each other” 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002:215). Organisations are pressured to 
conform to a set of institutionalised beliefs and processes that 
 
12 Isomorphism is described as a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units 
that face the same set of environmental conditions. 
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are deemed legitimate (Dickson et al., 2004; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
 
Drawing from the above discussions, there exist abundant 
literature that relates to formal rules and its impacts on routine 
change. What is conspicuously missing is studies linking 
informal rules to routine change. However, there are arguments 
on why SMEs remain informal, with arguments supporting 
excessive regulations. However, there is silence on how 
organisation routines are impacted by informal rules, especially 
within the scope of routine change. Further exploration is still 
needed on this front, and that will be addressed in this study. 
 
This section has dealt with the meaning, origin, and importance 
of habits and routines. The next section will address the 
implication of routine change on SMEs. 
 
2.10 Implication of Routine Change  
Routine change represents the emergence of a new routine as 
a result of adhering to loan preconditions. It is worthy of note to 
state that the present study is only investigating routine change 
in terms of established routines in the sector considered ‘good 
practice13’ by lenders and required to be adopted by aspiring 
borrowers. These new routines are likely to affect SMEs by 
altering the way they operate.  Bruhn (2008) asserts that reform 
can trigger this change. A study in Mexico where the introduction 
of simplified business registration in the municipalities increased 
registration by 5% and wage employment by 2.2% and 
increased competition, and the same time reduced income of 
 
13 Good practice within the context of  this study represents lenders preconditions for loans; for instance, 




incumbent businesses by 3% (Aparicio, 2014). Business 
registration reforms in Mexico also resulted in 14.9% of informal 
business owners shifting to the formal economy (Aparicio, 2014; 
Doingbusiness.org. 2018:27). 
 
Furthermore, changes in how SMEs operate may manifest 
through for example, registration or incorporation, bookkeeping, 
auditing, and tax payment, amongst others. For instance, when 
a business becomes incorporated or registered, it becomes 
formal (Rand and Torm, 2012; Barry and Tacneng, 2014; 
Linares, 2018). Operating in the formal economy means SMEs 
must have become registered or incorporated, compliant to tax 
requirement: by paying what is due. Therefore, SMEs will be 
contributing to the formal economy. SMEs that comply with 
regulations will find it easy to get access to loans and benefit 
from government subsidies. 
 
Also, formality may offer a “firm access to risk pooling 
mechanisms that could lead to a better attraction of more 
talented employees and engage them in a longer relationship 
with the firm, which in turn makes training and capital goods 
acquisition more profitable” (Fajnzylber et al., 2011:263).  
Besides, formality is a requirement for access to formal credit 
markets or government-provided business development 
services (De Paula and Scheinkman, 2007). This is suggested 
to have a positive and well-determined effect on gross profit 
growth in line with Fajnzylber et al. (2009, 2011) and McKenzie 
and Sakho (2010). However, as mentioned earlier, their studies 
were unable to analyse the registration effect on net profits due 
to a lack of reliable tax data. However, based on a field 
experiment in Sri Lanka, De Mel et al. (2011) showed that 
registered firms (with fewer than 15 employees) did not cause 
additional tax payments for the median firm in their sample. 
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Thus, suggesting that the negative tax effect on net profits may 
be reduced for smaller firms (Rand and Torm, 2012:991).  
 
Similarly, a study of informality in Rwanda suggests that tax 
compliance and recording requirements are strong deterrents to 
registering a business and paying taxes (Stern and Barbour, 
2005).  Tomlin (2008) was of a different view; he argued that 
loan preconditions like tax payment are resources SME direct 
towards tax compliance which could otherwise be used for re-
investment, which may facilitate future growth. Hence, there is a 
belief that taxes and a complex tax system put excessive 
pressure on SMEs. However, on the other hand, it increases the 
government’s tax revenue and reduces the size of the shadow 
economy and the number of non-complying registered taxpayers 
(Vasak, 2008). This shows a mixed outcome for complying 
SMEs, who experienced routine change due to adhering to loan 
preconditions. SMEs that comply may become registered might 
enjoy more access to a highly-skilled workforce, including 
access to more credit and more government support but, may 
suffer from harmful effects by taxing net profit.  
 
This was further countered by Rand and Torm (2012) that the 
net profits suggested by De Mel et al. (2011) may not be exactly 
as bad. Even if De Mel et al. (2001) are right, the adverse effects 
of the tax on net profit can still be managed by providing 
subsidies for SMEs. However, this study is not about the effect 
of tax alone but the effect of the overall loan preconditions on 
SMEs. This is emphasised in the literature as including change 
in routine due to adherence and consistent compliance to loan 
preconditions. Drawing from the above, if an SME decides to 
stay informal, it means access to credit from a formal lender will 
be challenging to obtain, and that may have implications. Some 
of the implications may include restricted access to more skilled 
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employees and government subsidies will not be opened to such 
SMEs.  
 
Current research emphasises a practice perspective on routines 
while theorising how routine change occurs. For instance, 
institutional theory (North, 1990, Hodgson, 2006) have explored 
how both formal and informal rules operate in relation to 
managing transaction cost, and evolutional theory (Hodgson, 
2009:3). The literature also provided the needed explanation of 
how a new routine emerges from external triggers coupled with 
how it leads to adherence (Dollimore, 2016). Thus, one could 
conclude that institutions may influence SMEs in varieties of 
ways such as adopting new routines, enabling, or constraining 
their growth. Although, within a Nigerian manufacturing context, 
there is a dearth of empirical studies about the mechanism of 
how routine change occurs. The outcome of this study has shed 
light on this (see chapter 7 for more details).  
2.11 Formal and Informal Sectors in Nigeria 
Most developing economies are characterised by a dual system, 
Nigeria is a good example. This is a situation in which both the 
formal and informal sector co-exist side by side and, therefore, 
have a close relationship. While the formal sector undoubtedly 
plays a vital role in the operation of monetary policy, the picture 
would be incomplete without some consideration of the informal 
sector that exists in developing countries (Oladele et al., 2014). 
As mentioned in section 1.1, there is always a back and forth 
movement between the two. This is applicable to the financial 
sub-sector of the economy. For example, although the 
relationship between “firms and workers can be informal. That 
means that such a relationship is not in the purview of state 
regulation. They can also develop an agency that falls within the 
formal sphere (Chen 2007; Harriss-White, 2003, 2010). Equally, 
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within the formal sector, informal network practices, e.g. 
between the state and business elites, is still widely in practice 
(Becker, 2014; Nolke, 2012).  
 
The financial sector is comprised  of formal and informal financial 
sub-sectors. The formal financial sector and informal financial 
sector co-existing side by side - a situation commonly denoted 
as financial dualism. In theory, the formal sector would imply an 
organised urbanised oriented, institutional arrangement - 
addressing the financial needs of the developed modern sector. 
Most businesses in the sector are registered. Meanwhile, the 
informal sector implies economic units which are outside the 
official channels and are unregistered. The informal economy 
entails the economic activities that are not taxed or complaint 
with the formal regulatory rules. These include employment or 
borrowing by formal SMEs which does not follow the formal 
rules. Indeed, posits that generally, many SMEs operates 
outside the banking system. Thereby they are more of passers-
by or spectators of government monetary policy programmes 
(Osuji and Nwani, 2020). Germidis et al. (1991:13) defined it “as 
a form of an unorganised and non-institutional oriented setting, 
which is conducted within the traditional, rural, subsistence (non-
monetised) domains of the economy”. Unorganised and non-
institutional sources operate outside the banking system, where 
monitoring is limited and regulation almost non-existent (Adeusi 
et al., 2012). Therefore, it can be argued that the informal sector 
is analogous to unorganised and non-institutional sources 
because they all are operating outside the banking system. 
 
It is important to note that an informal sector is conceptually 
slippery because it may not necessarily mean the same thing as 
informal or shadow economy. Some literature refers to both 
terms as the same but in some, they are not. Thus, differentiating 
what represent shadow economy i.e. ‘’informal economy” and 
91 
 
the “informal sector” comprise a source of disagreement among 
intellectuals.  
 
The 15th ICLS (International Conference of Labour Statisticians) 
declaration specified that the informal sector is characterised by 
“units engaged in the production of goods or services with the 
primary objective of generating employment and incomes for the 
persons concerned”(ILO, 1993:7). These units typically operate 
at a “low level of organisation, with little or no division between 
labour and capital as factors of production and on a small scale” 
(ILO, 1993:7). In this sense, activities carried out by economic 
units of the informal sector are not largely discharged to dodge 
taxes, social security payments or violating labour or other 
legislative obligations. It is just the norm and the way the informal 
arrangement works. 
 
As a result, these activities included in the informal sector should 
be differentiated from the activities included in the informal 
economy (Dell'Anno and Adu, 2020). An example of this result 
emerges by analysing the relationship between informal 
employment. This is widely considered to be one of the most 
essential “sources of informal value-added i.e. informal economy 
– and informal sector” (Dell'Anno and Adu, 2020:1065). These 
twin scenarios are conceptually distinctive because while 
informal employment refers to the characteristics of the job, the 
concept of the informal sector refers to characteristics of 
production units. Thus, we can have formal employment in the 
informal sector (e.g. a formal job carried out in informal 
enterprise) – that should not be included in the informal economy 
– and informal employment in the formal sector (e.g. an 
employee of a registered enterprise whose employment 
relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to national labour 
legislation, income taxation, social protection– that should be 




Moving on from national accounting to the economic definitional 
approach of informality, Dell'Anno and Adu (2020) proposed that 
the latter is usually based on the legality issues in terms of 
regulation and taxation. For example, Schneider and Enste 
(2000:79) defined the shadow economy as encompassing all 
“legal value-added creating activities which are not taxed or 
unregistered”. In this sense, this definition is comparable to the 
ILO definition of an informal economy. Meanwhile, Mazhar and 
Meon (2017) specified that the informal economy is one that 
cannot be taxed because the activities are mostly unrecorded 
and undeclared. According to the ILO Recommendation of 2015 
n 204, the informal economy does not cover illicit activities. The 
meanings put forward above shows the existence of a lack of 
agreement as to the legality of the shadow economy and the 
conceptual divergence. 
 
In terms of the theoretical views of the informal economy, Chen 
(2012) argued that there were four significant views linked to the 
informal economy: dualist, structuralist, legalists and voluntarist. 
The dualist school of thought argues that the informal economy 
arises due to the imbalances between population growth and 
employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sector. 
Therefore, if the growth rate of formal employment is lower than 
the growth of the urban population, we should expect an 
increase in the informal economy. The “structuralists” assert that 
informality arises due to excessive demand for informal labour 
rather than the lack of demand for formal labour as firms seek to 
remain profitable.  
 
Again, Chen (2012) stated that another factor contributing to the 
rise of the informal economy under the structuralist school of 
thought was the reaction of formal firms to the bargaining power 
of organised labour and the avoidance of state regulations, taxes 
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and social protection of workers. Consistent with the legalist 
view, the formal sector may be unwilling to go into any kind of 
relationship with unregistered (illegal) enterprises. Registration, 
thus, confers some legal status on informal sector enterprises. 
Registration is utilised in an expansive sense to refer to activities 
that are duly registered with the appropriate authorities or with 
various guilds and unions. De Andrade et al. (2013) contented 
that registration provides some form of legality and protection for 
the enterprise in question.  
 
Next, the legalist and voluntarist schools of thought are similar 
in the sense that they both focus on workers that decide to 
operate informally to avoid tax and regulation burden . However, 
the difference between these two schools is that the voluntarists 
do not blame the legal framework as the reason for operating 
informally (Chen, 2012). The voluntarists’ view is shared by De 
Andrade et al. (2013) who are opposed to the argument on the 
high cost of registration as the cause of informality. They were 
of the view that reduction in the cost of registration does not on 
its own make informal businesses become formal unless forced 
to do so. This is explored further in routine change, i.e., section 
2.7 and 2.8. 
 
In addition, it is pertinent to argue that the concept of the informal 
economy – mainly used by labour statisticians – is structurally 
different from the concept of the Non-Observed Economy 
(NOE). NOE is introduced by the National Statistical Institute to 
encompass all economic activities that may not be captured in 
the basic data sources used for compiling national accounts 
(Coli and Tartamella, 2012; Adair, 2020). The NOE includes both 
“legal – as underground, informal (including those undertaken by 
households for their own final use) – illegal and other activities 
omitted due to deficiencies in the basic data collection program” 




Also, the ILO Recommendation No. 204 (ILO, 2015) clarified that 
the term “informal economy (IE)” referred “to all economic 
activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in 
practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal 
arrangements.” This recommendation has become an 
international standard as it provides clarity as to what the 
informal economy stands for: In section (1), the IE does not 
cover illicit activities, and in (2) the IE covers all workers and 
economic units – including enterprises, entrepreneurs and 
households. Explicitly, the term “economic units” in ILO's 
classification refers to units that; (1) employ hired labour, (2) self-
employed individuals and (3) cooperatives and social and 
solidarity economy units. 
 
The legality of the informal sector is a subject of confusion, as it 
is generally seen as comprising of legal and illegal activities 
(Lippert and Walker, 1997). Though informal activities are not 
within the control of the government, the government is fully 
aware of  them. Informality in itself is a ‘‘process of income 
generation characterised by one central feature: it is unregulated 
by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in 
which similar activities are regulated’’ (Castells and Portes 
quoted in Rakowski, 1994:504).  
 
Some literature suggests that the conceptualisation of the 
informal economy and informal sector is mostly negative; Also, 
it indicates that it is either a problem of ‘unfair competition’ or the 
breaking down of the rule of law. Informality is most often seen 
as a rational calculation in which the gains of illegality offset the 
costs and barriers to formality.  
 
In principle, any business is expected by CAMA 2020 to be 
registered by the CAC. They could be registered as a sole 
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proprietorship, partnership, or limited liability company. 
Alternatively, they could register only their names. The downside 
to just having a corporate name is that they are not legal entities. 
Their proprietors could be directly sued in their (own) names in 
any legal action. However, as long as an SME is registered, they 
will be eligible to access loans from banks or other financial 
institutions. The nature of informal sector SMEs, i.e., being 
unregistered makes it unlikely for them to access formal lending.  
 
In determining the legality of the informal sector, in terms of their 
status, any business that is not registered is not a legal entity. 
However, in terms of their activities, as distinguished by Lippert 
and Walker (1997) (see appendix 12 for more details) there are 
two categories of activities within the informal sector. The first is 
legal activities and the second one is illegal activities. Similarly, 
the ILO’s 2015 classification also acknowledges those activities 
described by Lippert and Walker (1997) as legal. This study 
recognises these legal activities of the informal sector and the 
informal economy covers self-employed individuals, owners of 
SMEs, cooperatives, social and solidarity economy units; 
informal lenders (i.e., family and friends, Ajo, cooperative 
societies and money lenders). Informal lenders’ activities are not 
regulated by the government but by individual, groups and 
community. Furthermore, as mentioned above, this position is 
consistent with the types of legal activities emphasised by 
Lippert and Walker (1997); Awoyemi (2012) and Ekpo and Umoh 
(undated).  
 
Awoyemi (2012); Ekpo and Umoh (undated) deduced that the 
legal activities of the informal sector can be categorised into 
three broad categories. These are:  
(1) The informal, productive sub-sector: This 
encompasses all economic activities including the 
production of tangible goods. These include agriculture 
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production, mining, quarrying (Excluding Petroleum), 
small-scale manufacturing, building and construction. 
Specifically, they manifest in food production, 
woodwork, furniture making, garment making, welding 
and iron work. 
  
(2) Informal service sub-sector: This sub-sector 
includes repairs and maintenance, informal education 
services, health services, counselling services, and 
labour or menial work. Repairs and maintenance 
services include tailoring, vehicle repairs and 
maintenance, tinkering, carpentry and servicing of 
various household and commercial tools. Informal 
health services, especially in the rural areas, include 
traditional birth attendants, herbalists and other 
traditional medical practitioners. Also, there are 
traditional spiritualists who offer counselling services. 
These services are rendered for fees paid to those who 
render them.  
 
(3) The Informal financial sub-sector: The activities 
of this sub-sector are mostly unofficial, irregular, 
informal, shadowy and parallel. The most predominant 
type of informal finance in Nigeria is the Esusu. Among 
the Yoruba, it is called either Esusu or Ajo. Among the 
Igbo, it is called Isusu or Utus. Some groups operate 
with written laws while others operate with unwritten 
laws but on an oath of allegiance and mutual trust. 
  
The third sub-sector mirrors this study’s focus – i.e. informal 
financial sub-sector comprising of cooperative societies 
(unregistered), and the traditional Esusu/Ajo (who were part of 
the participants of this study) and are described as informal 
lenders. The informal lenders enforce contracts using informal 
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means—for example, social isolation or ex-communication. 
Social isolation could lead to reputational damage, and SMEs 
would not want such to happen. Thus, they would take 
appropriate measures to curb/minimise it. 
 
A flourishing shadow economy creates official statistics (on 
unemployment, official labour force, income, consumption) that 
are inaccurate. Policies and programmes that are framed based 
on inaccurate statistics may be unsuitable and self-defeating. 
The growth of the shadow economy may increase the tax burden 
of those in the formal sector. Also, it disincentivises formality and 
continues to encourage the growth of the shadow economy. 
Therefore, the existence of a large informal financial market in 
an economy is detrimental to effective financial intermediation 
and hampers monetary policy actions' effectiveness. When a 
large amount of money is unreported and out of the remit of the 
banking system; it makes it harder for the central bank to 
effectively influence the financial markets/institutions and 
monetary policy.  
2.11.1 Formal Financial Sector 
The formal financial sector comprises of commercial banks and 
various specialised financial institutions, which are created and 
licensed to operate by the governments in developed and most 
developing countries to target long-term investment. The formal 
financial sector is a central element of any national institutional 
arrangement whereby the structure of how capital is acquired 
and distributed is created and well laid out (Davis and Marquis, 
2005). At a macro level, North (1990) cites transaction costs as 
a factor in the development of institutional arrangements, 
including sets of culturally determined norms (social, moral, 




Recent literature on banking emphasised the role of the formal 
financial sector, especially banking, plays in reducing 
transaction costs, acting as delegated monitors for investors, 
and providing liquidity (Imoughele and Ismaila, 2014). It is these 
roles that make regulation and supervision necessary. Financial 
institutions, i.e. banks, reduce transaction costs in the services 
they provide. Bank services can be viewed as transforming 
assets into others, and such transformation has two aspects 
(Barth et al., 2009). First, banks transform deposits with few or 
no restrictions on the minimal amount and of short-term 
maturities, such as demand deposits, into loans with longer 
maturity and in larger amounts, and with credit risk (Aryeetey 
and Udry, 1995). Thus, they can be viewed as “providing 
services of divisibility, maturity, and risk transformation ” (Barth 
et al. 2009:6). Secondly, they provide payment services through 
several payment systems (Barth et al., 2009). 
  
Murray (1997) notes that financial institutions do not just oil the 
wheels of economic growth; they are the wheels. Weber et al. 
(2009) show that a country's historical background favouring 
investor-based systems (e.g., British colonies) increases the 
likelihood of stock exchange adoption and reliance on equity 
markets as the source of firm financial capital. Similarly, Zysman 
(1994) explains that Germany's heavy reliance on banks as the 
source of financial capital is rooted in its need to quickly catch -
up with the industrial revolution that had emerged in Britain. 
Hence, a society's path-dependent political and economic 
history underpins the logic with which financial markets develop 
and operate (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Davis and 
Marquis, 2005). Therefore, a less industrialised economy like 
Nigeria may not have a similar level of SMEs reliance on formal 





Earlier, Smith (1776) explained three key roles of government 
as: firstly, protection of lives and properties of the society and 
from external aggression. The next role is to establish a thorough 
system of justice. Lastly, the duty of creating and sustaining 
certain public works and certain public institutions, which can 
never be within the interest or capability of any individual, or a 
small number of individuals, to erect or maintain.  
 
A popular view observed by Olson (1982) explains that if these 
governmental activities usually had the effect of benefiting the 
polity as a whole, the role of government would be less 
contentious than it is in many developed nations where the 
benefits of government policies are often enjoyed 
disproportionately by those who are most effective at influencing 
political decisions. Nevertheless, in economies where financial 
institutions work well, it is believed that most, if not all, are 
beneficiaries as the government ensures certain basic functions 
are provided. In such economies, there will be more fairness in 
the way resources are allocated. 
  
Borrowing from Adam Smith above, the last two functions of the 
government are of high relevance to this discussion (Hillman and 
Keim, 1995). This is because it represents the role of 
government as a constituted authority with the power to create 
and maintain individual institutions like formal financial lenders. 
They also create mechanisms for the administration of justice for 
institutions created through laws on enforcement and property 
rights. Other scholars characterise these activities of 
government as "promotional, regulatory, and redistributive 
policies" (Lowi and  Ginsberg, 1992).  
 
In fairness, the regulation enacted by the government is to 
ensure impartiality in the way actors relate. Regulations refer to 
the establishment of rules, including legislative acts and 
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statutory instruments issued by the competent authorities 
nationally and supranationally, and rules issued by self-
regulatory organisations and private bodies or 'clubs', such as a 
cooperative bankers' association (Lastra, 2005).  
  
Supranational and international sources refer to laws 
administered across multi-territorial jurisdiction (Barth et al., 
2009). Examples of such are laws made by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), European Union (AU), African Union (AU), 
and the West African Union. Banking regulation draws from 
national, supranational and international sources. At a national 
level, the competent authorities are (though this varies from 
country to country) the government, through the ministry of 
finance or treasury, the central bank and the bank regulatory 
agency/agencies. In the wake of the recent global financial crisis 
(Hanson et al., 2010), banking regulation has become more 
focused in recent decades on the lending function of commercial 
banks (Lastra, 2005).  
  
Within these regulations, relationships between economic 
players are defined and laid out. This explains the institutional 
arrangement: where boundaries of formal lender's operations, 
functions, relationships and interactions within the financial 
environment are spelt out. The primary aim is to entrench 
financial mediation among economic players (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990:1076). The financing constraints that 
characterised the Nigerian formal financing environment exist to 
bring about orderliness in the way the game of financing is 
played.  
 
The Nigerian government, through its agencies, mandates 
banks, financing firms, and other lending organisations to meet 
certain conditions for them to obtain grants that can be 
distributed to SMEs at reduced interest rates. Equally, donor 
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agencies, international financial institutions, i.e. World Bank, 
African Development Bank, may from time to time make funds 
available, in most cases, to the formal financial lenders. After 
receiving those funds, it is the formal financial lenders' 
responsibility to allocate those funds to qualifying beneficiaries 
(e.g. SMEs).  
 
North and Thomas (1975) deduced that institutional 
arrangements help to secure property rights and enforce 
contracts.   This has been linked to the economic development 
experienced in Europe. This was achieved by “reducing 
transaction costs, enhanced economies of scale, 
encouragement of innovation and improvement in the efficiency 
of factor markets” (Hodgson, 2017:2). Therefore, to safeguard 
property rights and reduce the transaction costs of economic 
players such as investors, i.e. donor agencies and funding 
institutions, the banks and other financing organisations who are 
intermediaries must ensure certain critical conditions for lending 
are put in place and met by the prospective SMEs.  
 
2.11.2 Informal financial sector 
The definitions of informal financial sectors vary across the 
globe. Pagura and Kirsten (2006) define informal financial sector 
as a sector whose financial exchange is based on relationships 
and reputation. Furthermore, within this sector, they imply that 
information asymmetries between informal financial lenders and 
their borrowers are less acute. The loan application procedures 
lighter, and the collateral requirement easier to fulfil. Also, 
informal finance is synonymous with this sector and it dates to 
the 16th century. The activities predate those of the formal 
financial systems but are not subject to government regulation 




A study was undertaken in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and 
Tanzania by Aryeetey et al. (1997) and they concluded that 
informal finance is an important vehicle for mobilising household 
savings and financing small businesses. This function is carried 
out using specialised techniques that address the “problems of 
information, transaction costs and risks, which prevent banks 
from serving these market segments” (Rotich et al., 2015:339). 
The informal financial lenders are largely characterised by small 
scale financing and are transactions, loans, and deposits 
occurring outside the regulation of a central monetary or 
financial market authority (Adams and Fitchett, 1992). They 
include money lenders, cooperatives, Esusu, pawnbrokers, and 
Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCA) (Mohammed 
et al. 2015; Kyazze et al., 2017). It is important to note that 
informal financial lenders operating in the informal sector are 
mostly unregulated (Maloney 2004). However, a few of them 
may be registered, in most cases, the details of their activities 
are not fully open or known to the government (Godfrey, 2011; 
Webb et al., 2009). This has proven to be a problem since the 
“unregulated nature of the informal financial lenders means that 
statistical data are not routinely recorded by governmental or 
private agencies” (Stevens et al., 1992:20).  
 
Numerous studies conducted in Africa indicate that informal 
financial lenders exhibit much diversity (Aryeetey and Hyuha, 
1991; Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1991; Chipeta, 1996; Soyibo, 
1996a). Informal activities have wide-ranging operational scope 
and features: community or group-based, others are organised 
around individuals. Some informal financial activities involve 
mobilising savings only; others are involved in both savings and 
lending, while some are involved only in lending. However, cash 
transactions dominate, informal finance (Hugon, 1990). Also, it 
could consist of an ‘in-kind’ type of transaction (Soyibo, 1996a). 
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Also, despite the variety, informal financial lenders have a lot in 
common: deposit mobilisation and lending are done on a small 
scale with little or no record-keeping, there is no barrier to entry. 
In contrast, lending is done mainly on personal recommendation. 
The “geographical coverage of the units is limited in scope, as 
deposit-taking and lending often take place among kin and 
people of the same locality” (Babafemi et al., 2015:193).  
  
The informal financial lenders operate within this space. They 
are often better positioned to efficiently monitor and enforce 
repayment when legal enforcement is difficult and time - 
consuming (Allen and Qian, 2010). The most cited distinction is 
probably that the informal sector has an easier time dealing with 
problems associated with information and enforcement of 
contracts. In contrast, the formal sector can take advantage of 
economies of scale and the intermediation of funds over a more 
extended period (Jain and Mansuri, 2003). Likewise, informal 
financial lenders can monitor borrowers by offering credit to a 
group of known clients where social ties and social sanctions 
induce investment (Aleem, 1990; Ghate, 1992; Udry, 1990). 
Informal financial lenders can resort to social sanctions to 
enforce compliance based on their ties within the community 
(Etienne, 2010). This supports the community responsibility 
system that Greif (1998:3) mentioned as an aspect of reputation-
based institutions, in which future exchanges are conditional on 
past conduct. Therefore, enforcement rests on social sanctions 
available within the community (Madestam, 2014:168). 
However, the current study focuses on intra-community based 
enforcement, which differs from the inter- community-based 
perspective studied by Greif. Within the same community, 
savings can be harnessed and re-invested locally among 
members. A set of meticulously crafted safety net and 
governance features seem to nurture the trust necessary for an 
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improved local financial institutional arrangement (Ksoll et al., 
2016:82).  
 
There are a variety of legal enforcement mechanisms open to 
lenders. For instance, formal lending is distinct in nature. They 
can enforce debt repayment by going after a defaulting 
borrower’s income and assets without resorting to violence. 
They easily rely on courts to enable the enforcements of debt 
contracts (Djankov et al., 2008). For example, Banks in contrast, 
typically rely solely on formal legal institutions forthe 
enforcement of their contracts (Stark and Jakubek, 2013). 
However, the informal sector hardly relies on formal legal 
institutions,. This may be due to the unwritten nature of 
agreements (Liu and Spanjers, 2005). 
 
Informal lenders have different approaches to enforcement. 
Many studies on informal lending showed that enforcement of 
obligations and repayments are generally alluded to as leading 
to complications and sometimes resulting in groups' collapse 
(Anderson et al., 2009; Bauchet and Larsen, 2017). As Ostrom 
(1990:33) observed, problems of appropriation and provision are 
"intimately bound together": if misused, crowding and non-
payment can be severe, and members will not be driven towards 
contributing to the ‘‘common purse’’. As such, they cannot easily 
rely on formal enforcement to make members honour their 
obligations (Siwan et al., 2003:14). However, they do have 
strategies in place. These are informal enforcement strategies 
such as exclusion and social sanctions. Exclusion is deployed to 
deprive members of enjoying any future lending and that applies 
to other lending groups as well. The other strategy is to punish 
defaulters through a variety of social sanctions such as giving a 
bad reputation, retaliating at the workplace, or seizing or 




Informal lenders can exert social sanctions such as the loss of 
social reputation and various types of informal (even physical) 
coercion ‘ex-post’, which may discourage defaults ‘ex-ante’ 
(Siwan et al., 2009:14). Since informal finance is in the form of 
groups, members are drawn from the same area or formed by 
people known to each other or connected through friendship, 
business, religion or profession. Due to the reputational damage, 
it is doubtful for an individual who has defaulted to be accepted 
into another group, e.g., cooperative society. The social sanction 
meted out will disincentivise members from defaulting, and it is 
believed to be an effective enforcement mechanism. Besley et 
al. (1993) and Honda and Kirton (1999) point out the importance 
of social sanction mechanisms to deal with enforcement 
problems. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of 
social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing 
contract efficiency substantially (Lindenberg et al., 2020). 
 
Anderson et al. (2009) argue that informal lending such as 
ROSCAs could never be sustainable unless there is an external 
or social sanctioning mechanism. The effectiveness of exclusion 
and social sanction was examined by Anderson et al. (2009). 
They argued that members in ROSCAs who receive the first 
money " pot " always have the incentive to deviate, even in an 
infinitely repeated game, without extra enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure compliance. Furthermore, there 
aisevidence of moneylenders regularly monitory borrowers’ 
activities, by visiting them at their farms before the harvest. Also, 
they are making it difficult for the borrower to run away or use 
the proceeds of the invested loan for something else without 
making any repayment. In addition, there is the fear of losing 
access to credit in the future, which serves as a deterrent to 
default (Ghosh and Ray, 2015). The effectiveness of 
enforcement of exclusion and social sanction is a factor  in the 
flow of information. Without proper information flow, product 
quality, as well as partner credibility outside the relational 
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network; it might become too costly to verify (Akerlof, 1970). 
High information asymmetry often leads to over-reliance on 
personal relationships to reduce uncertainty (Peng and Heath 
1996; Zhou et al. 2003). Ahn et al. (2017) assert that 
organisations cannot operate sustainably without relying on 
some sort of extra means of enforcement.  
 
Most businesses, e.g., SMEs, in developing economies, operate 
within the informal sector, just like the informal financial lenders 
(Ouchi, 1980 in Mathias et al., 2015). Harriss-White (2003) 
categorises the informal sector as "small firms that are not 
regulated as well as the activity that takes place in and around 
the registered, formal sector but is itself unregulated". The 
informal economy is characterised by actions outside the normal 
scope of commerce (Mathias et al., 2015). A substantial portion 
of the world's commerce occurs informally through unregulated 
economic activities (Godfrey, 2011; Webb et al., 2009). Many 
research papers have shown the importance of business 
regulation, demonstrating how it relates to different economic 
outcomes (Calice et al., 2012). Doing Business calculates a 
series of factors that facilitate the occurrence of informality and 
give policymakers insight into the possible areas of regulatory 
reform in Nigeria and other developing countries 
(Doingbusiness.org. 2018:24). 
 
Furthermore, one of the most cited theoretical mechanisms on 
how excessive business regulation affects economic 
performance and development is that it makes it too costly for 
SMEs to engage in the formal economy, causing them not to 
invest or prompting them to move to or remain in the informal 
economy (Doingbusiness.org. 2018).  SMEs may opt for bribery 
and other informal arrangements to bypass the rules where 
regulation is particularly arduous (Doingbusiness.org. 2018). 
The levels of informality tend to be higher in economies with 
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particularly burdensome regulation. Compared with their formal 
sector counterparts, firms in the informal sector typically grow 
more slowly. Also, “they have poorer access to credit and 
employ fewer workers—and these workers remain outside the 
protections of labour law and, more generally, other legal 
protections embedded within the law” (Doingbusiness.org. 
2018:7). Firms in the informal sector are also less likely to pay 
taxes.  
  
Irwin and Scott (2006) and Adiqwe (2012) research concluded 
that the irregularity and adverse government regulations or 
policies contribute to the lack of encouraging performance of 
SMEs in Nigeria. Also, Schiffer and Weder (2001) demonstrate 
that small firms contend significantly with higher growth 
obstacles as a result of challenges in areas, such as financing, 
taxation and regulation.  
 
Bearing in mind, formal and informal sectors are intrinsically 
interlocked. The complex interaction between the two may lead 
to policy complications. This effect on the formal economy has 
been studied from various economic and social dimensions, 
including its implications for formal labour markets, poverty 
alleviation, credit markets, fiscal policy, monetary policy (Ahmed 
et al., 2016; Bandaogo, 2016; Batini et al., 2011; Carpenter, 
1999; Castillo and Montoro, 2012; Kathuria and Raj, 2016). 
 
Thus, examined literature suggest that excessive regulation 
makes informal SMEs remain informal and leads to the loss of 
expected benefit that the government should have accrued. 
Similarly, in cognisance of the cultural dimensions of the 
environment where these SMEs are located; initiatives that will 
make them play their developmental role and prevent loss of 
revenue to the economy should be encouraged. Therefore, this 
study argues that the informal sector SMEs should not be 
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pressured or forced to become formal. However, an approach 
that could incentivise them towards making the essential 
contribution to the economy without jeopardising their ability to 
be sustainable within their financial and managerial capability 





2.12 Information type in lending  
Critical to the dynamics of financial transactions and institutions 
is information, which has been significantly transformed 
following the advent of new technologies in the last 50 years. 
Liberti and Petersen (2019) described it as "hard information", 
as such, this sort of information is quantitative in form. Hard 
information is information that has been verified, and which 
formal financial lenders frequently use for lending decisions. 
Most Nigerian banks adopt hard information in their operations. 
Hard information is vital to financial transactions, and it is 
numerically based. However, in the long run, it is technically 
employed by the banks to make lending decisions. 
  
The opposite of hard information is soft information. Soft 
information is less useful and contextual. Numerous scholars are 
of the view that the importance of context for soft information is 
associated with whether a signal that is observable by outsiders 
is also verifiable by outsiders (Rajan , 1992). They maintain that 
for a signal to be verifiable, the interpretation of the signal mainly 
by the two contracting parties must be the same. Soft information 
is private and not verifiable. Hard and soft information  can be 
referred to as objective and subjective information, respectively. 
Hard information is quantitative, involving the use of verifiable 
data. In contrast, soft information, on the other hand, is social, 
psychologically-based and greatly influenced by past 
relationship (Brickley et al., 2003). The manifestation of this is 
when a loan officer is evaluating a potential loan from a long-
term borrower using his/her discretion based on some certain 
parameters to determine if the loan will be given or not. However, 
findings have also shown that loan officers can influence loans 
based on their personal benefits (Agarwal and Ben-David, 2014, 
2018). According to them, loan officers do use their discretion, 
which is unlikely to improve the quality of their decision. While 
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hard information is important in finance, its exclusive application 
in lending in developing countries has not been fully researched, 
as pieces of evidence on most formal financial lenders show 
reliance on loan officers' opinions and other attributes of 
relationship informal mechanism to complement the hard 
information (Petersen, 2004). 
  
There are arguments in some quarters that smaller, less formal 
and less hierarchical organisations are better able to use soft 
information in their decisions. Hence the reason relationship 
lending is built upon soft information. This is evident in some 
banks relying on information gathered by loan officers, 
registered cooperative societies and informal financial lenders 
such as unregistered cooperatives, friends and family, money 
lenders and Esusu. They base their lending decisions on trust 
and information obtained on members due to past conduct 
developed from close relationships.  
  
This shows how entangled formal lending decisions are with 
both hard and soft information. The next section explores formal 
and informal financial lenders' mechanism and how they relate. 
  
2.13 How Formal and Informal Lender Mechanisms Relate 
Explanations made above about both formal and informal 
financial lenders' mechanisms have provided a basis for 
understanding definitions, distinctions and the nature of 
dichotomy. However, how formal and informal lenders' 
mechanisms influence each other and their effect on players, in 
this case, SMEs, may offer explanations as to the nature of the 
outcome they achieved. In every environment, the application of 
a formal mechanism may involve some interference of informal 
mechanism. According to Helmke and Levitsky (2004), 
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interference underpins the relationship that exists and was 
captured using a two-dimensional typology. This typology was 
used to illuminate the relationship that may occur between a 
formal and an informal mechanism. The first is the degree to 
which formal and informal mechanism lead to similar outcomes, 
which they termed as convergence. Next, is the concept of 
divergence. It can happen when players experienced different 
outcomes after following the prescribed lending rules. This 
relates to” ineffective formal rules producing competing informal 
institutions. These informal rules shape “incentives in ways that 
are incompatible with the formal rules: to follow one rule, actors 
must violate another” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2012:724). 
 
The second is the effectiveness of the relevant formal 
institutions, i.e., the extent to which rules and procedures that 
exist on paper are enforced and complied with in practice 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Effective formal institutions 
constrain or enable economic players' choices. Players believe 
that there is a high probability that official authorities will sanction 
non-compliance. Where formal rules and procedures are 
ineffective, players believe the probability of enforcement (and 
hence the expected cost of violation) will be low (Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004).  
  





Convergent Complementary Substitutive 
Divergent Accommodating Competing 




Reflecting on the table above, the relationship between formal 
and informal rules may be complementary, accommodating, 
substitutive, and competing. The formal and informal financial 
lenders exist side-by-side, they interact, and some SMEs have 
benefited from one or the two types of lenders (formal and 
informal financial lenders) simultaneously in the course of 
financing their businesses. Complementary informal institutions 
may also serve as a foundation for formal institutions, creating 
or strengthening incentives to comply with formal rules that might 
otherwise exist merely on paper. When informal institutions 
complement formal institutions, that is when it has filled or 
bridged a gap either by addressing contingencies not dealt with 
in the formal rules or by facilitating the pursuit of individual goals 
within the formal institutional context (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004). When this happens, the formal institutions would be seen 
as effective.  The effectiveness of the role informal institutions 
play in the Nigerian SMEs lending practices may likely aid SME 
access to formal financial lenders. This is explored further in 
sections 6.4.4, and 6.4.6 of this study. 
 
In a situation where an ineffective formal institutional 
arrangement exists, the adoption of an informal institution leads 
to achieving the same outcome: especially, the outcome 
associated with formal rules. If this happens, then it can be said 
that substitution has taken place and informal financial lenders 
will be referred to as substitutive informal financial lenders 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). If reliance on informal approaches 
such as bribery results in obtaining loan access, then the 
informal institutional arrangement can be substitutive. On the flip 
side, if the borrower can get the same result as would a 
beneficiary of the formal lender by obtaining access from the 
informal lender for their credit need instead of relying on formal 
financial lenders. Thus,  informal lending could  be considered  




When an informal rule produces “incentives to behave in ways 
that alter the substantive effects of formal rules, but without 
directly violating them; they may contradict the spirit, but not the 
letter, of the formal rules” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004:729). 
Accommodating informal rules are repeatedly created by players 
who dislike results produced by the formal rules but are 
incapable of amending or openly infringe upon those rules. As 
such, they often help to reconcile these players’ interests with 
the existing formal institutional arrangements. For instance, 
SMEs who symbolically or superficially adopt rules mirroring 
formal financial lenders’ preconditions and do not in practice 
adhere to them.  Nevertheless, they have in a way 
accommodated them and created a sense of compliance for the 
formal financial lenders. If the formal lender fails to detect their 
deceit, they are likely to consent to grant them access to a loan. 
This is a form of decoupling or loose coupling. 
  
Loose coupling or decoupling occurs through symbolic 
responses associated with adherence (Sauder and Espeland 
2009). All forms of decoupling are analogous to resistance. By 
so doing, they have not efficiently enhanced formal rules but has 
enhanced stability by diminishing demands for change (Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2004). In higher education ranking, public shaming 
was suggested as an effective way of preventing decoupling. 
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977) enforcement and 
monitoring can enable compliance and prevent decoupling or 
loose coupling in lending. In a developing setting where 
enforcement is weak, it is likely for SMEs to decouple or loosely 
adhere to rules without suffering any consequence. 
 
Notwithstanding, not all SMEs decouple; some accommodate by 
copying precisely the template dictated by the loan 
preconditions. Informal rules do not rely on hard information for 
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loan assessment purposes. However, formal financial lenders 
rely on soft information. Nevertheless, they do so by adopting it 
in addition to hard information. In other words, formal lender 
accommodates informal rules to achieve their lending 
objectives. This may not directly correspond to Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004) but resemble the accommodation part of their 
model. 
 
Similarly, SMEs operating informally can adopt formal 
approaches if they belong to informal groups like cooperative 
societies. Cooperative societies may give them the shield they 
require and guide them with the right information needed to 
adhere to achieve access to formal lenders. In this case, informal 
institution i.e. cooperative society, may help to accommodate the 
interest of informal SMEs. 
 
In a situation whereby informal institutions are competing with 
formal ones; this will manifest in the way informal institutions 
structure incentives that are incompatible with the formal 
preconditions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). To follow one rule, 
players must violate another, in particular, informal institutions 
such as clientelism, patrimonialism, clan politics, and corruption 
are among the most familiar examples of how this occurs 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004:278). According to Horak et al. 
(2016), when informal rules are competing with formal ones, they 
suppress institutional development and result in a divergent 
outcome. 
 
Competition can occur when expected outcomes for adhering to 
formal rules are achieved using informal means. Therefore, the 
motivation to explore formal mechanism in the future may not be 
attractive again (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Any source where 
access to a loan was granted may remain most favoured and 
might be the go-to source for future loans. Therefore, if SMEs 
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find informal rules easy to adapt to and they are consistently able 
to obtain access, then adhering to formal preconditions will not 
be encouraging for borrowers, vice versa. That means both 
formal and informal financial lenders compete.  
 
The above depicts the sort of relationship that formal and 
informal institutions may have and their implication. Applying the 
typology in places has enhanced the discussion in chapter 6 
(see section 6.2.2) and conclusions 7 (see section 7.4 and 7.5) 
to be richer, analytical and enabled distinction amongst various 
outcomes linked to the relationship between lenders and SMEs. 
However, this is not suggesting the typology perfectly fits the 
phenomenon of this study, but it has aid explanation on an 
abstract level. Drawing from above, the way they relate with 
each other would have some impact on the practice of lending 
as examined in the next section. 
2.14 Growth: Effects of lending practices 
It is often the case that banks adopt a mix of lending practices to 
evaluate a firm’s creditworthiness and assess their credit risk 
(Uchida et al. 2006). In particular, financial statement lending 
and relationship lending are often used jointly. The adoption of 
financial statement and relationship lending indicates the dual 
approach of banks. The dual approach refers to the use of 
personal and impersonal approaches. This explanation goes to 
show how undistinguishable formal and informal institutions can 
be. As a result, a bank that can be viewed as a formal lender, 
rely on both personal and impersonal/transactional approaches. 




Similarly, in a study on lending practices towards Italian 
manufacturing firms, Bartoli et al. (2010) find the distinction 
between transaction lenders and relationship lenders to be 
somewhat blurred, as firms may obtain debt finance from the 
same bank through different lending technologies. These 
lending technologies encompass relational and transactional 
approaches. This form of complementarity is found at both large 
and small banks, suggesting that transactions lending 
techniques, such as credit scoring, are used to “harden” - or 
codify - the soft information collected through relationship 
lending. However, the study also finds that the way soft 
information is embodied in the lending decision differs 
depending on the main approach used by the bank. Soft 
information increases (lower) the possibility of credit rationing if 
the bank adopts mainly transaction (relationship) lending 
technologies. In other words, banks that mainly use “hard 
information to screen borrowers tend to use soft information as 
a mechanism for further discriminating loan applications” 
(OECD, 2015:15). 
 
A study conducted in Japan shows that before lending, banks 
emphasised three factors: i.e., the relationship factor, the 
financial statement factor, and the collateral/guarantee factor 
(Uchida 2011). The finding indicated that banks were relying on 
subjective soft information by  emphasising the relationship, 
especially when they were under competitive pressure (Uchida, 
2011).  Another transactional technique adopted by formal 
financial lenders is Asset-Based Lending (ABL): ABL is any form 
of lending secured by an asset. It is thus a transactions lending 
technology in which lenders address the problem of information 
asymmetry by focusing on a subset of the firms’ assets, as the 




Typically, four types of asset classes are secured under ABL: 
accounts receivable, inventory, equipment and real estate. 
Transactional lending is more likely to be a “one-off lending 
provision based predominantly on hard quantitative information 
about the borrower” (Bonini et al., 2017:173). According to Beck 
et al. (2014), when the credit cycle turned, assessing loan 
applications may turn out to be more challenging. During this 
period, bank officials in charge of loans may have to reduce their 
level of reliance on collateral and hard information and as an 
alternative, take a closer look at the prospects of the business 
seeking a loan. This requires a more subtle judgment and “softer 
information, such as the capability, integrity and level of 
seriousness of firm owners and management” (IIF, 2013 in Beck 
et al., 2014:31). They often resolve information asymmetry  
issues when lending to small firms by using fixed-asset and 
credit scoring lending technologies in extending individual loans 
and joint liability group lending for group loans. This poses a 
problem, however, for small businesses to qualify for loans 
because they lack sufficient “qualified” assets to put up as 
collateral (Ghosh et al., 2000). This is further exacerbated by the 
lack of information infrastructure in developing economies.  
 
Since 2006, “over 165 countries studied by the World Bank have 
adopted at least one reform or the other to facilitate institutional 
development” (Distinguin et al., 2016:22). It should be stressed 
that financial sector reforms in most developing economies are 
ongoing, encompassing wide-ranging measures and efforts 
(Aryeetey et al., 2017). The formal financial sector reforms are 
likely framed to address policy-induced bottlenecks existing in 
the form of structural and institutional deficiencies contained 
within the polity (Aryeetey et al., 2017).  An example of such 
policy in Nigeria is the Microfinance Policy Framework 





The loan preconditions of formal financial lenders are designed 
to incentivise informal SMEs to become formalised. In most 
developing economies, the large size of SMEs in the informal 
sector and finance can be used as bait to draw them out. In 
drawing them out, they might be encouraged to get their 
business registered, obtain a tax identification number, amongst 
others. These are the type of things that lead to overbearing 
regulation mentioned in extensively reviewed literature as one of 
the reasons SMEs prefer to remain informal (Eilat and Zinnes, 
2002). 
 
Unfortunately, to achieve formalisation, SMEs have to operate 
in an overbearing regulatory environment with a plethora of 
regulatory agencies, multiple taxes, and cumbersome procedure 
that constantly exert a severe burden on their operations. 
Notably, SMEs have to deal with a myriad of agencies at a high 
cost. As stated earlier, they are heterogeneous and these 
differences in size and structure may, in turn, carry differing 
obligations for record-keeping that affect the costs to the 
enterprises of complying with (and to the revenue authorities of 
administering) alternative possible tax obligations (Idewele, 
2020; Rand and Torm, 2012a; Akinboade, 2014). Public 
corporations, for example, commonly have more robust 
accounting requirements than sole proprietorships. Also, SMEs 
with employees may be subject to the full panoply of 
requirements associated with withholding labour income taxes 
and social contributions (International Tax Dialogue, 2007 in 
Ojeka, 2011). Under the regular taxation system, the SMEs are 
poorly treated, since the compliance requirements, cost of 
compliance and tax rate are the same for both small and large 
enterprises. Subjecting them to similar regulatory requirement 
raises an issue of fairness. To improve the imbalance, a 
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reduction in compliance and tax rate may lead to an increase in 
the small enterprises' profit margin (Ojeka, 2011).  
 
Some of the arguments put forward about the effect of 
formalisation on  growth. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006)  analysed 
the effects of business and institutional environment on firms’ 
decision to formalise operations and the effects of formalisation 
on access to finance and firm growth in developed countries, 
found that formalised firms grow faster than informal ones. 
Formalised firms face lower obstacles to their growth in countries 
with better developed financial sectors and efficient legal 
systems, strong shareholder and creditor rights, low regulatory 
burdens and corporate taxes and efficient bankruptcy 
processes. Registered businesses account for fewer financing, 
legal and regulatory “obstacles than unincorporated firms,” and 
this advantage is more remarkable in countries with more 
developed institutions and “favourable business environments” 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006:2933). 
 
Furthermore, Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) found that 
small firms grew faster in Germany than in Cote d’ Ivoire 
because the latter lacked a robust legal and formal rule. 
Similarly, Beck (2007) used cross-country data for 44 countries 
and 36 industries in the manufacturing sector and found that 
financial development wields a disproportionately significant 
positive impact on the growth of industries that are 
technologically more dependent on small firms. Their results 
suggest that the furniture industry (an industry with many small 
firms) should grow 1.4% per annum, which will be faster than the 
spinning industry (an industry with relatively few small firms) in 
Canada (a country with a well-developed financial system) than 
in India (where there is a low level of financial development) 
(Beck, 2007). Given that “the average industry growth rate in 
their sample is 3.4%, this is a relatively large effect” (Beck, 
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2007). Thus, small firms not only suffer more from market 
frictions such as transaction costs and information asymmetries 
than large firms as discussed above, but these market frictions 
have a disproportionately more significant effect on small firms 
in countries with less developed institutions. 
 
In another study conducted in Kenya, compliance to these 
preconditions, for example, booking keeping, shows there is a 
relationship between growth and bookkeeping (Chelimo and 
Sophia, 2014). The formalisation process provides verifiable 
information that helps underpin the sort of credible commitments 
needed to foster the growth and development of firms (Gindis, 
2013:210). Record keeping in the form of bookkeeping is a 
critical part of hard information and is synonymous with formality.  
 
Formal and informal financial lenders have their strengths and 
weaknesses, implying that a borrower may benefit by 
simultaneously obtaining both (Degryse et al., 2016). Informal 
financial lenders rely more on soft information . This is due to 
their lack of credit history and collateral. Nevertheless, because 
the supply of fund to informal financial lenders is limited and 
lacks scalability, the interest rate on informal funds may increase 
in the required loan amount made available to beneficiaries, 
thereby making informal finance less interesting for businesses 
seeking to finance large projects. Informal financial lenders are 
also often better positioned to efficiently monitor and enforce 
repayment when legal enforcement is difficult and time-
consuming (Allen and Qian, 2010). Informal finance from family 
members and friends may incentivise entrepreneurs due to 
mutual insurance between the informal lender and the borrower 
(Lee and Persson, 2016). 
 
Formal financial lenders can scale up with credit demand and fill 
the financing gap that cannot be met by informal finance. Some 
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formal financial lenders usually offer loans at a lower interest rate 
than the informal lender because formal financial lenders, i.e. 
banks, may face fewer restrictions in attracting deposits. In 
addition, banks also have an advantage in handling and 
processing hard information (e.g., credit scoring and collateral-
based lending). These characteristics of formal financial lenders 
benefit significantly the financing of large firms. From an SME 
perspective, a small business loan from commercial banks 
involves an average of twenty-seven (27) steps and nine (9) 
client meetings (Nenova and Niang, 2009), which makes them a 
time-consuming process (Khan, 2015:4). 
 
On the other hand, informal financial lenders, which consist of 
friends and family, cooperative societies, landlords, 
commissioning agents, and other non-institutional sources, are 
easy to understand and operates with easy loan requirements. 
Also, SMEs can access a loan in a little time with little or no 
documentation. This type of borrowing usually happens within 
social networks, and the lender knows some if not all members 
of the network. The critical aspect of the social network is trust 
among members (Khan, 2015). Thus, for instance, the 
performance of informal financial lenders such as unregistered 
cooperatives societies depend on their ability to establish and 
maintain trust, provide quality services, and social responsibility 
among members (Ruben and Heras, 2012). The conventional 
view is that relationship lending is the obvious—if not the only—
way to cope with opaqueness. It can mitigate opacity problems 
because it relies primarily on soft information gathered.  
 
Formal financial lenders have borrowed this sort of relational 
approach from informal financial lenders by employing loan 
officers' service, who, through continuous, personalised, and 
direct contacts with SMEs, acquire necessary soft information 
for future loan decisions (Berger and Udell, 2006). However, the 
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loan size a formal lender can offer cannot be matched with what 
an informal lender would provide. This is because formal 
financial lenders have robust sources from where they could 
access funds, unlike the informal financial lenders, whose only 
source is mostly their members. For example, a cooperative 
society source of funding is the contribution from members and 
that is the only source from where loans are given to members. 
In the case of money lenders, their source of funding is limited 
and determined by the wealth possessed by the lender. 
However, a formal lender can attract grants from various 
sources; for example, government, donor agencies. 
 
Allen et al. (2005) attribute the growth of the business sector to 
the reliance on alternative financing mechanisms such as those 
based on reputation and relationships. However, Ayyagari et al. 
(2007) argued that the role of reputation and relationship-based 
financing and governance mechanisms in supporting the growth 
of private sector firms is likely to be overestimated and unlikely 
to substitute for formal lending. The claimed growth tied to 
informal financing may be due to tax evasion, non-conformity 
with any official requirement that may involve cost. Recent 
studies regarding the impact of informal finance (i.e., based on 
relational exchanges) versus formal finance (i.e., based on 
impersonal exchanges) on growth are diverse. Some studies 
show that informal finance may support the growth of the private 
sector in countries with less developed legal and financial 
systems (Allen et al., 2005).  
 
On the other hand, some studies suggest that only the 
development of a formal banking sector has a positive impact on 
economic growth (Ayyagari et al., 2010; Cheng and Degryse, 
2010). Also, a study conducted in Albania shows that small and 
medium enterprises that adopt informal approaches such as 
bribery and reliance on personal networks, i.e., family and friend 
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ties (sometimes known as ‘cultural capital’) are more profitable 
than those whose approaches are through more formal 
legitimate contracting procedures (Karklins, 2005; Estrin et al., 
2006). Equally, the results of Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) 
indicate that the level of corruption which maximises growth is 
significantly greater than zero. That is, “corruption benefits 
growth at reduced levels of economic development and 
becomes detrimental to growth as the economy advances to a 
high level” (Wang and You, 2012:416). Equally, studies 
“conducted in Africa agree that bureaucracy and corruption are 
causes of poverty in Africa” (Barry and Tacneng, 2014:4). In a 
similar study on corruption and SME’s growth, it was perceived 
as a challenge (Chilosi, 2001, Okpara and Wynn, 2007). 
 
According to Mendoza et al. (2010:435), in the Philippines’, 
corruption makes commercial activities easy for SMEs, 
particularly in cities with poor business environments. In a 
cautionary tone, Rose-Ackerman (2017:186) warns “that if 
exchanges are based on informal exchanges, it will lead to 
distortion and unpleasant outcome”. In pre-modern times, 
personal networks facilitated trade, as Greif (2006) has shown 
for Maghreb traders in the Middle Ages (Rose-Ackerman, 
2017:184) might be appropriate. However, in current times, if 
exchanges are only based on relationships without 
consideration for the viability of the business, there may be lots 
of capital around. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to be efficiently 
deployed (Rose-Ackerman, 2017). This is because businesses 
that are not viable may end up getting funded due to the 
influence of their network and reputation. 
 
According to Degryse et al. (2016:32), obtaining a loan from 
informal financial lenders is associated with the higher sales 
growth rate for small firms. In developing countries, finance from 
friends and family play a much more significant role than in 
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industrialised countries (Degryse et al., 2016). More generally, 
SMEs in many developing countries sidestep market failures 
and lack of formal rules by creating private governance systems 
in the form of long-term business relationships and tight, 
ethnically based, business networks. However, there is variation 
in access to such networks across ethnic groups, as discussed 
by Biggs and Shah (2006). Indian entrepreneurs in East Africa, 
Lebanese firms in West Africa and European enterprises in 
Southern Africa form business networks whose members lend 
to each other. They provide personal references and ease 
transactions with an informal contract enforcement system 
based on reputation. These networks help overcome the 
problems of asymmetric information and weak formal contract 
enforcement systems. Advantages of networks even extend to 
new entrants who started twice as large in terms of assets as 
new entrants outside the ethnic networks and get immediate 
access to supplier credit without building up a reputation and 
relationships (Biggs and Shah, 2006).  
 
While networks with private institutional support systems help 
their members overcome deficiencies in their economies’ 
institutional environment, they have a discriminatory effect on 
non-members who can effectively be excluded from market 
exchanges. This has not only “negative repercussions for equity 
but also provides for a static pattern of business exchange, with 
little competition and innovation” (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 
2006:2939). 
 
A Brazilian micro-enterprise survey study on the 1996 
introduction of a business tax reduction and simplification 
scheme called Integrated System for the Payment of Taxes and 
Social Security Contributions of Micro and Small Enterprises 
(SIMPLES), found out that there was a significant increase in 
‘formality’ in several dimensions as a result of the scheme 
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(Fajnzylber et al., 2011). Moreover, newly created “firms that opt 
for operating formally show higher levels of revenue and profits, 
employ more workers and are more capital intensive (only for 
those firms that have employees)” (Fajnzylber et al., 2011:262). 
Equally, in an empirical study focusing on the implications of the 
shadow economy on official growth, a positive relationship 
between the growth of the shadow economy and the official 
economy under certain assumptions (meagre entry costs into 
the shadow economy due to a low probability of enforcement) 
was found (Schneider, 2005). They conclude that an 
expansionary fiscal policy is a positive stimulus for both the 
formal and informal economies (Schneider, 2005:613; Rand and 
Torm, 2012b). 
 
In contrast to the above, Beck et al. (2008), in their study, found 
that Chinese firms that access loans from formal financial 
lenders perform better in different ways than firms that rely on 
informal financing. According to Saeed (2009), empirical 
evidence from Brazilian SMEs 1999-2005 revealed that internal 
or owners’ funds and formal sources of finance had been found 
significantly related to the performance of SMEs and that 
informal source of finance seem not significantly related to SMEs 
performance (Oladele, 2014). The cause of the conflicting 
evidence was suggested to be caused by differences across the 
firm size samples (Degryse et al., 2016). Informal and formal 
finance have their strengths and weaknesses that imply that 
firms of different sizes may make different choices. Some firms 
may also benefit by simultaneously engaging informal and 
formal financiers. This is called co-funding and was found to 
have a positive effect on growth (Degryse et al., 2016).  
 
The co-existence and potential complementarity demonstrate an 
ability to raise funds from both formal and informal financial 
lenders. As suggested by Degryse et al. (2016), co-funding can 
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be beneficial if SMEs that have been previously disadvantaged 
by the formal sector become a beneficiary of the formal sector 
again. This is possible after getting informal loan accessing and 
that experience may help to prepare the ground to acquire the 
ability to obtain access to formal finance. Furthermore, Degryse 
et al. (2016) argued that it is a familiar occurrence for small 
entrepreneurs to demonstrate an ability to raise funds from 
informal financial lenders before formal financial lenders give a 
green light on their funding. Most reasons for not getting access 
in the first place was because they could not meet loan 
preconditions. There is a possibility that after a series of funding 
from the informal sector, a business might be able to put in place 
all that is required to qualify for formal financing. Putting in place 
the requirement of formal financial lenders would involve 
decision making, which would set the wheels in motion leading 
to routine change.  Routine change has been explored 
extensively in section 2.9.  
 
The influential effect of informal rules on formal rules has been 
extensively addressed in general contexts and routed in similar 
but not the same environment. For example, in the issue of 
guanxi was explored by Horak et al. (2016) in China and Helmke 
and Levsiky is applicable to both developing and developed 
environmental context (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Horak, 
2016).  
2.15 Summary  
The literature review has provided a context to the current study 
and a discussion on the nature of the institutionalised 
arrangement guiding lending relationships, and likely outcomes 
have been explored. Relevant theories such as institution 
theory, cognitive psychology and the theory of evolution and 
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concepts (e.g., institutions, formal and informal lenders, 
regulations, rules, social capital, amongst others) have offered 
the premise upon which relevant issues can be understood and, 
more importantly, critically compared. In this respect, the 
literature review does not only offer the necessary lens through 
which the data will be viewed but a mirror against which the 
participants’ and researcher’s independent understanding of the 
findings can be reflected.  
 
The critical analysis of multiple perspectives has yielded 
numerous ideas which are self-evident in their relevance to the 
current research. The discussions enable the researcher to 
communicate the theoretical arguments towards which the 
research ultimately seeks to contribute. At the core of this study 
is, therefore, an understanding of individual experiences of 
lending and the preconditions linked to various lenders, including 
the interplay between formal and informal lenders and its 
implications.  Focusing on such experiences may lead to the 
generation of a novel contribution to the broader debates on 
lending practice, and formal and informal rules related to growth 
and routine change.  
 
This chapter provides a basis that addresses the gaps identified 
in the current understanding of the role of lenders as a key 
external influence on SMEs by explaining the coercive power 
exerting pressure on SMEs who are desirous to obtain loans. 
Thereby making them adhere to certain preconditions as this is 
the only way access to finance can be obtained.  
 
In summarising the arguments presented in this chapter, the 
likelihood of growth has been established. However, the extent 
of it remains elusive. Equally, routine change was seen to be 
possible despite the stickiness; the coercive role of external 
triggers was presented to be powerfu l enough to create that 
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change in SMEs’ routines. There are arguments to suggest that 
the nature of this change is determined by SMEs’ disposition and 
capacity to adapt. The decision about where to borrow and the 
process of adaption emphasises the influence of past 
experiences/history. The changes in routines experienced might 
vary or otherwise across the different beneficiaries. However, 
except that the literature was able to establish the possibility of 
change in routine and growth, the likely underlying cause of the 
change, including variations that may occur remain elusive. Little 
is known of the extent of the underlying mechanism and causes 
of the routine change in relation to the developing nature of the 
Nigerian Manufacturing setting. Similarly, the role of formal and 
informal lenders needs to be explicitly presented within the 
lending viewpoint touching on growth and routine change, which 
the literature review could not do as there is no study out there 
demonstrating that.  
 
Hence, the next chapter will explore how this can happen by 
looking at the methodology adopted, which led to the outcome 
that bridges the identified gap in the reviewed literature. This was 
done through attracting, eliciting and analysing narratives 
obtained from participants. Furthermore, it helps to understand 
how each formal and informal rule differs from each other and 
how they interfere with one another and how best they relate to 
one another for a better outcome.  
 
To achieve the aim of this study, a systematic approach is 





CHAPTER THREE- METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter presents an in-depth description and justification for 
the methodologies and principles adopted in this study. This was 
done in line with the overall aim of the research design and 
questions. The articulation of reality was interpreted based on 
experiences expressed by SMEs, which touched on their lending 
relationships and the outcomes associated with them. As a 
result, the understanding of their realities on the effects of 
preconditions of loan helps the researcher to determine its 
implication on their businesses.   
 
The study was in two stages, the first stage was the pilot study, 
and the second stage was the main study. This research began 
in September 2016 with several drafts of proposals and a 
continuous review of relevant literature. This was followed by the 
pilot study, which took place in August 2017. The main study 
was conducted between January and February 2018, and both 
analyses had been concluded.  
 
Before  discussing how this research was conducted and the 
explanations about philosophical ideology and paradigms, the 
research aim and objectives are presented in the next section. 
 
3.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
This research aims to investigate the impact of formal and 





To achieve the research aim mentioned above, three research 
objectives were identified: 
 
The objectives of this study are: 
1. To identify how formal and informal financial 
institutions impact the growth of SMEs through lending 
preconditions. 
2. To explore how institutions (formal and informal 
financial sources) impact the adoption and 
development of new routines in SMEs. 
3. To investigate the interplay between formal and 
informal financial institutions and their impact on 
SMEs. 
3.3 The Research Philosophy adopted 
An interpretivism ontological perspective is employed for this 
study. This was done to assist in understanding the 
phenomenon at hand, reflects the study's context, accommodate 
the inherent complications and complexities, and the subjective 
nature of realities associated with SMEs experiences. However, 
this study is not investigating or observing routines per se, but 
drawing on participant narratives on their understanding of how 
habits of thought, habits and routines have or have not changed. 
Interpretivism interprets phenomena within its context and has 
the capacity to touch on how participants develop their 
knowledge (Schwandt, 1994).  
 
The suitability of the interpretive approach is due to its ability to 
capture the subjective nature and multiple interpretations of 
reality as expressed by participants who are beneficiaries of 
loans. In this context, it was intended to understand how SMEs 
perceive lending from different perspectives following their 
experiences of different types of lenders and the associated 
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outcomes. When designing the underpinning methodological 
framework, the freedom and the flexibility of expression informed 
by participants' own opinion justify why this interpretative 
position is appropriate. This interpretive method of research 
starts from the position that our knowledge of reality, including 
the domain of human action, is a product of human actors' social 
construction (Walsham, 1993).  
 
Interpretative philosophy is rooted in the philosophical traditions 
of hermeneutics and phenomenology, and the central influence 
of this approach is linked to German sociologist Max Weber. 
Interpretivism looks for meanings and motives behind people's 
actions like behaviour and interactions with others in society and 
culture (Whitley, 1984). Cultures can be comprehended by 
studying people's ideas, thinking, and the meanings that are 
important to them (Boas, 1995). Interpretivists argue that value-
free data cannot be obtained, since the enquirers use their 
preconceptions to guide the process of enquiry. Furthermore, 
the researcher interacts with the human subjects of the enquiry, 
changing the perceptions of both parties (Walsham, 1995). 
Interpretivists contend that only through subjective interpretation 
and intervention can reality be fully understood.  
 
Interpretivism sees reality as complex because different people 
view the same reality in very distinct ways. Several possible 
factors account for these differences: while some are 
independent of the individual, others are inherent to the 
individual. For instance, in a crash, witnesses would have 
differential views (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The positions from 
which the crash was witnessed, the amount of time that elapsed 
between the accident and the time of making a statement, the 
reliability of the witnesses' memories, the amount of sunlight 
present, and the health and quality of eyesight would determine 
the witnessed reality (Guba and Lincoln , 1994:110). These and 
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other “variables account for differing interpretations of the 
accident” (Johnson , 2008:304).  
 
Thus, there are two critical sides to understanding reality, the 
researchers and the participants. This relates to the idea of 
double hermeneutic, wherein the researcher attempts to make 
sense of the participants' interpretations, and at the same time, 
the participants are making efforts towards making sense of their 
own experiences (Elliott et al., 1999; Larkin et al., 2006). This 
means that the themes that emerged here may be constructed 
differently by another researcher or perceived differently by 
another reader. Nevertheless, it is expected that the 
researcher's efforts to present a logical and well-articulated 
account of the analyses would enable any would-be reader to 
make their ‘own ’ credibility checks (Elliott et al., 1999).  
 
Equally, the participants' narratives were expressed freely, as 
the instrument adopted for data collection was a semi-structured 
interview and questions are more or less open-ended to allow 
for openness and flexibility. This corresponds with the IPA 
principle deployed for capturing participants' perception 
embedded in their narratives; more details on IPA is explained 
in section 3.8. 
 
Accordingly, understanding the subjective meanings assigned to 
reality by individuals is essential in interpretive 
philosophy. Reality can be “conceived along a continuum with 
two extremes” (Johnson, 2008:30). At one end of the extreme is 
the objective view of reality; at the other end is the subjective 
view. The difference between the two extremes is expressed in 
the subsequent question: Are the discussions and incidents that 
we are exposed to, understandable to us as objective realities 
that occur without our perceptions or as our subjective 
interpretations? An example of a riddle explains this distinction: 
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if it happens that a tree falls in the forests and there is nobody to 
hear it fall, would it make a sound? (Johnson, 2008). Those who 
agree with the objectivist ontology viewpoint may be quick to 
claim that it does (304). Their argument will be that regardless 
of whether anyone was there to hear it or not, the objective fact 
is that it made a sound. 
 
Nevertheless, those who hold reality in terms of subjectivist 
ontology would contend otherwise. Since no one was there to 
witness, to perceive, to interpret and consequently make sense 
of the falling tree, it neither occurred, fell, nor made any sound 
(Johnson, 2008). However, an objectivist defines reality as being 
external to and independent of the individual. On the hand, the 
subjectivist defines reality as internal to and dependent on the 
individual's perception of experience. From a subjective 
viewpoint, reality exists if it was perceived and interpreted.  
 
Without someone physically present to experience and interpret 
it, the subjectivist argues there is no reality. Discussions of the 
nature of reality are complicated because between these 
ontological extremes, many combinations of objectivism and 
subjectivism are possible (Johnson, 2006). The objective view 
on one end of the continuum mirrors positivism, indicating that 
reality is independent of the researcher. Moreover, the 
subjective end of the continuum sees reality within the lens of 
the individual, this mirror interpretivism.   
 
Gaining the insight of SMEs is pertinent to this study, and that is 
why SMEs who are direct beneficiaries of loans from lenders are 
the focus. This is because they have experienced the lending 
process as defined within the existing financing institutional 
arrangements. An outsider who has not benefitted from a loan 
before would not be able to ascribe valid meanings that would 
represent a similar reality. In this ontological description, 
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cognitive elements ("meanings, beliefs and intentions") appear 
to be essential (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991:14). Thus, the 
researcher role is to interpret the subjective meaning SMEs 
ascribed to their reality within the context of their environment. 
The context here includes, for example, past lending 
experiences, education, and societal beliefs. 
 
Past experiences may cover experiences and relationships with 
lenders. Educational background or level of education and the 
cultural beliefs within the community an SME belongs are 
experiences that may lead an SME owner to be more disposed 
to or be more comfortable with certain lending practices. These 
are variables the researcher accommodated in making sense of 
the participant's reality. 
 
At this junction, it is crucial to transition on to issues of 
epistemological perspective. This is because leaning towards a 
social constructivist position is compatible with the aim of this 
research, as it enables the creation of new, usable knowledge 
through multiple perspectives of the truth (Jarvensivu and 
Tornroos, 2010). Epistemology, as a technical term in 
philosophy, it refers to how we know and the relationship 
between the knower and the known (Soini et al., 2011). 
Epistemology refers to "how people know what they know, 
including assumptions about the nature of knowledge and 
reality" (Mingers, 2003:213). I Interpretive epistemology is one 
of subjectivism which is based on real-world phenomena. This 
means the world does not exist independently of our knowledge 
of it (Grix, 2004:83). 
 
Regarding objects, for example; trees, Crotty (1998:43) 
suggested that we should bear in mind “that it is human beings 
who have constructed it as a tree, given it the name, and 
ascribed to it connotations we generally make with trees." A tree 
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will mean something else if no one calls it a tree. Although this 
statement appears controversial, the point here is that 
consciousness is always an awareness of something (Crotty, 
1998:44). To experience a world is to participate in it; through 
participation, one is simultaneously moulding and encountering 
it (Heron and  Reason, 1997:3). Therefore, the meaning is not 
discovered; it is constructed through interaction between 
consciousness and the world. 
 
How knowledge is generated and exchanged by people in 
interaction within and between organisations forms the main 
focus of constructivism. This emphasis on the experiential 
nature of the process, and the social contexts that both define 
and create it, are equally reflected in Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2002) where experience is stated as very important to reality.  
 
It is in relation to the explanation made above that it was 
concluded that interpretivism and social constructivism are the 
most appropriate to the phenomenon at hand. Equally, the 
ontological and the epistemological stance of this study is more 
aligned with a case study research strategy, and its adoption is 
in tune with the research aim. The next section will explore the 
adoption of a case study as a research strategy. 
3.4 Research Strategy 
The adoption of a case study research strategy is, on the one 
hand in line with the philosophical stance explained above, and 
on the other hand, suitable for qualitative research, as it  could 
be used to achieve the research aim and objectives (Saunders, 
2012). Equally, the phenomenon under study, which is the 
impact of formal and informal lending to SMEs in the 
manufacturing sector in Nigeria, can easily be explored by 
adopting a case study. This is because a case study provides 
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tools for researchers to study complex phenomena within their 
contexts (Baxter and Jack, 2008).  
 
According to Moen (2006), the unit of analysis must be a living 
part of the whole, and the SME represents that living part that 
connects the whole. The unit of analysis under study here is the 
SME. They are individuals who have had past or ongoing 
dealings with lenders, and their experiences would offer some 
uniqueness and originality needed for an enriched outcome. The 
study is interested in investigating the relationships of the unit of 
analysis (SME) with lenders and the implication of that 
relationship on their growth and routine change.  
 
There are critical justifications for adopting a case study. For 
example, case study research allows for the exploration and 
understanding of complex issues. It can accommodate a range 
of philosophical positions. For example, interpretivism and social 
constructivism. The choice of case study is as a result of its 
ability to be tailored to the inherent complexity of the research 
problem (Anthony and Jack 2009; Houghton et al., 2010; 
Farquhar 2012; Merriam, 2009; Stake, 2006; Yin, 2014). It is 
recognised as a tool for investigating many social science 
studies (Grassel and Schirmer, 2006) and community-related 
issues (Johnson et al., 2006). It goes beyond the surface but 
reveals behavioural conditions through the participant's 
perspective (Zainal, 2015). Also, this works well with the choice 
of Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) adopted for 
making sense of participants' narratives (Smith & Shinebourne 
2012; Eatough and Smith, 2008; Smith et al., 1999). See 3.8 for 
more details on IPA. 
 
This is because a case study, according to Yin (1994, 2009) is 
an empirical inquiry that examines an existing phenomenon 
within its real-life setting, especially when the boundaries 
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between phenomenon and context are unclear. Due to this 
reason, the study was carried out in real-life settings with 
participants (e.g., at their offices and factories). Undertaking 
data collection at their place of work, i.e., offices and factories 
made the context of their realities easier to understand and 
captivate…. It also gave room for an in-depth investigation to be 
done. This has exposed the detailed information needed to 
achieve the research objectives and contribute to knowledge.  
 
In statistical analysis, one is generalising to a population -based 
on a sample that is representative of that population; however, 
in case studies, one is generalising to a theory based on a case 
selected or unit of analysis selected to represent dimensions of 
that theory (Yin, 2009). Furthermore, the role that the researcher 
performed, involves data collection, designing, interviewing, 
transcribing, analysing, thematising, verifying and reporting. This 
does not imply that this order was followed as listed. Similarly, a 
case study is popularly linked with qualitative research 
(Creswell, 2014; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Merriam, 2009; 
Miles et al., 2014). The goal of most qualitative studies is not to 
generalise but rather to provide an enriched, contextualised 
understanding of some aspect of human experience through 
rigorous studying. This explanation mirrors what was done by 
the researcher, as this research employed a qualitative method 
and explored and discussed the phenomenon using a variety of 
data sources. This ensures that the issue is not explored through 
one lens, but rather a variety of viewpoints which gave room for 
multiple aspects of the phenomenon to be discovered and 
understood. 
 
In determining the right research strategy, careful consideration 
of the different case study approaches is required to determine 
the design that best addresses the aim of the study and that 
aligns with the researcher's worldview. An interpretative case 
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study appears appropriate because it supports the researcher's 
philosophical approach that views reality as a phenomenon that 
is constructed intersubjectively through meanings and 
understandings developed socially and experientially. 
Correspondingly, Yin (2014), Merriam (1998, 2009) 
"emphasises that whenever information is abundant and 
concepts abstract, it is important to utilise processes that help 
interpret, sort, and manage information and that adapt findings 
to convey clarity and applicability to the results".  
 
The researcher ensured narratives are captured in a way that 
reflects participants' view and not clouded by their own biases. 
The research finding contributes to theory and practice by 
providing the knowledge that improves the understanding of the 
implication of loan preconditions on SMEs' growth in the 
Nigerian manufacturing industry. Therefore, it does not 
generalise to all context but only offers explanations based on 
data gathered in connection to the phenomenon relating to the 
constructed impact of formal and informal lending to SMEs in the 
manufacturing sector in Nigeria.    
 
3.5 The Research Method and Approach 
The research approach and method this study will adhere to are 
qualitative method and inductive approach. These two are in 
agreement with the philosophical stance of this research. 
Qualitative method is concerned about gaining a qualitative 
understanding of the phenomenon under study. In other words, 
it is concerned with uncovering the underlying causes of a 
particular issue. It relies on small sample size and non-statistics 
data. 
In contrast, the inductive approach is interested in unravelling 
phenomenon that cannot be fully explained by existing theories. 
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It aims to move from specifics to broad generalisation. Although, 
for instance, institution theory, routine theories, cognitive 
psychology theory, and social capital theory were relied upon, 
they could not explain or provide the answers to the research 
questions.  
 
For instance, the institutional theory was used to define and 
explain the concepts and the theoretical basis that can help 
readers understand the phenomenon and the implication of the 
arrangements that structures the relationship between SMEs 
and lenders. The routine theory was adopted to define and 
theorise what the likely effects of compliance to loan 
preconditions can be. Cognitive psychology was employed to aid 
the debates and expositions on learning, memory, and transfer 
of knowledge - by drawing from the work of Mayer (1977), Cohen 
and Bacdayan (1994), with the sole aim of substantiating and 
clarifying the foundations of habits and routines origins. Social 
capital was introduced to amplify the understanding and idea 
behind the networks associated with informal lending and the 
interplay between lenders. This was done by relying on Helmke 
and Levitsky (2004) and Kostova and Roth (2003).   
 
Although these theories enabled the understanding of key 
concepts and the related theories but do not explain how the 
context of lending preconditions to SMEs within the Nigerian 
manufacturing can impact their growth or routine change. 
Therefore, the adoption of the inductive approach is suitable for 
a situation where there is no theory explaining the phenomenon 
at hand. The inductive approach builds knowledge from the 
bottom to the top via observation of the world (Ritchie et al., 
2013). As a result, themes were developed from data collected, 
based on the qualitative methodology that focused on 
unravelling underlying causes of the phenomenon under 
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investigation, where appropriate findings were drawn and 
conclusions reached (Schwandt, 2007). 
 
Due to the qualitative method and the philosophical basis of this 
study, the most appropriate research instrument that seems 
suitable to address the research objectives is a semi-structure 
interview. It allows for flexibility and the free flow of expressions 
from participants to the researcher. Free flow of expression is 
essential for a rich holistic description, as it can illuminate the 
understanding of the phenomena under review (Merriam, 1998).  
The next section will illuminate further the reason and the 
usefulness of the research instrument chosen. 
3.6 The instrument used for data  
A semi-structured interview using guided questions was 
employed in the pilot and the main studies to gather primary 
data. Semi-structured interviews offer greater flexibility than 
structured interviews, generate richer data. Also, allows the 
researcher to follow interesting or new areas that may arise 
during the interview (Smith, 1995). 
 
As mentioned in the last paragraph of the last subsection, semi-
structured was deemed suitable because it enables exploration 
of experiences in line with the research problem outlined above 
in 3.2 and helped in the generation of insight relevant to the 
themes emerging across these experiences. The semi-
structured interview meets the research requirement as it aids 
the transfer of SMEs' narratives to explicit forms of data, 
especially when conducted in a reflexive style (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Stover, 2004). It is also an effective method for 
enabling the generation of narratives through which experiences 




The instrument collected primary data, with questions framed to 
elicit responses that touched on the constructed realities formed 
by SMEs' owners within the context of loan preconditions. 
Adopting this method provide for flexibility (Saunders et al., 
2009), in a manner that subsequent questions are framed, as 
participant's responses may prompt the researcher to ask further 
questions that are relevant to the direction the discussion is 
heading, hence leading to the originality of ideas. The research 
instrument employed open-ended questioning, and that 
supports the gaining of access to the perspective of the person 
being interviewed (Qu and Dumay, 2011) and allows the 
interviewer to pursue points of particular importance. This 
included providing participants with the opportunity to expand 
upon their answers as necessary. These narratives were then 
transcribed by the researcher and then subjected to the same 
processes of open/initial coding. Themes then emerged from the 
data (see 3.10 for more details on themes that were developed). 
Therefore, to accomplish the aim of the research in line with the 
method and the philosophical ideologies of this study, the next 
section explores the data collection process.  
3.7 The Process of Data Collection 
Data were collected in two phases. The reason was that the 
study was in two parts: the pilot study and the main study. 
3.7.1 Pilot Study - Data Collection  
The research started by contacting family and friends. Through 
that effort, the researcher got introduced to the secretary of the 
Lagos State Small Scale industrialist and a cooperative society 
chairman based in Ilorin, Kwara State. Nigeria is divided into 36 
states plus the Federal Capital, Abuja, making it 37. Lagos State 
is one of the states in Nigeria. Through the researcher's 
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interaction with him, it was realised there are other state 
chapters of the Small-Scale Industrialist Association. The 
researcher started checking their contact details online. Through 
that means, a few individuals; whose interest seems to match 
the requirement of this  study were discovered and contacted. 
They include the Chairman of Ogun State Small Scale 
Industrialist Association, the Chairman of Lagos State Small 
Scale Industrialist association on LinkedIn. The researcher 
contacted them, and that was how a relationship was created. 
During the exchange of correspondence, the researcher 
informed them of the research which has to do with 
understanding the role financing preconditions play in the 
lending process and its implications. They agreed to participate, 
and a future date was arranged. Further contact was suspended 
for those that stated they had not obtained a loan before. 
 
However, in maintaining participant anonymity, the effort was 
focused on presenting participants' experiences without 
presenting data that identifies them. The questions were open -
ended in nature and were chosen to provide insight into how and 
why the individuals had become involved in lending. Their 
narratives offer an initial insight into how individuals were making 
sense of their experience in lending to SMEs and the way they 
perceive the impact of such loan preconditions on SMEs' 
growth.  
 
The pilot study interview was conducted over four weeks 
between the 2nd of August 2017 to 30th of August 2017. All 
interviews were recorded. The data from the pilot study had a 
significant influence on the subsequent development of the data 
collection instrument used in the main study. More importantly, 
the need to increase the sample size of experts from four to eight 
was realised in the pilot study and it was put into consideration 
and implemented in the main study. Specifically, two of the four 
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experts referred to the Bank of Industry. Similarly, some 
questions relating to regional variations in loan preconditions 
were removed because responses from respondents who are 
experts in lending revealed loan preconditions of any financial 
institution such as a bank is constant and do not change 
according to regions. This was substantiated further by 
information on the central bank website indicating that there is 
only one central bank of Nigeria. Also,  any regulation passed  
by the Central Bank covers the whole financial sector of the 
country.  
 
The revelations supported the achievement of the pilot study 
objective, whereby it informed the next phase of data collection, 
i.e. the main study, by ensuring the development of subsequent 
research instrument captured some of the lessons learnt from 
the responses that emerged from the pilot study. See more 
details in section 4.12, where questions relating to regional 
contexts were removed due to the standardisation of lending 
preconditions across all the states and regions of Nigeria.  
3.7.2 Main Study – Data Collection 
The main study's data collection follows a similar pattern as the 
pilot one. Friends and families were contacted, and through 
them, a list of potential participants was compiled. The Lagos 
State and Ogun State Small Scale industrialist associations 
were also contacted, which led to access to their members who 
have obtained loans in the past. Due to time, distance and cost 
factors, the number of participants targeted was restricted to 
twenty (20). Of the twenty (20), at least eight was approved to 
be the minimum required for the study. The rationale for 
targeting SMEs that have achieved access to finance is to 
evaluate their interpretation of the effect loan preconditions of 
different sources, i.e. the formal and informal lenders, have on 
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SME. The researcher had first-hand information from SMEs' 
owners about their lending experiences, views and 
interpretations.  
 
As stated in the last paragraph of 3.7.1, two more banks and a 
government financing agency were added to the targeted 
sample. As a result, the researcher included a microfinance 
bank, a development bank, i.e. Bank of Industry and Lagos State 
Employment Trust Fund (LSTEF). The mandate of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) is to provide banking services to the poor. 
Many of the Nigerian microfinance banks evolved from very 
informal beginnings, i.e. local cooperatives. The development 
bank was created to provide the much-needed financial support 
for industrial development in the country, and the Bank of 
Industry does that in Nigeria. The Lagos state government 
established LSETF through the Lagos State Employment Trust 
Fund Law 2016 to provide financial support to residents of Lagos 
State, for the job, wealth creation and to tackle unemployment 
(www.lsetf.ng, 2018) See more details in 5.1. 
 
The inclusion of additional sources of financing allows for the 
evaluation of the extent to which access to loan from each of 
these sources affects SMEs. The questions that were asked 
revolved around; preconditions of loan, how SMEs met them, 
and the implication it has on their businesses. The researcher 
allowed respondents to answer questions based on their 
realities. See appendix 5 and 6 for the Pilot and Main Study's 
questionnaires. 
 
3.8 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is employed for 
capturing and sense-making of narratives. This is because IPA 
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is concerned with the detailed examination of personal lived 
experiences of participants (Eatough and Smith , 2008). In the 
light of the philosophical principles and research method 
employed, the researcher visited participants' offices and 
factories to have the first-hand experience and to witness their 
lived environment. This exposed the nature of work ongoing in 
their factories and workplaces. This action eases and guides the 
researcher when interpreting their narratives. The understanding 
of the connection between their lived experiences, social 
relationships, the environment and its effects on their subjectivity 
made much difference to this qualitative research outcome.  
  
Unfortunately, many researchers are unable to comprehend that 
management behaviours/actions as practised in an organisation 
is not the same as management theory. Managerial actions are 
moulded by and knotted in a network of human activities, which 
depend on competing human mutual actions (e.g., 
communication) and experiences (Anosike et al., 2012). In 
capturing this web of connectivity that constitutes the 
multifaceted reality of lived experience, requires employing an 
approach that holds non-positivistic research procedures such 
as interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (Anosike et 
al., 2012). As we know, IPA seeks to capture experiential 
understanding and the connectivity of the network-facing 
individual subjective realities. Smith et al. (2009:11) state that 
IPA is "an approach suitable for qualitative, experiential and 
psychological research which has been informed by concepts 
and arguments from three key areas of philosophy of 
knowledge: phenomenology, hermeneutics and idiography". IPA 
draws on each of these theoretical approaches to inform its 
distinctive epistemological framework and research 




As indicated above, the philosophical roots of IPA are most 
closely aligned with phenomenology (Oxley, 2016). 
Phenomenological researchers generally seek to evaluate the 
rich details of participants' ways of making meaning of particular 
experiences by focusing more intentionally on aspects of lived 
experience that regularly go unnoticed or uninvestigated daily 
(Finlay 2011). At its best, this "interpretative approach combines 
the detailed description of a phenomenological core (which aims 
to capture something of the claims and concerns of the 'person-
in-context') with the more speculative development of an 
interpretative account (which considers the meaning of such 
claims and concerns)" (Larkin et al., 2006:117). 
 
Phenomenology focus is "on the way things appear to us 
through experience or in our consciousness where the 
phenomenological researcher aims to provide a rich textured 
description of lived experience" (Finlay, 2008:1). There are two 
distinct branches to be considered, the descriptive and the 
hermeneutic or interpretive. Hermeneutic phenomenology is 
less objective and more personal (reflexive) on the part of the 
philosopher (researcher). It is referred to as interpretive 
phenomenology because it takes an interpretive rather than a 
descriptive method of analysis. (Finlay, 2008, 2009; Matua and 
Van Der Wal, 2015). Hermeneutic research is interpretive and 
focussed on historically connected meanings of experience and 
their developmental and cumulative effects on individual and 
social levels. Similarly, Pietkiewicz and Smith (2014:8) observe 
that IPA blends ideas from both backgrounds, "resulting in 
descriptive method”. 
 
Finlay (2011) identified Martin Heidegger's (1962) hermeneutic 
phenomenology and Edmund Husserl's (1970) transcendental 
phenomenology as the twin in-depth categorisations of 
phenomenological study. Resulting from Heidegger, IPA 
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focuses on exploring the meaning of personal experience as an 
interpretative endeavour on the part of both researcher and 
respondent. At the same time, in agreement with Husserl's 
phenomenology, IPA is concerned with examining experience, 
as far as possible, in its ‘own ’ terms as contrasting to for example 
being excessively pressured by prior psychological theorising or 
by the personal inclination of the researcher. In consequence, 
IPA operates with a double hermeneutic. See section 4.4, 
where the researcher explains how he tries to make sense of the 
participants’ views in their attempts to make sense of their 
world(Smith & Osborn, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, IPA extends beyond traditional phenomenology in 
its distinct commitment to idiography (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 
2014). Idiography can be defined as the study of the particular 
versus the general (Smith et al., 2009). It underscores the 
importance of the individual as a unit of analysis (Smith et al., 
1995). An idiographic approach is committed to the detailed 
examination of a particular phenomenon (preconditions) as it is 
experienced and given meaning in the lived‐world of a particular 
person (SME). 
 
More importantly, as suggested by Matua and Van Der Wal 
(2015), phenomenology has now transitioned from descriptive 
phenomenology, which emphasises the 'pure' description  of 
people's experiences, to the 'interpretation' of such experiences, 
as in hermeneutic phenomenology. This shift of focus of 
phenomenological inquiry from 'description' to 'interpretation and 
understanding' is grounded in the work of Heidegger who argued 
that all descriptions are already an interpretation because 
understanding is an inevitable basic structure of our 'being in the 
world' (Heidegger 1962;Finlay, 2008). An individual practically 
interprets and finds meanings in events in their lives and how 
these events influence the context in which they operate, for 
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example, a mother or an employee (Heidegger, 1962; Wojnar 
and Swanson, 2007) and by extension SMEs. 
 
Consequently, the capturing of perceptions and constructed 
realities of SMEs and lending experts was systematically done 
by adopting IPA because it touches extensively on their lived 
experiences, in connection with the relationships crafted within 
the institutional lending arrangement, and the subjectivity of the 
participants relating to their cognitive capacity.  
 
Eatough and Smith (2008) suggested the use of an analytical 
approach that involves employing several levels of 
interpretation. Beginning with an empathic sharing of the 
participant's ideas based on experiences, the analysis then 
moves through a series of levels to a more interpretative stance 
and then further towards a more abstracted and conceptual 
reading, while still grounded in the participant's words and lived 
situation. Smith et al. (2009) contend that "for IPA, a successful 
interpretation is one that is principally based on a reading from 
within the terms of the text produced by the participants". When 
successfully applied, it creates outcomes that lead to a richer 
and deeper understanding of management practice. 
 
As such, IPA is an inductive approach used to understand the 
SMEs' ‘personal’ account of their lending experience in relation 
to its effects, rather than trying to find causal explanations for 
events or produce objective 'facts' (Smith and Osborn, 2008). In 
the current study, the IPA approach acknowledges the inevitable 
influence of the researcher's views, assumptions and beliefs 
upon the interpretation of the participants' account, and it is, 
therefore, crucial for the researcher to reflect upon this explicitly 
(Smith et al., 1997). The analytic account produced from the 
interview data is viewed as a joint product of reflection and 
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collaboration from both the participant and the researcher (Smith 
et al., 1997).  
 
Analysis of textual data and elucidation of themes requires a 
systematic process of coding, examination  of meaning and 
provision of a description of the social reality. This study adopts 
a qualitative research involving some level of familiarity with the 
data collected, which can help to obtain the right interpretations 
and conclusions.Examples of analytical approaches suitable are 
content analysis and thematic analysis. To achieve an enriched 
analysis that captures the participants' reality, and at the same 
time reflect the phenomenological and 
hermeneutic/interpretative ideologies, thematic analysis (TA) 
was chosen.  
 
From the above, it can be established that IPA is essential 
because it allows the obtained information to be clearly 
understood and analysed in ways that address the research 
questions. Despite the merits of IPA, there are various concerns 
raised against its adoption, this has been explored in the next 
section.  
3.9 Critiquing of IPA as a Method and How it was 
Addressed 
IPA has been critiqued by some for being too descriptive, less 
standardised, not providing enough level of interpretation, 
ambiguous, and lacking context (Pietkiewicz and Smith , 2014). 
Other criticism of IPA is that the methodology suffers from some 
major conceptual and practical limitations. Also, it cannot 
accurately capture the experiences and meanings of 





Whilst phenomenology as philosophy is associated with 
introspection allowing the philosopher to explore his or her 
experiences through ‘phenomenological meditation’. Also, 
phenomenology as a research approach relies on the accounts 
of participants and the experiences of researchers. Yet, the 
critical unanswered question is whether both the participants 
and researchers have the requisite communication skills to 
successfully communicate the nuances of experiences. 
Therefore, a phenomenological study is suitable for highly 
eloquent individuals. This may be particularly the case when 
interviewing people about sensitive issues (Pietkiewicz and 
Smith, 2014). However, the criticism could be regarded as elitist. 
Thus, suggesting that only those having access to the right level 
of fluency are allowed to describe their experiences. However, it 
is sensible for readers hoping to use IPA for future projects to 
note this criticism and adopt extra attentiveness when collecting 
rich and exhaustive data from participants. 
 
Secondly, IPA, like other phenomenological inquiries, focuses 
on perceptions is problematic and limiting to our understanding, 
because phenomenological research seeks to understand the 
lived experiences but does not explain why they occur. A 
rigorous research inquiry seeking to understand the experiences 
of its participants will also seek to explore the conditions that 
caused the experiences which took place in the past and the 
socio-cultural dimension.  
 
Various approaches have been put forward to address the 
shortcomings mentioned above. For example, Creswell (2013) 
list of standards. This could help remedy the arguments against 
IPA research and make it unique and exceptional. As a standard 
of excellence in a phenomenological research study, the 
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standard proposed by Creswell was followed. These standards 
stipulate that the author needs to: 
• convey an understanding of the philosophical tenets of 
phenomenology. 
• have a clear “phenomenon” to study that is articulated in 
a concise way.  
• use procedures of data analysis in phenomenology 
• convey the overall essence of the experience of the 
participants, including a description of the experience and 
the context in which it occurred. 
• be reflective throughout the study (pg. 152-153) 
 
In line with the standard proposed above and to address the 
shortcomings cited about IPA; necessary steps were taken.  
 
In terms of ensuring clarity of ideas, the philosophical 
underpinning of how reality was captured and how sense-
making and analysis were done to mirror the steps above. Also, 
further clarification was done using interpretivism and social 
constructivism. Details of the interpretivism ontological and 
social constructivism epistemological perspectives are 
described in section 3.3. The rationality and justification of IPA’s 
adoption are presented and explained within the context of this 
study. This was done by unravelling the main three key areas 
that IPA draw from i.e. phenomenology, hermeneutics and 
idiography (see section 3.8 for details).  
 
This research identifies concisely and clearly the “phenomenon” 
of study, i.e. the influence of formal and informal lending on 
SMEs in the manufacturing sector in the South West of Nigeria.  
 
Participants’ voice and opinion were considered while ensuring 
sufficient critical analysis was undertaken. Allowing participants 
to provide explanations as they deem necessary without 
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interference from the researcher. This was aided through the use 
of open-ended questions. Thereby allowing for flexibility, sharing 
of lived experiences and personal reflection.  
 
To ensure the researcher’s interpretation is reflective of the 
participants’  views and not influenced by the researcher’s 
biases, efforts were directed at making sure lived experiences 
were captured. This was done through visits to factories and 
office locations. Also, this enabled researcher’s sense-making 
and analysis to be based on narratives and the experiences 
gained from visits to participants’ locations. Thus, the 
researcher’s prejudice and bias were minimised/mitigated. 
 
Additionally, the study employed a small sample size. This 
allowed easy management of data and enabled detailed 
analysis to be conducted. Furthermore, the above standards 
were observed to achieve standardisation and orderliness. This 
enabled better organisation and presentation of the lived 
experiences of the participants. For example, a description of the 
experience and the context in which it occurred were done using 
superordinate and subordinate themes. Efforts were taken to 
explain each theme and the link between them. 
 
At each stage of the data analysis, reasonable effort and due 
attention were given to reflection on participants’ accounts. 
Where necessary, references and quotations from participants 
were cited as a means to make sure analysis and sense-making 
were reflective and grounded in participant’s views. 
 
Further standardisation in the analysis was attained by following 
a step-by-step approach rooted in Thematic Analysis (TA). Six 
different steps were followed, these include familiarisation, 
generation of initial codes, searching for themes, evaluation and 
reviewing of themes for further improvement. Also, choosing 
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what aspect of the data each theme had to capture and 
identifying what was of interest. Lastly, reporting of the results 
and findings. The adoption of NVivo also addresses the criticism 
as it aids the organisation of thoughts and patterns that 
systematically emerged. 
Common threads across different participants' account were 
searched and categorised into various levels of themes. This led 
to a systematic and organised presentation of ideas, entrenched 
in participants narratives. To ensure that the analysis was 
systematically approached and routed in respondents' realities. 
Thus, a thematic analytical method was employed in the 
classification and presentation of participants’ perceptions. The 
conceptual meaning and justifications are explored in the next 
section. 
3.10 Thematic Analysis  
This study adopts TA because it is a more flexible, useful and 
systematic analytical tool. It is a systematic approach that 
searches for and identifies common threads across different 
participants' account. This is essential for investigating the 
impact of loan precondition on SME growth and routine change, 
a phenomenon that has never been investigated before.  
 
Some authors contend thematic analysis as a process used for 
qualitative methods. It is not a separate method, preferably 
something to be used to assist researchers in analysing data 
(Boyatzis, 1998; Holloway and Todres, 2003). Aronson (1994), 
Attride-Stirling (2001), Crabtree and Miller (1999), described it 
as a guide in conducting research with an applied focus (Guest 
et al., 2011) or as a described inductive versus deductive coding 
(Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Others claimed thematic 
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analysis should be considered a standalone method (King 2004; 
Thorne, 2000). From the various descriptions, it can be 
concluded that there is no consensus about what it is. 
To make the best use of thematic analysis, this study clarifies 
and introduces methodological approaches relating to each step 
involved in adopting thematic analysis. Through this approach, 
the steps taken to get data coded, categorised, interpreted, and 
analysed were explicitly explained. 
 
However, the flexibility permitted by the adoption of thematic 
analysis may lead to contradiction and a lack of consistency in 
the development of themes resulting from the research data 
(Holloway and Todres, 2003). To prevent inconsistency and 
enable cohesion, an adequate attempt was made to be explicit, 
using the interpretative epistemological position that coherently 
underpins the study's empirical claims (Holloway and Todres, 
2003). This takes the form of consistently interpreting narratives 
thematically. This was preceded by the coding of data. Data 
coding informed theme development, and the type of coding 
done is inductive coding. 
 
The explanation above touched on the meaning and reason for 
the adoption of the thematic approach. However, the explanation 
about the structure and the sequence of the analytical stages is 
presented in the next section. 
3.11 Steps in Thematic Analysis 
For a quick reminder, the capturing of perceptions and realities 
rooted in participants' narratives was done using interpretative 
phenomenology analysis (IPA) and the analytical tool employed 
is thematic analysis. The process and sequence followed in 




To start with, the data collected was transcribed by the 
researcher himself. The researcher reflected on the response 
from the respondents and maintained a continuous parallel 
examination of a range of sources to determine how codes might 
be understood in relation to both the broader theoretical context 
and participant's stories/narratives. 
 
To logically analyse and clearly link data to themes, reduction of 
text was needed and synthesisation of findings to generate 
answers to the research question was important. For this to be 
accomplished, the steps followed the suggestion of Nowell et al. 
(2017) on how a trustworthy thematic analysis can be done. This 
involves the following key stages. The first stage is 
familiarisation with the data and the identification of recurring 
themes; the second stage is the generation of initial codes, the 
third stage is searching for themes, the fourth stage is reviewing 
themes and fifth stage is defining and naming themes, the sixth 
stage is the production of the report. Below is the explanation of 
how each of the stages works: 
 
The first stage involved familiarisation with the data and the 
identification of recurring themes arising from the data. An index 
of the themes identified relating to the research questions was 
developed, and each part of the data was labelled systematically 
and rigorously in relation to their relevance. The familiarisation 
was made easy by uploading the transcripts into NVivo version 
2.0. and reading them from there. 
 
The second stage is the generation of initial codes. The second 
phase involves the initial production of codes from the data, a 
theorising activity that requires the researchers to keep revisiting 
the data. Qualitative coding is a process of reflection and a way 




The third stage is searching for themes, the third phase begins 
when all data have been initially coded and collated, and a list of 
the different codes identified across the data set has been 
developed. Some codes are inductively formed and make up the 
main themes, some of which matched an interview question, and 
were represented as parent nodes in NVivo. Some codes in 
NVivo are subsequently labelled subordinate themes and other 
superordinate themes. 
 
Codes are the lowest units of analysis that capture interesting 
features of the data (potentially) relevant to the research 
question. Codes are the building blocks for themes, (larger) 
patterns of meaning, underpinned by a central organising 
concept - a shared core idea. Codes are like tags attached to a 
word, phrase or clause under examination. For instance, 
"increased sales, increased number of employees, improved 
revenue" represent any improvement participants noted they 
experienced in their businesses (Glisczinski, 2018). These items 
were categorised under "growth". See more explanation on 
growth in the next paragraph. 
 
Category refers to the descriptive level of text and is an explicit 
manifestation of the participants' account. Categories are 
descriptors of themes (Green et al., 2007; Bailey,2003). Similar 
to a theme, the meaning of category is attributed by the 
researcher, and it may consist of subcategories that identify the 
meaning of category. A category is the primary product of the 
analytical process, has a descriptive identity and is mainly used 
at the beginning (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). A category is a way 
coded segments are grouped, with the purpose of decreasing 
the amount of various parts of data in research  analysis. For 
example: 'growth, represents data (statements or words from 
excerpts) coded as improved sales, increased number of 
employees, improved revenue, amongst others. Therefore, the 
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grouping of these coded items represents a category or theme. 
In addition, category and theme are sometimes used 
interchangeably. That may result in a lack of cohesion between 
the method of data analysis and the result (Morse, 2016). 
Therefore, at the start of the description of the process of theme 
development, there is a need to describe the meaning of a 
category and differentiate it from a theme in terms of the level of 
depth and abstraction.  
 
In the light of that, a theme is a higher-level of categorisation; a 
theme is more than a category. It is through the development of 
a theme that a category is given the depth of meaning (Green et 
al., 2007). Thus, its development has a priority to the 
development of a category. For example: 'The interplay between 
formal and informal financial institutions on the growth of SMEs' 
is labelled as the superordinate theme. This particular theme is 
made of smaller themes labelled subordinate themes, such as 
improved access, enforcement and savings, and disbursement 
are subordinate themes. These are signalling what the 
superordinate theme represents. Each item under the 
subordinate themes such as improved access, is made up of 
categories. An example of such items under the category of 
improved access is data signalling how SMEs obtained access 
to finance as a result of the overlap of personal and impersonal 
exchange mechanism/formal and informal relationships.  
 
Each theme was developed based on narratives, where patterns 
that were representative of key stages in the lending process 
were picked up as superordinate themes. Patterns leading to 
these key stages are categorised as subordinate themes. 
Therefore, the themes are divided into two headings: 
superordinate themes and subordinate themes. In other words, 
a superordinate theme may have the following features, these 
are they appear more often or more pervasive across different 
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participants' narratives, they are essential and are likely to 
manifest in the way people react when the theme is violated 
(Shatkay and Wilbur, 2000). The choice of the themes may not 
completely satisfy all the stated points, but at least two to three 
out of the four points reflected in the choice, designation and 
arrangement of themes. Also, the arrangement of the themes in 
the findings chapters was determined by the order of events that 
led to access to loan and the attributed outcomes. Subordinate 
themes are the subcategories that come under each 
superordinate theme. See details in chapter four and five.  
 
Hence, for example, the data coded under the superordinate 
theme 'impact of access', represents an outcome, and it is one 
of the key milestones in the lending process. The superordinate 
theme (impact of access) speaks to the effect of access to 
finance on beneficiaries. This means that after access to finance 
has been experienced by an SME, there may be some impact 
as a result. For instance, these impacts were found to manifest 
through growth and change in routine. Therefore, access to a 
loan could lead to growth and routine change, and they are both 
classified as subordinate themes. Sequentially, before impact 
can be experienced, there must be access to a loan. For 
example, the excerpts that were coded under growth are below:  
1. Yes, access to a loan may result in SMEs acquiring more 
infrastructure, i.e. motor vehicles, machinery etc". was 
coded as growth. 
 
2. Getting a showroom upgraded to attract more customers", 
was also coded as growth (See appendix for details of all 
the codes and categories). 
 
Equally, an example of excerpts that were coded under the 
subordinate theme 'routine change' is stated below: 
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1. It makes SMEs to start doing things right. This includes 
keeping proper books of account, conducting the periodic 
stock count. Whenever an SME request for a loan and after 
the bank has done its assessment if they realise, they do 
not keep proper books, and they are not registered etc., 
such SME will be denied access. 
 
2. We have seen cases where SMEs will go and come back 
after some months with evidence that shows they now 
have proper processes in place. The bank normally gives 
them three months to regularise their operations. The bank 
expects them to have basic business/financial records, 
such as daily sales book, stock books. (See appendix for 
details of all the codes and categories).  
 
The steps mentioned above were employed to enable 
interpretation of different perspectives to make them relevant to 
the research question. More examples of illustrations of how 
some narratives were coded under selected themes are shown 
in Appendix 4 below. The table in Appendix 3 was created to 
show the reader what steps were taken to code and categorise 
data under themes. The first column is the category; the second 
column is the code. The third column contains the narratives, 
which represent the examples of the actual excerpts. There are 
other items in the cell: such as reference and percentage, i.e. 
Reference 1 - 6.91%, Islamic Bank-Expert and File. Reference' 
Reference 2 - 3.22% Coverage' signalled the number of times a 
particular code was assigned to different excerpts. This is to 
demonstrate patterns or the number of times a code occurs. The 
'Reference 2 - 3.22% Coverage' shows the percentage of times 
a particular code occurs. The word "file" represents where and 
what name the transcript is saved with on NVivo. In this case, 
'Islamic Bank Expert' is used to save the transcript on NVivo. IB 
expert (assigned name) is one of the respondents. It appears on 
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NVivo as Islamic Bank Expert because the transcripts of the 
interview were generally saved using each participant's 
assigned name. 
 
The fourth phase involves evaluation and reviewing of themes 
for further improvement. This is a step that is preceded by the 
creation of a set of themes. During this phase, researchers 
review the coded data extracts for each theme to consider 
whether they appear to form a coherent pattern. Individual 
themes were reviewed and compared against the data set to see 
if the meaning is coherent. In this phase, inadequacies in the 
initial coding and themes were revealed, and necessary 
adjustments were made (King, 2004). Whenever the researcher 
identifies a relevant issue in the text not covered by the existing 
set of codes, a new code would be created. If the researcher 
found out that there was no need to use a code or if it 
substantially overlaps with other codes, it would either be 
merged with the most relevant one or deleted (King, 2004). The 
researcher also incorporated the processes of returning to the 
data, and generating memos informed by both the primary data 
and non-technical literature analysis, which supported the 
immersion required to support the emergence and refinement of 
emergent themes and categories (Mills et al., 2006; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). The reason for the explanations about various 
themes is to allow readers to understand how each theme was 
derived from the data.  
 
During the fifth phase, researchers decide what aspect of the 
data each theme captures and identify what is of interest to them 
and why. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), themes need 
to be punchy and give the reader a sense of what the theme is 
about. To achieve relevance and clarity, similar data may be 
included in multiple themes if they represent the meaning the 
theme is trying to project. At this stage of the research, 
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consideration was given to each theme on how they fit into the 
overall story reflecting on the data in relation to the research 
questions. For each individual theme, a detailed analysis was 
conducted, and identification of the appropriate story was 
developed. 
 
The sixth and last stage is the production of a report. At this 
stage, all the themes were arranged logically in line with the 
order that tells the story of how SMEs' relationship with banks 
are structured, touching on the preconditions of loans, and how 
these loan preconditions are satisfied, and how it impacted 
growth and routine change. Thorne (2000) encouraged 
researchers to clearly communicate the logical processes by 
which findings were developed in a way that is accessible to a 
critical reader. As a result, the claims made in relation to the data 
set are rendered credible and believable. Halpren (1983) 
recommended that researchers keep methodological notes, 
trustworthiness notes, and audit trail notes to ease the reporting 
process. This was complied with by ensuring that at each point 
of the analysis, specific references were made to narratives, 
directly quoted from participants' excerpts.  
The content of the coding process was anchored on the 
individual narratives on their experience relating to lending 
preconditions within the context of the lenders and borrowers. 
While doing this, IPA principles were adequately adhered to 
capture narratives that was thematically analysed. Chapter 5 
and 6 dealt extensively with the actual analysis, by explaining 
relationships and patterns between lenders and SMEs in relation 
to access and its implication. 
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3.12 Connection between Themes  
The order in which themes were arranged reflects the key stages 
an SME desirous of obtaining a loan has to go through before 
access is granted. Under the pilot study, four main superordinate 
themes emerged. These four superordinate themes are the 
sacrosanct nature of precondition, the impact of access, access 
denial, and the interplay between formal and informal financial 
institutions on SMEs.  
 
To clarify the connection between themes, one must understand 
how the first theme came about. The first superordinate theme 
is the sacrosanct nature of precondition. As explained in 4.6, it 
is the starting point of getting access to a loan. The reason is 
that loan preconditions are too valuable to be disregarded (it 
must be met). The importance of this theme (sacrosanct nature 
of precondition) makes it to come first in the arrangement of 
themes. As a result, the next theme is compliance with loans' 
preconditions and access. This is what determines or qualifies a 
prospective borrower for a loan. This is a standalone theme, and 
it is a superordinate theme. This is because it is an important 
milestone in the SME lending experience. What comes after 
access to a loan has been obtained is the effect or impact the 
previous stage of "satisfaction of precondition and access" has 
on SME, and that is how the theme "impact of access" emerged. 
One must appreciate that obtaining a loan is determined by the 
satisfaction of the loan precondition. What this indicates is that 
satisfaction of loan precondition is essential. It is important 
because it is the only way that leads to access to a loan. Impact 
of access is a superordinate theme. The subordinate themes 
associated with the "impact of access" are "routine change and 
growth". This is because it is a key milestone in the SME lending 




The next theme is access denial, which emerged from data, and 
it indicates the outcome of not satisfying loan preconditions. 
While this theme (access denial) is the outcome of the situation 
where loan preconditions are not satisfied.  The connection 
between the superordinate theme (access denial) and the 
constituent subordinate themes (such as the level of familiarity, 
bias and insecurity) is that they provide explanations to the 
superordinate theme "access denial (See details in 4.10). 
 
The last theme under the pilot study is the impact of the interplay 
between formal and informal financial institutions on SMEs. This 
superordinate theme draws on the implication of the overlap that 
occurs when a lender borrows or adopts the mechanisms that 
are synonymous with other types of lenders. For example, an 
informal lender may rely on official channels such as police for 
enforcement reasons, especially when default occurs. Another 
example is when a formal lender relies on relational approaches, 
i.e. liaising with cooperatives to recommend some of their tested 
and trusted members. This is the meaning that surfaced from 
data in the pilot study (See explanation on 4.11).  
 
Under the main study, six main superordinate themes emerged. 
These six superordinate themes are the sacrosanct nature of 
precondition, the impact of access, the impact of routine change, 
non-compliance to loan preconditions, no routine change, and 
the interplay between formal and informal financial institutions 
on SMEs.  
 
The first superordinate theme is the sacrosanct nature of 
precondition. As explained above, it is the starting point of 
getting access to a loan. The reason is that preconditions are too 
valuable to be disregarded; they must be met. SMEs who have 
gained access would have adhered to all the preconditions. The 
next theme is the satisfaction of loan preconditions. The 
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satisfaction of preconditions is analogous to compliance with the 
preconditions of loan, which can lead to access. The satisfaction 
of loan preconditions is a standalone theme, and it is a 
superordinate theme because it is an important milestone in the 
SME lending process. 
 
The next superordinate theme is the impact of access. This 
study aims to investigate SMEs' constructed view about the 
impact of loan preconditions on their businesses. Logically, what 
would follow after a loan has been granted is the effect of the 
loan they obtained. The impact of access is categorised as a 
superordinate theme. While the themes designated as 
subordinate themes under the 'impact of access' are those 
themes representing what the impact of access are, such as 
routine change and growth. According to data, routine change 
and growth surfaced as outcomes of compliance to loans' 
preconditions and getting access. Therefore, they (routine 
change and growth) are explanatory devices for the 
superordinate theme "impact of access". 
 
The next superordinate theme is "no routine change". This is 
categorised as a superordinate theme because it signifies a key 
milestone after which loan preconditions has not been satisfied. 
The effect of this superordinate theme is; becoming formal and 
efficiency. These two are categorised as subordinate themes 
because they are the outcome of routine change. Without 
routine change, these outcomes cannot be experienced. As a 
result, the impact of routine change is independent, while 
becoming formal and efficiency are both dependent on the 
superordinate theme. 
 
Next is non-compliance to loan preconditions, which indicate 
that SMEs that fail to comply would not be granted access to a 
loan. Data did not reveal much on this, and as a result, no 
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outcomes or subordinate themes surfaced. More details can be 
found in 5.12. 
 
Another superordinate theme is no routine change. It indicates a 
situation where routines are not affected as a result of 
satisfaction of loan preconditions and access. Data revealed that 
this occurs when access is obtained from informal sources. No 
further outcomes or subordinate theme was identified for this 
theme. More details can be found in section 5.13. 
 
The next superordinate theme is the interplay between formal 
and informal lending on the growth of SMEs. This superordinate 
reflects the whole process of relationships between lenders and 
borrowers and its implication; hence that is why it comes last. 
This superordinate theme draws on the nature and the 
implication of the overlap that occurs when lenders adopt 
exchange mechanisms that is synonymous with both personal 
and impersonal exchanges. For example, a formal lender may 
rely on relational approaches such as making sure a prospective 
SME is known to their organisation. The loan officer is usually 
tasked with this responsibility. This may involve visiting SMEs 
place of business., including asking them to open an account to 
allow the bank to know their turnover after a period (See 
explanation on relational approaches under personal exchanges 
in 2.2.1). In accordance with the data collected, the outcome of 
the interplay is as follows, improved access, loan assessment, 
and transparency. These outcomes are designated as 
subordinate themes. The reason for this designation is because 
they are the effect of the interplay. In other words, the 
superordinate theme is independent of them. Therefore, without 
the interplay between formal and informal lenders, there cannot 
be any outcome relating to the subordinate themes identified. 
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3.13 Time Horizons 
Research studies and the research onion consist of a time 
dimension where there are two types of time horizons, which are 
Longitudinal and Cross-sectional research (Saunders et al., 
2006). Longitudinal Studies are repeated over an extended 
period, allowing researchers to track changes over time (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2013). This type of time horizon is suitable for 
testing and developing theories on human development (Kloep 
et al., 2009). Cross-sectional studies are "carried out once and 
represent a snapshot of one point in time", and they study 
various sectors or sections of a population (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2013:128).  
This study is analogous to cross-sectional research because the 
phenomenon at stake is to assess the impact of lending 
relationships relating to formal and informal lenders and their 
beneficiaries (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995). Regarding this 
research's aim and questions, the focus is to explore the impact 
of lending preconditions on Nigerian small and medium scale 
enterprises within the manufacturing sector. This is expected to 
be conducted within a limited time , and that contributed to the 
reason why a cross-sectional and limited time horizon was 
considered most appropriate. The study compares and 
categorises SMEs according to different sources from which 
they have obtained finance and how each of the sources have 
impacted their growth and adoption of new routines.  
3.14 Positionality, Reflexivity and Validity 
It is recognised that adopting the epistemological view on social 
constructivism and the ontological view of interpretivism is not 
without limitation.  To acquire and represent authentic beliefs 
and meanings, the researcher would need to become embedded 
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in the relevant political community and emerging narratives 
(Hay, 2011). The view here is that the researcher is indistinct 
from the socially constructed narratives emerging within field 
research, which presents a further challenge. A way out of the 
'vicious circle, which would make a balanced interpretation 
possible' is required (Silva, 2007:167).  
  
However, in maintaining consistency within the constructivist 
position, it is important to recognise that the 'right' interpretation 
has a question of truth. Also, the truth within such an ontological 
account is also based on the same processes of social 
construction. The response to this matter, therefore, appears 
from the intersubjective construction of reality through the 
meanings and understandings developed socially and 
experientially (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). By emphasising 
trustworthiness and authenticity, a presentation and 
interpretation of data consistent with both the participants' 
accounts and the researchers' interpretations (Walsham, 2006) 
can ensure that the researcher does not cloud the participants' 
reality with his own bias.  
 
The researcher requires transparency to the audience in terms 
of revealing the researcher's established theoretical disposition 
and sensitivity and the role this has in generating the initial areas 
of interest. To capture the value of the research within the 
interview context also requires the validity of the interpretation. 
The researcher ensured that immediately after each interview, 
the process of documenting own experiences of the interview 
and interview setting was done, as this is important to the 
subsequent interpretation of the data (Glaser, 1992). 
 
The acknowledgement of the role of the researcher in the 
research process is necessary because the findings and 
analysis are inescapably bounded by both the researcher's 
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sensitivities and their direct involvement. For example, in 
shaping the interactions through which the data was generated 
(Mead, 1912). In doing so the discourse and narratives 
generated within various interviews are regarded as extensions 
of the construction of the experience itself as imbued with 
affections, connotations and dispositions (Blumer, 1936; Mead, 
1934; Shotter, 1993; Wittgenstein, 1958). In doing so, such 
discourse is itself an extension of the power relation constructed 
between interviewer and interviewee and as an extension of the 
process through which the narration of history is endowed with 
present reality and future intent (Foucault, 1972).  
 
Three alternative benchmarks: authenticity, plausibility, and 
criticality were used in planning and enacting the study. These 
standards, adopted from the highly relevant qualitative research 
literature, can be seen to bridge the philosophical position 
characterised with the methods employed (Walsham 2006; 
Lukka and Modell, 2010). The first criterion, authenticity, 
requires maintaining a close and consistent alignment with 
experiences from the field and the accounts of those 
interviewed.  
 
The findings and analysis chapter closely reflect the empirical 
findings. Plausibility requires that the findings connect inter-
subjectively with the reader at both a personal and professional 
level. By drawing closely on the empirical findings, theoretical 
interpretation remains firmly based on finding and analysis. 
Subsequent abstraction similarly adheres to data so that the 
pattern of interpretation may be closely followed by its audience. 
Finally, criticality in research and its presentation is  focused on  
encouraging  the reader not to take for granted both their 
ideas/beliefs and that of those individual perspectives presented 
in this study. Therefore, it is a fundamental part of IPA in 
ensuring that the researcher remains aware of their personal 
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experiences and pre-understandings, particularly their influence 
on data analysis (Finlay, 2008).  
 
The researcher endeavoured to stay close as much as possible 
to the original events so that the difference between analysing a 
narrative and linking it to participants' own reality was achieved. 
To ensure that this study's narratives were close to participant's 
reality, the transcribed format was shared with participants to 
ensure the researcher's interpretation of their reality matches 
their ‘own ’ account. 
3.15 Ethics and Responsible Research Practice 
The research maintained the highest ethical considerations and 
responsible research practices. To ensure the safety and 
comfort of the researcher and participants, all interviews were 
conducted in person. Where interviews were conducted in 
person, these were conducted only in spaces approved by the 
University's ethics committee. Permissions were confirmed as 
relevant.  
 
All data generated by the research is stored using the University 
of Hertfordshire approved research drive. All names and 
locations that might risk participant anonymity in the analysis and 
presentation of the data have been substituted or removed. 
Where justified, other details that might lead to identifying 
potential participants were also generalised to a level that would 
mitigate the risk. This includes focusing on the empirical data 
from the interview in the Analysis and Findings Chapters. This 
avoids revealing any data that might otherwise threaten 
anonymity. Details concerning the participants' identities were 




Firstly, the reviewed literature suggests that a case study cannot 
generalise its conclusions. However, this is a perfectly 
acceptable ‘limitation’ given the dearth of knowledge in the area 
under study. The value of the rich data on processes and 
perceptions that this research unveiled would have been 
missed. Also, with regards to the involvement as a researcher, 
necessary and reasonable precaution was taken to maintain an 
objective stance throughout this study while faithfully recording 
all dialogue with participants.  
 
It is important to reiterate that this study did not attempt to 
generalise but uncover the underlying influences and 
implications of lending relationships between lenders and SMEs. 
As such, this study consciously did not employ a large sample 
size as this study is qualitative; a large sample size would be 
deemed unnecessary and work invariance to the study 
objectives.   
 
Similarly, the adoption of a sampling technique that permits 
referrals may have restricted the researcher to a closed network 
of individuals who are known to each other. This works perfectly 
well for achieving the research aim. This was the only way a 
purposive and snowballing technique can be applied. However, 
this means that some of their experiences may be similar, and 
that might prohibit the flexibility and inclusion of others who may 
have richer ideas. 
The adopted methodologies above and approaches are in line 





This chapter justified and established the philosophical 
approach of interpretivism and constructivism. Thus, allowing 
the generation of new ideas permitting the use of relevant sense-
making ideologies. For example, IPA which captured the lived 
experience of SME that benefited from loans. Thematic Analysis 
(TA) was employed to systematically analyse data in a logical 
and explicit manner grounded in participants' lived experiences. 
A qualitative methodology using a semi-structured interview 
approach demonstrated the depth of the investigation in an 
undiluted and unique manner, having placed participants in 
control of their accounts. The next chapter contains the findings 
of the study with an overview and profile of each of the 
participants to underscore the presence of the personality 





CHAPTER FOUR - PILOT STUDY FINDINGS 
4.0 Overview  
Having identified the relevant theoretical foundations and 
determined an appropriate research methodology for this 
research in the previous chapters, the present chapter describes 
the findings of the pilot study. Accordingly, this chapter describes 
the types of lenders, names assigned to them, themes that 
emerged, participants’ context and the analysis of their 
responses to the semi-structured open-ended interview 
questions (leading to a qualitative data).  
 
4.1 Participants in the Pilot Study 
Five experts from formal and informal lenders and SME groups 
were targeted, out of which four were successfully interviewed. 
These participants came from a variety of backgrounds: 
commercial bank, Islamic bank, executive of an SME 
association, and executive of a registered cooperative society. 
Table 4.1 below describes the type of lending organisation to 
which each participant belonged. The labels given to these 
participants in the “assigned names” column is used to ensure 
their anonymity is protected. The “status” column is to distinguish 
between those that were interviewed and those that were not. 
The “type of lender” column refers to formal and informal 
financial lenders. As noted in chapter two, formal rules represent 
“those with government-defined and enforced constraints, while 
informal rules capture private constraints embedded in culture, 
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norms, code of conduct, amongst others” (Williamson, 
2009:371).  
 
Formal financial rules are regulated and recognised by the 
government and, then, act under the monetary authority’s 
supervision. Three out of the four participants represented 
formal financial lenders, and the remaining one represented the 
informal financial lender. As explained in sub-section 2.11.1 and 
2.11.2, formal financial lenders usually adopt impersonal 
exchange approaches and most cases have also embedded a 
personal approach to their exchange approaches. The informal 
financial lenders are lenders whose activities are guided by as 
norms and cultural practices within society. Informal financial 
lenders are not regulated by the monetary authorities or any 
other public authority, and they work with little to no trace of 
formalisation in their transactions. Therefore, their activities are 
regulated by groups of individuals within the community to which 
they belong (Germidis et al., 1991). They mainly adopt personal 
exchanges, which is influenced by network and relationships. 
 
The pilot study included two formal lending experts, one informal 
lending expert and an SME representative. This has been 
depicted in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 below, respectively. Table 
4.1 depicts the types of lenders under which each participant 
falls, i.e. formal or informal lender. Those that fall under formal 
financial lenders are commercial bank (Commercial Bank 
Expert), Islamic bank (Islamic Bank Expert) and the only lender 
that fall under informal lender is cooperative society (Coop 
expert). The participant that is conspicuously missing in the 
Table is the Bank of Industry expert (DFI Expert) who was not 
included because the researcher was unable to secure an 
interview with him (until during the main study). The SME 
representative appears below in Table 4.2 to indicate he belongs 
to a different participant status. He represented the SMEs. He 
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was included in the pilot study so that the researcher could use 
his experience to gauge and understand the effect loans have 
on SMEs. This is because the group he represents are direct 
beneficiaries of lending services provided by lenders. He was 
targeted as an individual who is experienced in SME financing 
and their relationship with lenders. It will be erroneous to 
categorise him as a lender. 
 







Commercial Bank CB Expert 
Islamic Bank IB Expert 
Cooperative Society Coop Expert 
 
As mentioned above in section 4.1, the fourth participant was not 
included in Table 4.1 because he is not a lender but a 




Table 4.2 - SME Representative 
Participant 
type 






Before going into the results and analysis of their narratives, it is 
important to consider the respondents’ views and research 
framework in context. All the participants in the pilot study were 
experts with many years of experience in SME financing and its 
operations. The rationale for targeting them for an interview was 
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to ascertain how SMEs meet loan preconditions and its 
implications on SMEs.  
4.2 Participants in Context: Lenders  
4.2.1 CB Expert 
The commercial bank expert manages the loan portfolios of all 
customers (e.g. SMEs, micro-businesses). The commercial 
bank expert makes appropriate recommendations to the 
regional management team based on the report submitted by 
sales or credit or loan officers on loan applications. This report 
is mostly done after the credit/loan officers have conducted the 
required assessments on prospective SMEs and judged them 
worthy. However, the final approval resides with the regional 
manager. 
Due to a busy workload, the commercial bank expert requested 
that the interview be brief. The request was accommodated, and 
the questions were kept concise. His office was located within a 
business environment, with other offices and a market nearby. 
This indicates that the bank is situated in a commercial area. In 
terms of educational background, the CB expert reported that he 
was educated to degree level and had over eight years of 
banking experience. 
4.2.2 IB Expert 
The representative of the Islamic Bank is a branch manager who 
also had a hectic schedule, which made it extremely difficult to 
organise the interview appointment. Before the researcher was 
able to conduct the interview, a total of four visits to the branch 
were made, along with countless phone calls, all to no avail. On 
the fourth occasion, the interview took place in the branch 
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manager’s office. The position the participant maintained 
mirrored that of the commercial bank branch manager and her 
narratives reflect the practical understanding and underlying 
biases that often make financing of SMEs both difficult and, at 
the same time, possible. The participant’s position emphasised 
her organisation’s commitment towards the profession and the 
organisation, as well as their understanding of the nature of 
SMEs in general and the cultural beliefs of people in Nigeria. The 
relevance of this is expanded in the findings and discussion 
chapter. 
4.2.3 Coop Expert 
The Cooperative expert is an academic, with a PhD qualification. 
He has worked as a university lecturer for approximately 30 
years. The interview appointment was arranged by the 
researcher’s acquaintance after  several consultations. He 
engaged well with the interviewer, responding to all questions 
asked. It was evident that his experience as a member and as a 
top executive, and many years of involvement in cooperatives, 
informed his narrative. The cooperative he represents is 
registered, and therefore, it is a formal lender. 
4.3 Participants in Context: SME Representative 
The SME expert had more than ten years of experience. He is a 
top executive of the Ogun State Chapter of the National 
Association of Small-Scale Industrialist (NASSI). The NASSI 
was founded in 1978 and registered under the land perpetual 
succession Act as a non-profit organisation. It has a national 
secretariat, four zonal offices and branches in all the states of 
the federation and Abuja. Nigerian Association of Small-Scale 
Industrialist is the voluntary coming together of a group of SMEs. 
The association admits those in manufacturing, processing, 
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mining and service industries and whose capital investment fall 
within the definition of the small-scale industry as may be 
reviewed from time to time by the government.  
 
The position of the participant is an elective one. He leads, 
champions and represents the interest of all SME owners within 
the association. On the agreed date, the researcher travelled 
approximately two hours to meet the respondent at his office. 
The researcher arrived around 9:00 and met with his secretary. 
He was told by the secretary that the chairman has not arrived 
and was asked to wait for him to come. He arrived around 30 
minutes later, and the researcher was invited into his office. 
Pleasantries were exchanged, and informal discussions ensued 
for a couple of minutes, after which the interview commenced. 
He presented his view in a manner that reflects his ‘personal’ 
business relationship with banks as well as experiences other 
SMEs had shared with him. 
4.4 Presentation of Result and Analysis 
This section will present the results of the study and describe 
emergent themes. The findings were presented using the 
participants’ experiences drawing from Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Willig, 2013), and analysis 
was undertaken using the principles of thematic analysis (Cole, 
2013). The account presented here results from a thorough 
analysis of the data. However, it represents possible 
construction of the experience of an SME that benefitted from 
loans from either formal or informal lenders. The double 
hermeneutic is acknowledged here, wherein the researcher 
attempts to make sense of the participants’ interpretations, and 
at the same time the participants are making efforts towards 
making sense of their own experiences (see section 3.3 and 4.4 
for more on double hermeneutic). This means that the themes 
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constructed here may emerge differently for another researcher 
or another reader. Nevertheless, it is expected that the 
researcher’s efforts to present a logical and well-articulated 
account of the analyses would enable any would-be reader to 
make credibility checks (Elliott et al., 1999). Furthermore, 
borrowing from Yardley (2000) principles for evaluating the 
quality of qualitative research, verbatim excerpts are deemed as 
valuable when extracted and included where necessary in the 
analysis to justify and validate findings. 
 
To achieve a methodical and thorough analysis, the process of 
thematic analysis was employed. It involves observing the key 
stages of thematic analysis such as; familiarisation with data, the 
identification of recurring themes, generation of initial codes, 
searching for themes, reviewing themes and defining and 
naming themes, and lastly, production of a report. This enabled 
detailed and systematic coding, categorising and theme 
development to be achieved (See chapter 3, section 3.9 and 
3.10 for more details). It is important to note that codes were 
produced across the four experts’ narratives, (See Appendix 4 
for details on coding) from where patterns/themes emerged. 
Some refinements were made to the themes and new ones 
emerged in the analysis of the main study. These themes are 
viewed as a combined construction of participants’ (SMEs and 
experts) narratives and the researcher's interpretation. This is 
attributable to the double hermeneutic nature of IPA, in that it is 
an effort in making sense of participants’ experiences, who are 
simultaneously trying to make sense of their own experiences 
(Smith and Osborn, 2008).  
 
It is recognised that there may be divergent interpretations. This 
equally relates to the hermeneutic nature of IPA, in which 
readers can make sense of their ‘own ’ meaning-making through 
their own interpretation of the data, which might differ from the 
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researcher’s and that of the participants. This is associated with 
the addition of another level to the process of hermeneutics 
(Smith et al., 2009).  On different occasions, the researcher 
usually realises old meanings should be replaced as they may 
appear not to represent or adequately articulate the reality 
expressed during the study. This led to refinements of the 
themes on three to four occasions. Some codes that had sat 
under themes that required amending were renamed to enable 
a better explanation and comparison across different sources of 
financing. This gives room for a clearer understanding of the 
data that had been coded. 
 
This section was written to represent the convergence, 
divergence, commonality and individuality that are portrayed 
within and across themes. This is imperative in guaranteeing that 
the research is both phenomenological and interpretative, 
sustaining a closeness to the accounts of participants whilst 
adding an interpretation from a psychological perspective (Smith 
et al., 2009). 
 
Within this section, verbatim quotes from the participants were 
used to describe, explain and expand on narratives that lead to 
themes. The presentation of verbatim excerpts has been 
modified to some extent to ease reading and understanding. 
While eliminating hesitations or unnecessary text, the 
researcher has chosen to retain some hesitations such as ‘erm’, 
where this is done. This is to allow interpretation to be reflective 
of the underlying emotional response. Any absent or shortened 
material is designated with ‘…’, and where slight amendments 
have been made the use of square brackets ‘[]’ was adopted. 
Italic text is used to draw the reader to particular aspects of 
interest. Additionally, the researcher’s reflections will be 
interspersed all over this section to clarify his contribution and 
reflexivity to the research process. The four superordinate 
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themes and their related subordinate themes that emerged in 
the pilot study is explored and explained starting from the next 
section 4.5 to section 4.11. 
4.5 Superordinate and Corresponding Subordinate Themes 
The superordinate themes are overarching patterns that 
emerged from the analysis of participants’ narratives and in 
many aspects, mirror theoretical framework. The theme 
captures a common, recurring pattern across the narratives, 
organised around a central organising concept. It describes the 
different facets of a pattern across the dataset. A subordinate 
theme exists ‘underneath’ the umbrella of a superordinate 
theme. It shares the same central organising concept as the 
theme but focuses on one notable specific element. It is used 
only when there is one particular element of a theme with a 
particular focus and is particularly important for the research 
question.  
 
Six superordinate themes that emerged from the analysis of the 
pilot study interview transcripts include: 
• The sacrosanct nature of loan preconditions 
• Compliance with loan preconditions 
• Impact of access 
• Access denial 
• Partial or No routine change 
• The interplay between formal and informal financial 
lenders on the growth of SMEs. 
 
The six listed superordinate themes with their corresponding 




Table 4.3 - Themes that Emerged During the Pilot Study 
Superordinate themes Subordinate 
themes 
Sacrosanct nature of precondition   
Compliance with loan preconditions 
and access 
  
Impact of Access  Routines change 
SME growth 




The interplay between formal and 
informal financial lenders on the 
growth of SMEs 
Enforcement 
4.6 Superordinate Theme: The Sacrosanct Nature of 
Precondition 
Meeting loan preconditions for all lenders, whether formal or 
informal, is sacrosanct. The sacrosanct nature of the loan 
precondition was evident in the participants’ narratives.  For 
formal financial lenders, participants narrated their experiences 
in relation to how important it is for prospective SMEs desirous 
of accessing formal lender’s loans to adhere to its preconditions. 
According to them, no access will be provided if preconditions 
are not met. The banks lack the autonomy to accommodate 
individuals that do not meet loan preconditions. Commercial 
bank expert remarked that there are: 
 
Established standards that the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) has mandated all banks to abide with. 
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If there is any compromise, the bank will be penalised 
by the CBN (Commercial bank expert).  
 
This speaks to the sacrosanct nature of loan preconditions. 
Similarly, informal lenders, represented by the Coop expert, also 
affirmed the same position as others claiming loan preconditions 
must be met. He reported that anyone desirous of accessing a 
loan from the cooperative society must meet the preconditions 
created, agreed and administered by members of the 
cooperatives. 
 
Drawing from the except above, loan preconditions denote the 
standard that lenders must uphold, which, if they fail to, might 
lead to severe penalty. Therefore, all narratives from experts 
support the position above. There is no possibility of side-
stepping the requirement of meeting loan preconditions; the 
existing system has made it mandatory for all preconditions to 
be met. All four experts are in total agreement that before access 
can be achieved, every player, both formal and informal financial 
lenders and SMEs, must treat loan preconditions as sacrosanct. 
The superordinate theme “The sacrosanct nature of 
precondition” speaks to the importance attached to loan 
precondition that SMEs must meet before a loan is provided. To 
improve the understanding of this theme, it is essential to state 
that there are two types of lender covered by this study, formal 
and informal lender. The Subordinate theme that was drawn 
from the experiences narrated here is “satisfaction of 
precondition and access”. This means loan preconditions are 
very important and granting of access to finance is conditioned 




4.7 Superordinate Theme: Compliance with Loan 
Preconditions and Access 
The theme of compliance to loan preconditions and access 
emerged from narratives as no participant shared their 
experience about loans given to them without the satisfaction of 
loan preconditions. The relevance of this study is that most if not 
all the participants have to satisfy the loan preconditions before 
they can obtain access to a loan. Therefore, the satisfaction of 
loan precondition is the main determinant of loan access. The 
subordinate theme could be relevant to the sacrosanct nature of 
loan preconditions. This made it compulsory for both formal and 
informal financial lenders to ensure they are satisfied by loan 
seeking SMEs. 
 
Examples of the kind of loan preconditions common to formal 
financial lenders are evidence of incorporation business plan, 
six-month membership, business registration, possession of a 
tax identification number, evidence of tax payment, enterprises 
with high employment generation capacity, enterprises that have 
good management set-up and proper accounting procedures, 
six months’ account statements showing the current exposure, 
membership of a business association, amongst others (Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 2014).  
 
For informal lenders, examples of the kind of loan preconditions 
common to them are two guarantors, regular meeting 
attendance and regular contribution. To satisfy the preconditions 
of formal lenders, documentary evidence must be provided and 
verified. It is the responsibility of each lender to conduct 
necessary verification of preconditions, which may involve 
checking documentary evidence, inspections of premises from 
the officials of the formal lender, particularly those that are 




There are no alternatives, other than putting in place 
what will be required for them to qualify for a loan. 
Many of the SME owners are not formally educated, 
but that does not mean they cannot work towards 
putting necessary things in place, especially by 
employing educated individuals to help in keeping 
proper records. 
 
His comment was also corroborated by other participants. This 
goes to show that satisfaction of loan preconditions and access 
is important for both formal and informal institutions before a loan 
application could be considered. 
 
The granting of access to loan emerged as an outcome that 
confirms the narratives of participants, which points to satisfying 
loan preconditions. This is a reflection on what comes into play 
after loan preconditions have been fully satisfied.  
4.8 Superordinate Theme: Impact of Access 
From the previous themes explained above, it was established 
that satisfaction of preconditions of loan might lead to access. 
This is analogous to saying access can only be obtained after all 
the boxes have been ticked in relation to loan preconditions. The 
theme here emerged because of narratives about the benefits of 
obtaining loan access.  This superordinate theme tries to explore 
the effect of financing on SMEs after the loan has been granted. 
It touches on the effect that access to loans has on loan 
beneficiaries. The effects as informed by the participants led to 
the emergence of some specific themes, such as routine change 
and SMEs’ growth. These are treated as subordinate themes, 




4.8.1 Subordinate Theme: Routine Change 
The context to which this theme speaks is when SMEs have in 
place certain characteristics that were previously not in place 
because of having to comply with loan preconditions. For 
example, in the case of formal financial lenders, access to a loan 
will mean businesses must have been registered, be in 
possession of a tax identification number, keep up to date 
records, audit accounts, amongst others. This means their 
routines have changed. We cannot adequately establish at this 
point whether the routine change that has occurred at this point 
is temporary or permanent. The outcome of the main study’s 
analysis expatiates on that (see section 5.10.1). 
 
The narratives emanating from the participants reveal various 
experiences. The CB Expert and the IB Expert are the only two 
respondents that agreed in totality to the theme. For example, 
the CB Expert commented that: 
 
We have seen cases where SMEs will go and come 
back after some months with evidence that shows 
they now have proper processes in place. The bank 
normally gives them three months to regularise their 
operations. The bank expects them to have basic 
business/financial records, such as daily sales book, 
stock books. 
 
The narrative suggested that access to loans, as determined by 
the satisfaction of loan preconditions and access, might 




4.8.2 Subordinate Theme: Growth 
This subordinate theme touches on the effect of obtaining loans 
on beneficiary SMEs. It speaks to the effect loan preconditions 
have on SMEs’ activities/businesses. The four experts were of 
the view that SMEs that get access to loans may experience 
some improvements that are analogous to growth. Since the 
study is guided by a semi-structured interview, experts 
expressed their views on growth in a variety of ways. They 
constructed the meaning of growth in a manner that mirrored 
their meaning-making, understanding and reality. 
 
Based on their narratives, the nature of growth SMEs have been 
experiencing an  increase in the number of employees, an 
increase in turnover, an increase in the volume of sales, 
geographical expansion, diversification, and acquisition of 
assets. Three out of the four experts expressed a common 
position about growth dimensions. Though, the CB Expert 
seems not to be aware of the nature of growth SMEs experience 
after obtaining loans. He attempted to excuse himself by saying 
he is not sure of what it is they experience, but one interesting 
statement stood out from what he said, and that is, most SMEs 
pay back when due. This, according to him, is an indication that 
everything is going well with them. 
 
On the other hand, his statement— “I am not too sure”—might 
suggest he knows what they experience, but he is not proud to 
say it. This will be adequately explored further when conducting 
the main study, as participants will include SMEs themselves, 
and they would be able to construct their reality based on their 
experience. However, the SME representative agrees that 
growth experienced by SMEs manifest only in three dimensions, 




Access to finance has an impact on turnover, sales, 
and acquisition of asset; however, it has no impact on 
the number of employees employed, and business 
ability to diversify” (SME representative). 
 
He is not refuting that SMEs experience growth, but he appears 
to be specific about what constitutes growth based on his 
experience.  
4.9 Superordinate theme: Partial or no Routine Change 
This theme emerged from the SME representative’s narrative. 
This narrative indicates a situation where prospective SMEs do 
not copy exactly the template symbolised by the loan 
preconditions handed to them by formal financial lenders. They 
either adhere superficially, partially or refrain from complying. 
According to the SME representative, how it happens is 
captured in his excerpt below: 
 
Not in all cases, as most SMEs keep two books of 
accounts. One will be the actual book of account, and 
the other one is mostly doctored to show banks that 
the business is doing well. They do this to deceive 
bank officials, and the bank officials will find it difficult 
to discern. SMEs show business record books that do 
not match the cash flow in their bank statement. The 
argument put forward on this is that they don’t bank 
all their money, which may be true.  
 
Most of the new routines mentioned in 4.8.1, such as business 
registration and Tax Identification Number (TIN) are one-off 
routines that most SMEs can easily obtain. Nevertheless, other 
routines such as record keeping, auditing, and tax payment are 
continuous practice, which most find difficult to adhere to 
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consistently. SMEs may superficially demonstrate compliance 
by loosely decoupling from it. What usually happens is what is 
captured in the excerpt above, when business records are 
altered, or two records were created, one will be the original, and 
the other will be made to mirror what is acceptable to lenders.  
 
The one-off routines are analogous to corporate governance, 
which can be likened to best practices. Best practices, within the 
context of this study, are the activities or practises that can lead 
to beneficial outcomes for all stakeholders. For example, 
stakeholders in an economy could be the government, business, 
citizens, amongst others (Ocasio and Joseph, 2005). According 
to this research, lenders, government, and SMEs are key 
stakeholders. Any practices that benefit each of these groups 
will qualify as best practice. Tax payment is of great benefit to 
the government; it adds to the GDP and improves the growth 
experienced by a country. For SMEs it encourages them to be 
responsible, and open to government support; another practice 
is record keeping, which has made many business owners to 
detect fraud which means it is beneficial to the SMEs 
themselves. Therefore, any routine that is of benefit to the 
mentioned stakeholders will be analogous to best practice. 
 
Hence, if the SMEs are able to obtain loan from formal financial 
lenders, even with loose/partial compliance by presenting 
altered records which are not conspicuous to the lenders, they 
would still be experience change in routine in those best 
practises such business registration, possession of tax 
identification numbers. However, what they will not change is tax 
payment, accurate accounting records, and auditing because 
these are routines that are ongoing and continuous. For 
example, tax is expected to be paid annually, auditing is done 
annually, and record-keeping is daily, and SME could alter the 




In summary, a loose/partial compliance will lead to partial routine 
change, which is analogous to best practises, while a complete 
lack of compliance will lead to no routine change.  
 
4.10 Superordinate Theme: Access Denial  
This superordinate theme touches on what may lead to a denial 
of access. In this subordinate theme, narratives that emerged 
explain instances where the satisfaction of loan preconditions 
and access may be difficult to achieve or even if achieved, may 
not necessarily lead to access.  
 
Three Subordinate themes emerged from the above: Level of 
familiarity, bias, and insecurity. 
 
4.10.1 Subordinate Theme: Level of Familiarity 
This theme emerged from the narratives of participants around 
access from informal financial lenders. It reveals how important 
it is for SMEs desirous of accessing a loan from informal lenders 
to be known to the community to which they belong. This can 
only occur if the owner of the prospective SME socialises with 
certain people who are linked to cooperatives or other local 
groups that may have links to financing schemes before the time 
of making his or her intention known. This is very important as 
informal institutions like cooperative societies are based on 
personal exchanges rooted in relationships and reputation. As 
the Coop expert confirms, every prospective member must be 
known to an existing member before they can be introduced to 
the group. Before they qualify for loans, the member must have 
two guarantors. One of the guarantors might be the same person 
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who introduced the member. In addition, the member must have 
spent six months, and during that period, he or she must have 
attended meetings and made his or her financial contribution 
consistently. 
 
Accessing a loan from an informal lender will not be possible, no 
matter how good and viable a business is, except the owner is 
introduced to the cooperative society. For example, a registered 
or unregistered cooperative society expect prospective 
members to be introduced by at least one existing member. In 
some cases, viable businesses may lose out of gaining access 
to cooperative membership because they are not well known in 
the community. The situation happens when the person just 
moved into the community. In such a case, trust and reputation 
typically built in a relationship will be absent, preventing them 
from getting recommendations from existing members to 
become a member of their cooperative. 
An example of a member was cited. An existing member 
recommended someone. At some point, the member that 
introduced him left the cooperative society and moved to another 
part of the country. The new member did not mingle well with 
other existing members; this is because of a language barrier. 
As a result, he could not create the right relationship with the 
right people.  According to the Coop expert excerpts: 
 
No one knew him enough to stand as a guarantor for 
him, and he was not able to obtain loan despite being 
a member for more than six months. He decided to 
withdraw his funds and revoke his membership. The 
policy around the withdrawal of funds is that the 
owner of funds will have to give six months’ notice. 
This policy was applied to him, and his money was 
paid back to him in full. Though he approached other 
members, requesting if they can stand for him, but 
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those ones were scared because they don’t know him 
well. This made it impossible for him to get a loan, and 
he withdrew his membership. 
 
The above excerpt illustrates the challenge that a new SME that 
intends to obtain informal institution finance may face when not 
well known to many existing members. As explained under the 
superordinate theme “access denial”, lack of familiarity or low 
level of familiarity may lead to denial of access. 
 
4.10.2 Subordinate Theme: Bias 
Responses from participants explained the existence of the 
feeling of unfairness among formal financial lenders as it has led 
to an inherent inclination or prejudice against SMEs when it 
comes to formal financing. It is generally assumed that SMEs 
are too risky. IB Expert’s account touched on this as evident in 
the excerpt below: 
 
Generally, giving loan to SMEs is seen as very risky 
by banks. Many banks shy away from giving it. I don’t 
like giving it. According to my experience, the default 
rate of SMEs is high, and some show lackadaisical 
attitude when they default. Some SMEs will give you 
very flimsy excuse for defaulting and made it look as 
if you are asking for too much. Example of such is 
complaint about no sales, because of that they cannot 
pay. 
 
This is a feeling of lack of confidence on the part of the bank as 
they feel money given as loans to SMEs is not in safe hands. 
They believe SMEs are risky, and their ability to pay back is low. 
This means that for SMEs to gain access to loans from formal 
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financial lenders, they may have to go the extra mile to convince 
formal financial lenders of their ability and capability.  
This sort of bias was not apparent from narratives about informal 
financial lenders. 
 
4.10.3 Subordinate Theme: Insecurity 
The SME expert also came up with a similar view that negates 
the general narrative of how the meeting of loan preconditions 
can lead to access (as previously established in the 
superordinate theme). He commented that there is a general 
belief that banks do not want to give loans out, especially to 
SMEs. According to his narrative, he was of the view that 
 
In some cases, meeting preconditions of loan does 
not guarantee access, erm... as most SMEs believe 
that even if they meet loan preconditions, banks may 
not still give them the loan. They have conditioned 
their minds that they (SMEs) cannot meet the 
conditions. They see the preconditions as an excuse 
for not trying to access a loan, thinking in their minds 
that it is not achievable [SME representative]. 
 
From the summarised narrative above, the SME Expert believes 
formal lenders have a negative predisposition against SMEs. 
This is known to the SMEs as it has made them lose faith in the 
formal financial lenders, and it has led to a widespread feeling of 
insecurity among them, which has prevented many from even 




4.11 Superordinate Theme: The Interplay between Formal 
and Informal Lenders. 
This touches on the overlap of preconditions of loans and 
processes between formal and informal financial lenders and 
how they affect each other. Therefore, this theme explores how 
the two lenders influence each other and also explores the 
implications of that influence on beneficiary SMEs. For example, 
the Oxford Dictionary defines interplay as the way in which two 
or more things affect each other. The data here shows how each 
lender is similar in how they operate and the kind of influences 
and support they lend to each other. 
 
As loan preconditions are sacrosanct with formal rules, so also 
it is for informal rules (See 4.6 Superordinate theme: The 
sacrosanct nature of precondition). The only difference is that 
the rules and the process of enforcement are different from one 
another, and they impact each other in a number of ways. 
 
Based on the IB and CB Experts’ opinion, formal rules may, as 
part of other preconditions for a loan, require any SME who 
belong to a group, e.g. cooperative society, to obtain a 
guarantee from the group before a loan can be issued to him/her. 
For example, the IB Expert made the following comment: 
 
In the case of SMEs that belong to a cluster, there will 
be a need for them to be guaranteed by their cluster 
or association. The parent body must provide a 
guarantee that the members that the bank is 
providing funds to are creditable and are of good 
character. 
 
This shows that banks are happy to engage with SMEs based 
on cooperative membership or any other group-based initiative. 
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The reason for banks to require a recommendation from the 
group to which a borrower belongs may be to know more about 
the credibility of such borrower. They (the bank) may find it hard 
on their own to know who the SMEs are because they have a 
reduced face-to-face/personal relationship with the SMEs.  
 
Similarly, according to the explanation given by the Coop Expert, 
the most important determinant for granting a loan request is 
conditioned on one’s past actions and social affiliation. For 
instance, Coop Expert expressed his opinion by saying: 
  
You must be a member for six months and be known 
to have been attending meetings and keeping up to 
regular agreed contribution. Two guarantors will be 
needed from existing members to vouch and 
guarantee that you will pay back when seeking a loan.  
 
This is important to cooperatives as they seem to lack such 
capacity that supports impersonal exchanges. This is because 
the cooperative is meant for a group of people that see 
themselves face-to-face and must have existing relationships. 
One can only become a member after being introduced by an 
existing member, and before a loan is granted, two members 
must stand as guarantors. The two guarantors will be held 
responsible if there is a default.  
 
Similarly, the expert representing the formal lender also claimed 
that the Commercial, Microfinance, and Islamic Banks and other 
formal financial lenders, i.e. banks, would expect an account to 
be opened by new SMEs for a while (at least six months). The 
bank will advise them to ensure a regular deposit of an agreed 
amount into the new account. This is to create a relationship-like 
scenario that would allow the formal financial lenders to learn 
who the prospective SME is, and on that basis, trust can be 
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established, and the decision to lend can be made. This reflects 
how informal rules, i.e., relationships, complement formal rules.  
 
On the other hand, it is expected that formal financial lenders will 
typically adopt official channels to manage all their processes. In 
contrast, this may not ordinarily be expected of informal financial 
lenders. However, from participants’ narratives, it is established 
that informal financial lenders (i.e., Cooperative Society) do rely 
on official channels when necessary. This was apparent in the 
way the enforcement of rules was carried out.  
4.11.1 Subordinate Theme: enforcement 
Enforcement emerged from the data, and it fits perfectly under 
the superordinate theme of the interplay of formal and informal 
financial lenders. Formal financial lenders do not rely on informal 
enforcement mechanisms for enforcement purposes, except 
using formal official enforcement channels such as police or the 
law courts.  Informal financial lenders times resort to official 
channels in other to recover unpaid debts. For example, the 
Cooperative Expert talked about seeking the services of police 
officers  in  debt recovery or when they need to take over 
business premises. In a situation of default, after all efforts and 
options have been explored, an informal lender may rely on the 
formal enforcement agencies, such as the police as a last resort 
for enforcement purposes. As such, the Coop Expert remarks:  
 
We have the power to close members’ business 
premises with police support.  
 
Resorting to official channels during times of enforcement may 
indicate that social pressures and sanctions may not always be 
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enough. Hence the support of law enforcement agencies will be 
needed. 
 
4.12 Lessons from the pilot study 
In conclusion, from the survey instrument, it was realised that 
some refinements had to be made to the research questions, 
thus necessitating the removal of questions relating to regional 
contexts. The reason for this is because banking operations in 
Nigeria are fully standardised, irrespective of regions 
(Cbn.gov.ng 2019;  Adigwe et al., 2018). In other words, the 
regional context may not have much implication or any 
significant role in the outcome of the research. Similarly, the 
outcome of the pilot study revealed that there is uniformity in the 
application of banking policies across regions and formal 
lenders, especially when it comes to meeting loan conditions. 
 
On the other hand, from discussions with various lending 
experts, including the Coop expert, there was no suggestion that 
the operations of informal financial lenders are not the same 
across regions. Similarly, their exchange approaches stated in 
various studies are in line with experts’ accounts (Zhou and 
Peng, 2010; Berger and Udell, 2006). This is not to say that there 
might not be a slight variation that may not have been captured 
during the study or in the literature reviewed. However, if there 
are variations, they may not be very significant. Hence, that 
might be the reason why it is not evident in narratives and 
literature. 
 
The implication of this strict policy is that SMEs that do not meet 
the loan precondition will not get access to finance. Therefore, 
one of the encouraging revelations of the pilot study about 
Nigerian formal financing institutions is that their operations are 
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very standardised. Also, there is little or no room for cutting 
corners, except when SMEs deliberately falsify documents they 
presented and slip through the formal financial lenders’ 
screening process without detection. Every application for a loan 
will be treated based on laid down principles. Although there 
might be some hidden way of circumventing the system like the 
one mentioned above about falsification of a document, which 
the participants acknowledged, otherwise, the assumption made 
about the standardisation of banking operations in relation to a 
loan for SMEs may have revealed a different outcome. 
 
Another aspect that was modified is an informal approach. This 
centres on questions covering the practice of SMEs engaging in 
bribery of bank officials, relying on friends and family to access 
a bank loan. As captured by narratives of the beneficiaries of 
both formal and informal financial lenders, there is no such thing 
as bribing or relying on an official of the bank or the coop society 
to sidestep the loan preconditions. There may be some truth 
hidden from their responses, but that cannot be verified. This 
may affect conclusions to an extent about whether SMEs have 
or do not have alternatives to access loan than to abide by laid 
down rules that are stipulated in the loan preconditions or may 
have to wait to put things in place. This aspect was modified to 
explore the implication of no waiver policy on SMEs. The impact 
of no waiver forces SMEs to change their routine in a manner 
that conforms to the precondition of the lender. 
  
Apart from the points mentioned above, other aspects of the aim 
of the pilot study (to carry out ‘preliminary analysis’ that would 
inform the research question) were adequately achieved. The 
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pilot study pointed the researcher’s atten tion to other aspects 
that were previously not considered, including the various 
sources of financing, which have varied preconditions, and the 
effects that this may have on the adoption of new routines or new 
practices and growth. These were included in the main study, 




CHAPTER FIVE - MAIN STUDY FINDINGS 
5.0 Overview  
Through the adoption of interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA) for making sense of interview transcripts, coupled 
with the use of thematic analysis (TA) to achieve a systematic 
and orderly analysis, six superordinate themes and eight 
subordinate themes emerged, and these form the basis of this 
chapter. Details differentiating between new themes that 
emerged in the main study from those that emerged in the pilot 
study are explained below in Section 5.6. These themes are 
illustrated with verbatim extracts from the interview transcripts 
drawn from the interviews conducted. 
  
Although a consistent pattern of themes emerged across the 
participants’ narratives, the individual experiences within these 
themes varied considerably. These commonalities and 
differences are reported in the results. The names of the thirteen 
participants have been changed to safeguard their 
confidentiality. In presenting verbatim extracts from the 
transcripts, some minor changes have been made by the 
researcher. Minor hesitations, such as repeated words or words 
such as “erm” or “eh” have been deleted from the text for 
readability. Also, due to the expressive language impairments, 
participants in some circumstances  used words or phrases that 
did not make sense or that were unclear. These were been 
excluded using dotted lines within excerpts. Dotted lines at the 
beginning or end of excerpts indicate that the person was talking 





Four experts on lending were targeted and successfully 
interviewed. They include: 
1. An acting director of operations of Lagos State 
Employment Trust Fund (SEF) 
2. A senior member of staff in charge of SMEs credit 
in the Bank of Industry. 
3. A head of a department of a microfinance bank. 
4. An owner of an informal financing institution (locally 
known as Ajo) 
 
According to Diagram 6. 2 below, types of lenders under each of 
the formal and informal financial lenders are those participants 
that fit into the above definitions (see 4.1). Three lenders (SEF, 
Bank of Industry, and Microfinance Banks) fall under formal 
financial lenders because they are regulated through the official 
channels. The official channel referred to here is government 
agencies. In Table 5.1, informal financial lenders (Ajo, friends 
and family, Money Lender and unregistered cooperative society) 
are regulated privately, i.e. individuals or the community and are 
usually guided by customs, norms and culture.  Similarly, their 
lending approaches are mainly relational and based on the 
adoption of soft information. 
 
 The experts were assigned names in column 4 of Table 4.1 and 
4.2 above.  Correspondingly, the respective participating SMEs 
are captured, with assigned names, in the first column of Table 
5.1 below. The purpose of assigning names is to uphold the 
principles of anonymity to which this study subscribed. However, 
informal financial lenders such as Ajo, friends and family and 
cooperative society will not be assigned any name because the 
name in the current form is general to many and different 
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communities, and it does not make anyone or any group 
identifiable.  
 
Table 5.1 - Lenders and assigned names 
Type of 
lenders 






























*Ajo,  *Ajo,  
Friends and Family Friends and 
Family,  




Cooperative society.   
 
Participants in Context: formal lenders 
5.1.1 State Empowerment Fund (SEF) 
The Lagos State Employment Trust Fund was established by the 
Lagos State Employment Trust Fund Law 2016 to provide 
financial support to residents of Lagos State, to promote 
entrepreneurship by improving access to finance, strengthening 
the institutional capacity of MSMEs and formulating policies 
designed to improve the business environment in Lagos State. 
In addition, the Fund also develops programmes designed to 
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train and place unemployed Lagos residents in jobs while also 
focusing on programmes designed to drive innovation within the 
Lagos ecosystem. The fund is financed by the Lagos State 
Government, and it was also expected to raise additional funding 
from various sources, including donor partners, development 
agencies, corporate organisations, and individuals14. 
 
Under this scheme, SEF is created to eradicate poverty among 
the residents of the state through encouraging and empowering 
them to undertake entrepreneurial endeavours. SEF provides 
the most generous loan attributes in Nigeria at the time of this 
study. This is because the scheme gives out loan to micro, small 
and medium enterprises at less than 5% to 6% interest per 
annum, with tenure of at least three years. 
 
The person assigned to talk to the researcher for this study by 
SEF is an acting director; therefore, he is well versed in the 
operations of the organisation which was also observed from the 
way he responded to questions including knowledge of how SEF 
manages their loan portfolio. His job description indicates that 
he operates at the strategic level, with no direct involvement with 
the operational level duties. Personal questions were avoided 
during the interview; this was done by the researcher due to 
acknowledging the cultural practice within the society which 
expect respect to be given to people who are older or highly 
placed. Moreover, this participant is a highly placed official, and 
the researcher tried not to make him feel uncomfortable or 
inconvenient by asking personal questions. 
 
 
14 See https://lsetf .ng/.   
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5.1.2 Development Financial Institution (DFI)  
Development Financial Institution is Nigeria's oldest and most 
successful development financing institution. It was 
reconstructed in 2001 out of the Nigerian Industrial Development 
Bank (NIDB) Limited, incorporated in 1964. The bank took off in 
1964 with an authorised share capital of 2 million pounds (GBP). 
The International Finance Corporation, which produced its 
pioneer Chief Executive held 75% of its equity and several 
domestic and foreign private investors. Although the bank's 
authorised share capital was initially set at N50 billion in the 
wake of NIDB's reconstruction into DFI in 2001, it has been 
increased to N 250 billion to better position the bank to address 
Nigeria's rising economic profile in line with its mandate. The DFI 
is strategically positioned to manage foreign grants and aids 
given to facilitate the attainment of the nation's developmental 
aspirations. The bank's development orientation is focused on 
prudent project selection and management. It supports quality 
projects with high developmental impact, such as job creation 
and poverty alleviation. Also, the government expects DFI to 
operate in ways the enhancement of the socio-economic 
standard of Nigerians can be achieved.  To have its impact felt 
nationwide, it operates an office in each of Nigeria's geo-political 
zones and the Federal capital territory, Abuja (BOI website, 
2019). 
DFI provides loan at an interest rate of 9% and maximum 15loan 
tenure of three years, with loan amounts averaging above N20 
million per obligor (Bank of Industry, Nigeria, 2019). A senior 
 
15 Loan tenure could be short term, medium term or long term. If it is short term, it means payback 
period will be one year or less. And, if it is medium term, the expected payback period will be 
between one year to four years. While, a tenure referred to as long term, would represent a payback 




member of staff was interviewed. He has been in the SME 
financing sector for more than fourteen years and had worked 
with lenders before joining DFI. He is well versed with the credit 
operations of the organisation, including how the loan portfolio 
of SMEs is being managed. He is not currently directly involved 
with the operations, as he is at the mid-management level. 
5.1.3 Microfinance Institution (MFI) 
According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), microfinance 
banks provide financial services to the poor who are traditionally 
not served by conventional financial institutions (CBN, 2016). 
Microfinance banks in Nigeria are established to provide easy 
access to affordable loans to those that are excluded by the 
formal banking sector. For example, micro, medium, and small 
enterprises as well as improve the general financial status of its 
customers. Most of the Nigerian microfinance institutions are 
limited liability companies duly incorporated under the 2002 
Companies and Allied Matters Act, and they are regulated by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria. The loan interest provided by 
microfinance is about 60% per annum, with minimum tenure to 
be one year (Cbn.gov.ng, 2019). The respondent representing 
the microfinance bank is referred to as an MFI expert in this 
study.  
 
5.2 Participant in Context: Informal Lender 
The informal lender, locally known as  ‘Ajo’, which normally 
provides small loans to petty – micro-enterprises, was initially 
targeted and an expert, a key person who coordinates the 
operation, was interviewed. From the interview, it was realised 
that most of their beneficiaries are not engaged in 
manufacturing. Further painstaking research by the researcher, 
205 
 
via interviews and direct interactions with the beneficiaries, was 
carried out to ascertain what they do and how their businesses 
work. The outcome of this interaction confirmed that all the 
beneficiaries are into petty trading. Also, the size of their 
business can be categorised as a micro business.  
 
However, petty trading and micro-business do not qualify or fit 
into the definition of SME adopted by this study. As such, the 
researcher did not engage them for further interview. However, 
in the course of the interview, it was noted that some SMEs had 
enjoyed access to loan from family and friends and money 
lenders. These have contributed interesting dimensions to this 
study, especially on the informal lending relationship with formal 
lending. As such, some of the key points drawn from them are 
interspersed across the findings and analysis sections in 5.4.5, 
5.13 and 6.4. Further details of the sources from where each 
SME obtained loans is 5.3. 
  
5.3 Assigning Names and Sources of Finance 
Most of the SMEs who participated were recommended by the 
lenders as previous loan beneficiaries, except SME 7, SME 8, 
SME 9, and SME 10. This is in line with the snowballing survey 
technique. 
 
5.4 Participants in Context: Loan Beneficiary SMEs 
5.4.1 SME 1 
This participant is a CEO of a confectionary business, and he 
doubles as the secretary of the Lagos State chapter of the 
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National Association Small Scale Industrialist. He shared his 
experience on both microfinance and Lagos state-owned 
financial empowerment agency loans and their impact on his 
business. Before starting his own business, he was a senior 
manager in a manufacturing company. He arrived at his office at 
8:30 am; after that the interview commenced. From the sound of 
machines and operators emanating from the factory, it shows 
that there were a lot of ongoing manufacturing activities.  
 
5.4.2 SME 2 
He is a member of the Lagos State Small Scale Industrialist 
Association (LASSSI). The researcher contacted the association 
and was introduced to some members who agreed to participate 
in the study. SME 2 happened to be one of those members. 
Membership of this group was formed by ‘people’ who are small 
scale manufacturers, who desire to tap into the benefit that 
membership of social network or social groups brings. They 
always use it as a platform to pull resources together to pursue 
a common goal. Some of their objectives include liaising with the 
government on policy relating to improvement of financing, 
negotiating with banks, using their cooperative society to provide 
funds for deserving members, recommending tested and trusted 
members to formal financial lenders, amongst other things. 
 
SME 2 shared his experience about the loans he had obtained 
for his business (from microfinance and SEF). He runs a 
company that produces home products. He mentioned during 
the interview plans to diversify and add more products to their 
product portfolio. He obtained his MBA from the UK. He was 
already in his office at the time the researcher arrived, which was 
around 8:00. The researcher could tell from the movements and 
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sounds around the factory that production was ongoing at the 
time. 
 
5.4.3 SME 3 
He is the CEO of a small carpet manufacturing and trading 
company. He did not appear to have a formal education but 
comes across as adequately learned. He told the researcher 
about the training he had attended, including the ones organised 
by the SEF. He spoke intelligently, and it was clear he 
understood his business inside out. He had previously obtained 
a loan from a microfinance bank and currently SEF. In his 
narratives, he compares both experiences, microfinance loan 
and developmental loan, and gives h is conclusions. The 
researcher only saw one of his staff who notified him of his 
arrival. The office was detached so the researcher could not 
ascertain the nature of work going on in the factory. 
 
5.4.4 SME 4 
This participant (SME4) has a PhD, his factory is  a three-storey 
building. He is into the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals 
products. At the start of the interview, he questioned the 
researcher about his identity. He asked how he could be sure 
the researcher was not from one of his competitors. The 
researcher had to present his University ID card before the 
interview commenced. This participant  is widely experienced in 
business financing and had obtained a number of loans from co-
operative society and DFI. The interview was conducted on a 
Sunday. There was no significant activity going on around the 
factory because it was a Sunday, and the researcher could not 
see much as the offices were not within the factory building. 
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However, there were signs that a lot of production goes on 
during the week. The researcher saw some pallets that must 
have been used to offload raw materials or to store finished 
products. The researcher also saw a big industrial generator. 
5.4.5 SME 5 
He is educated to a degree level and previously worked with 
formal financial lenders. He jointly owns a food processing and 
packaging business with his wife. The new factory was built with 
money sourced from personal savings, family and friends, and a 
money lender. After this series of loans from savings, family and 
friends and money lenders, he became eligible for DFI loans. 
SME 4 hosted the researcher and conducted the interview in his 
lounge. The factory is located within the same compound at his 
house. The office was detached from the main house. Because 
of this, the researcher could not ascertain the nature of the work 
going on in the factory. 
5.4.6 SME 6 
He is into small scale manufacturing and fabrication of factory 
equipment. He obtained loans from a microfinance bank in the 
past. He is educated to a diploma level. He shared his 
experience about microfinance loans and the sort of prospects 
and challenges they pose. The factory and the office were within 
a small industrial estate. The office is detached from the factory, 
which made it impossible for the researcher to see the nature of 




5.4.7 SME 7 
He was a company director before retiring to manage his own 
company, which is into the manufacturing of beverages. He has 
obtained loans from two commercial banks in the past. The 
researcher was taken on a tour of the factory. During the tour, 
the researcher saw some factory workers and other support staff 
busy with production, including machines and equipment. 
 
5.4.8 SME 8 
She is a business owner that has been into processing and 
packaging of food product: i.e. vegetable oil for more than 20 
years. She has benefited from microfinance and commercial 
bank loans in the past. She also belongs to a co-operative 
society. She obtained commercial loans through the co-
operative society. The researcher did not see much activities 
ongoing, except equipment and storage facilities which were not 
in use at the time of the visit. The interview was conducted in the 
factory. 
 
5.4.9 SME 9 
This business owner is into floor tiles and marble manufacturing 
and has been in the business for more than ten years. The 
business has obtained a loan from an Islamic bank in the last 
four years. The office is detached from the factory; however, the 
researcher could tell that many activities were ongoing in the 
factory because the researcher was able to view the coming in 




5.4.10 SME 10 
She is a retiree who has been involved as a member of a co-
operative society for more than 15 years. She has been running 
a nylon manufacturing and packaging business for more than 17 
years. She mentioned that she has never approached any 
formal source of financing for her business except co-operative 
society. The cooperative society she belongs to is not registered 
with the government. Therefore, it is categorised as an informal 
lender. The interview was conducted in her house, and the 
researcher could not see what nature of work was ongoing. 
 
In summary, at the end of the main study, ten individual SMEs 
were interviewed. In addition to that, a total of four experts who 
have many years of experience working with formal and informal 
financial lenders were interviewed—bringing the total number of 
individual interviews conducted to fourteen. A summary of 
themes was provided to set the scene in the readers’ mind, and 
the details of the themes, supported with relevant excerpts, are 
presented in Section 5.7.  
5.5 Presentation of Result 
This section presents the results of the study and describes how 
the themes emerged. 
5.6 Summary of Themes 
This chapter presents six superordinate themes and their 
constituent subordinate themes (see Appendix 13 below). This 
is in addition to the four superordinate themes that emerged in 
the pilot study (see section 4.4). Three new superordinate 
themes emerged: impact of routine change, non-routine change 
and non-compliance to loan preconditions. The corresponding 
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subordinate themes to the superordinate theme, impact of 
routine change, are ‘becoming formalised’ and ‘efficiency’. Two 
of the new superordinate themes, non-compliance to loan 
preconditions and non-change in routine, have no subordinate 
theme. Three additional subordinate themes emerged for the 
existing superordinate theme, the interplay between formal and 
informal financial lenders on the growth of SMEs, is: ‘Loan 
assessment’, ‘improved access’, and ‘transparency’. In total, six 
superordinate themes and eight subordinate themes are 
explored in the remainder of this chapter, where they are 
illustrated with verbatim excerpts from the interview transcripts.  
From Appendix 14 below, the first column shows the themes that 
emerged from the pilot study and subsequently emerged in the 
main study. The second column contains the themes that did not 
emerge in the pilot study but only in the main study. The third 
column shows the subordinate themes that emerged during both 
the pilot study and the main study. The fourth column contains 
the subordinate themes that emerged in the main study only.  
5.7 Superordinate Theme: The Sacrosanct Nature of 
Precondition 
Loan preconditions are critical to all lenders. In keeping with the 
sacrosanct nature of loan preconditions, lenders do not waive or 
sidestep any loan preconditions. The only difference is that the 
type of loan preconditions relating to different lenders may vary. 
For example, all formal financial lenders may expect all 
prospective customers to be registered with the Corporate 
Affairs Commission; they will expect them to have a tax 
identification number. They will expect them to have an existing 




On the other hand, an informal lender may require just 
membership, attendance to meetings and payment of agreed 
periodic contribution. The rationality behind the creation of loan 
preconditions is to identify credible SMEs that are loan-worthy, 
who will not default after the loan has been issued. For formal 
financial lenders, participants narrated their experiences in 
relation to how important it is for prospective SMEs seeking to 
access formal financial lenders loans to adhere to its 
preconditions. 
 
All participants involved in the main study mentioned that none 
of the lenders they have a past or present relationship with, 
would permit the waiving of preconditions. This was affirmed by 
other beneficiary SMEs. For example, SME 3 commented that: 
 
“Their conditions are essential to them; you cannot 
get the money until you have done them”. 
 
From the excerpts related to this theme and captured in the 
above, all borrower maintained that they must adhere to loan 
preconditions before access could be obtained. According to 
them, access will not be provided if preconditions are not 
satisfied. Both the formal and informal lenders lack the power to 
accommodate individuals that do not meet loan preconditions; 




5.8 Superordinate Theme: Satisfaction of Loan 
Preconditions and Access 
The Subordinate theme “satisfaction of loan preconditions and 
access” emerged  due to the importance attached to loan 
preconditions by all parties. This made it compulsory for both 
formal and informal financial lenders to ensure they are satisfied 
before access is granted. All the participants commented that 
from their experiences, they endeavour to satisfy loan 
preconditions in their bid to gain access to loans. The 
superordinate theme encapsulates the various loan 
preconditions every SME must adhere to in order to qualify for a 
loan. It captures their narratives about what they must do and 
what the lenders expect before access is granted. Loan 
preconditions are to identify the SMEs that are credible and 
worthy of a loan. All participants emphasised the satisfaction of 
loan preconditions as the only means through which loans can 
be accessed. 
 
SEF expert expressed his opinion as thus: 
 
“Let me give you a hint, we don’t work in isolation. We 
have partners that complement all the processes we 
have. Except if someone applies through submission 
of a paper application all applications are done online. 
And it will not get to us until our partner (PWC) has 
reviewed and shortlisted, which will be based on 
merit. They do the first level screening. They make 
recommendations and we follow that. They might 
recommend that an application should be declined or 
be considered for the next stage. The next stage is an 
interview, which is jointly conducted by SEF and 
PWC. These are processes we have put in place to 
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ensure that the process is not circumvented. I can tell 
you for a fact that our processes are merit driven”. 
 
The above excerpt shows a detailed process involved in loan 
application approval and how important it is for it to be followed. 
The importance of following the process would result in the 
granting of access. In other words, it is expected that access 
would be granted as soon as all preconditions have been met. 
This is analogous to saying access can only be obtained after all 
the boxes have been ticked in relation to loan preconditions. 
Following the loan precondition, the aftermath is granting of 
access. This was supported by the view expressed by the DFI 
Expert, and he commented that: 
 
“If you (SMEs) meet our conditions getting a loan from 
us is very easy”. 
 
The excerpt above shows quite clearly that gaining access to 
finance is hinged on meeting loan preconditions. 
 
5.9 Superordinate Theme: Impact of Access 
This theme emerged from the narratives of participants who 
reflected on what access to finance means to their businesses.  
 
According to DFI Expert,   
 
“For instance, some business approached us in the 
past, and after evaluating their application, we might 
realise they did not meet those conditions. But, later 
on, after a few months, they came back and after 
evaluation of their application the second time, we 
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became satisfied as they were able to meet all the 
expected conditions”. 
 
DFI Experts account points to routine change as a result of 
seeking and meeting formal loan’s preconditions. 
 
According to SME 4, another point touching on growth was 
mentioned: 
 
“When I wanted to get the loan from them, I told them 
I wanted to buy a distribution van. Which I did, and 
that has helped the business tremendously. Anytime 
I want to take money from them, I will tailor it to a 
project”. 
 
In other words, it concerns what the effects of access to a loan 
are on SMEs that have obtained loans. Drawing from the 
narratives across the different participants’, the following 
Subordinate themes emerged, which include: Routine change 
and growth. 
 
5.9.1 Subordinate Theme: Routine Change 
The effect of access to a loan may lead to routine change. There 
are three different ways in which changes have occurred to 
routines within the context of this study. First is changing or 
adopting a routine possibly dormant routine X instead of former 
routine Y (see explanation on page 72). The second is making 
changes to a particular existing routine and the third scenario is 
the development and operation of an entirely new routine was 
experienced by respondents. This is because before SMEs can 
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gain access, certain practices must have been developed or put 
in place. This theme explores the new routines that were 
developed as a result of meeting loan preconditions and 
obtaining a loan. In other words, it means SMEs put in place 
certain routines that were previously not in existence. For 
instance, in the case of formal financial lenders, access to loans 
mean businesses must have been registered, they must now be 
in possession of a tax identification number, they are now 
keeping update records, and their account is being audited 
periodically, amongst others. This appears to explain how new 
rules are introduced and old ones rejected (Dollimore, 2016). 
This analogous to Holland et al. (2006: 777) referred to as 
“breaking habits”. This is understood as “steadily changing an 
old behaviour that was regularly performed within a specific 
situation into new behaviour that is frequently performed in that 
same situation”. 
 
As explained in 5.3, SME 4 obtained some loans from family and 
friends and money lender. According to him, these loans from 
family and friends and money lender helped put the right things 
in place for DFI loan. Example of some of the things he was able 
to put in place as a result of access to loan from family and 
friends and money lender are recording keeping, building a 
factory, obtaining relevant accreditations. This accentuated  an 
interesting dimension to the study, and it cannot be neglected. 
Hence, the reason why it is featuring here. 
 
SME 5 observed that: 
 
“No formal financing institution will want to provide a 
loan to a start-up. Because at that stage, I was just 
starting up by building structures, getting required 
statutory documentation, i.e. National Agency for 
Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) 
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registration, getting a microbiologist, registering the 
business with the Corporate affairs commission 
(CAC). And after putting all these things in place, I 
decided to seek the Bank of industry loan facility”. 
 
He used the money he got from informal financial lenders to put 
in place those things mentioned in the excerpt above. The 
routine he developed was for the purpose of qualifying to obtain 
future loans from formal financial lenders, not from  informal 
financial lenders. Therefore, informal finance does not, on its 
own make, SME wants to adopt a new routine that may bring 
about formality. 
 
Drawing from his experience, accessing loans from money 
lenders or friends and family does not directly lead to routine 
change. However, it would help towards putting physical and 
operational structures that may later set the scene for new 
routines to take place. One can say it aids the establishment of 
new routines, and it will only lead to routine change if the SME 
is interested in pursuing loans from the formal financial lenders. 
The reason is that they (formal financial lenders) would want to 
see accounting books, sales books, registration documents, 
amongst others.  
 
As a result of the loan borrowed from informal financial lenders, 
i.e. money lenders and friends and families, SME 5 was able to 
put things in place that made meeting formal lender’s loan 
precondition possible. Consequently, he was able to register his 
business, obtain the necessary documentation needed to get his 
business going, built his factory. These made him ready to meet 
the formal financial lenders’ loan precondition.  
 
According to the account of SME 8, who has enjoyed access to 
loans from two different formal financial lenders, i.e. MFI and 
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commercial bank at different times prior to the time of interview. 
She attested to change only in auditing; however, from her 
further narratives, it appears routine such as the keeping of 
records came up as part of the routine that was developed, but 
this was not mentioned specifically. Also, at some point, she 
added the importance of having a business plan which she 
reported as being a requirement for a loan. 
 
All participants who obtained loans from formal financial lenders, 
including the experts, agree that complying with loan 
preconditions enables them to evolve new ways of conducting 
their businesses.  
 
From the findings, routine change experienced is not the same 
across the board. This is because the loan preconditions SMEs 
are subject to are not the same across different lenders. 
Therefore, there is a variation in routine change. In Diagram 6`.1 
below are some examples of how SMEs claimed they 
experience routine change. 
 
Diagram 6.2 shows the variation experienced by different SMEs. 
The routine change seen here is pointing to new practices that 
were adopted as a result of SMEs effort towards meeting loan 
preconditions. It shows that formal financial lenders led SMEs to 
acquire different routines, which are linked to the lender’s 
preconditions. While informal financial lenders may not enable 
routine change, however, there is an exception as beneficiaries 
can experience routine change as a result of obtaining a loan 
from informal lenders. This is elaborated in section 6.3. It is 
important to note that the routines mentioned in the third column 
are made sense of by the researcher based on SME narratives. 
 
Some of the routines developed are analogous to making 
changes to a particular existing routine. According to SME 8, 
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when they could not develop a proper accounting procedure 
because they lack the required skill. A new employee who is a 
professional was employed, and all the coupling relations 
between routines, i.e., a bundle of different routines involved in 
each unit were created simultaneously and diffused across the 
organisation. For instance, the tracking, recording and reporting 
of all daily transactions and reporting of periodic stock takings, 
which will all be made available to the accountant who would use 
them to prepare profit and loss account, balance sheet and any 
other documents required for auditing and loan application 
purposes.  
 
Besides the exact “cloning” of the original routines, these new 
routines must be, to some extent flexible and adaptive to be 
suitable to the new, in part similar but also different, 
organisational context. The keeping of relevant books is not for 
owners’ consumption but must be of the right standard that 
measures up to what can be presented to lenders. Several 
adaptations would be required and that may require having the 
right skill and flexibility. 
Furthermore, the development and operation of an entirely new 
routine were experienced by respondents. There is substantial 
evidence informed by participants’ account about the adoption 
of completely new routines. For instance, SMEs with no proper 
records, and no Tax Identification nNumber (TIN) have had to 
develop these routines and keep operating them for no other 
reason but to remain complaint. These are evident from most if 
not all respondents that they had to develop specific new 




5.9.2 Subordinate Theme: Growth 
This subordinate theme touches on the way participants 
obtained loans and how they made sense of their experience 
about growth and the dimension of growth emanating from 
access to loans. To encourage openness and freedom of views, 
the researcher respectfully did not probe for sensitive 
information; rather, participants were encouraged to express or 
evidence growth in their preferred way. Hence, participants 
expressed growth in qualitative ways, based on their experience 
of improvements and what they used the loan for.  
 
This theme speaks to the effect that loan access has on SMEs. 
The participants were of the view that SMEs that get access to 
loans experience some improvement that is synonymous with 
growth. Since the study is guided by a semi-structured interview, 
the participant expressed their views on growth in a variety of 
ways. They constructed the meaning of growth in a manner that 
mirrored their meaning-making and understanding. Since the 
qualification of growth experienced by each participant is not the 
same. Formal lenders experience more growth COMPARISON 
INCOMPLETE… – this is shown in diagram 6.1 (see section 6.1 
for more details). 
 
Looking at individual experiences, starting from SEF expert’s 
account, it indicates they are continually looking out for better 
opportunities that would be of benefit to beneficiaries. They have 
put in place support mechanisms, for example, the provision of 
periodic training through the BDSPs (see meaning in the 
glossary). The latter are consultants working with the DFI to 
support borrowers. The DFI expert was not able to talk about 
growth in specific terms but was able to explain the kind of 
support they provide to SMEs to nurture their growth potentials. 
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This is understandable because they are only giving out loans; 
they are not the beneficiaries. 
 
SME 1 and SME 2, who are beneficiary of loan from SEF both 
reported that they were able to repackage their products, expand 
into bigger markets: by getting their product into bigger public 
places such as schools, supermarkets and also being able to 
repay what is due in instalments without a struggle. Staff 
capacity was also improved with additional manpower added to 
the workforce. SME 2 was at the time of the interview 
researching a new product, which he was planning to introduce 
to the market. SME 3, who also is a beneficiary of a loan from 
SEF, from his experience, reported that the loan had improved 
his productive capacity and he can meet customer demand with 
ease. The free training he received also taught him that he could 
increase his profitability by outsourcing manufacturing. The 
loans obtained from SEF are observed by borrowers and the 
SEF expert as the most generous in terms of the interest rate. 
See excerpts from SEF expert confirming this claim. 
 
“All our loan programmes attract only five per cent 
interest per annum and a guarantor. You do not have 
to present any collateral, and we use the guarantor-
based system”.  
 
The narrative reveals the interest rate amount, and when 
compared with other loans claimed to have been obtained by 
other participants, one could conclude that it is the most 
generous. 
 
Another growth observed is an increase in working capital. It was 
suggested that access to loan enable SMEs to benefit from 
economies of scale, as they are able to purchase in large 
quantity at a reduced cost. SME 9 mentioned that the growth 
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they have experienced as a business was as a result of the loan, 
which has made it possible for them to be able to have the 
capacity to undertake bulk buying, reducing overall raw material 
costs and enabling them to buy better quality raw materials. This, 
SME 9 believed has made it possible for them to save production 
time, as they have quality raw materials to use and more time to 
focus on other important aspects of the business.  
 
In addition to the reduction in processing//manufacturing time, 
working capital was mentioned to have increased. According to 
SME 1’ s account: 
 
“They will ask you what you will use the money for. 
We told them we want to change our package. They 
didn’t give us the money directly. They paid directly to 
the company and the remaining balance we told them 
we want to use it for working capital, and they gave 
that to us”. 
 
The working capital they receive helps them to have a sufficient 
amount of stock throughout the year and also helps SMEs to 
acquire assets through the banks’ asset financing loans. This 
account supports the kind of growth SMEs can experience. 
 
SME 5 (beneficiary of loan from the DFI) shared his experience 
about the loan he obtained. He expressed that it helped to 
improve product packaging; procurement of new machines, and 
that has led the business into getting into new markets. 
According to him, the new packaging has made their product 
acceptable to other big stores and high-profile customer 




“The new packaging has made our product 
acceptable to other big stores and high-profile 
customers”. 
 
From the excerpt, growth is also experienced through increased 
productivity. This is due to improved production capability, which 
improves meeting demand as a result of new production 
equipment purchased. This contributed to an increased market 
share and entering a new market. 
 
The microfinance expert revealed his organisation has no 
mechanism in place to assess if beneficiary SMEs are 
experiencing growth or not.  
 
However, he mentioned there are some indicators they use to 
determine the status of SMEs that have been obtaining loans 
from them. This is reviewed by monitoring teams at each stage 
of loan application assessment when an existing customer 
seeks another loan. After each visit to a customer place of 
business, a report will be prepared. The new report will be 
compared with the previous one. The comparison will show if 
there is any improvement or not in the SME’s business. Some of 
the things they check include but not limited to annual turnover, 
asset value, a quantity of stock.  
 
Another point made was that some SMEs would be treated in 
their first loan attempts as a micro business. The loan amount 
they will qualify for will be the size every micro business will 
attract, but after a period, they usually move up to qualify to be 
treated as an SME. This supported by MFI Expert’s account 
where he asserts that: 
 
“We have not been doing impact analysis. But, I know 
that most businesses that have started with us started 
224 
 
with micro loans, and most of them graduate to SME 
loan. Another thing is that as they graduate from 
micro to SME loan, we realise the business with just 
one shop has grown to two, and the one with two has 
grown to three. The way they graduate is not linear. 
Some take one year to graduate, some two years to 
graduate etc. At the bottom of the pyramid, there is a 
lot of money for them to make”.  
 
This means they would be receiving a higher loan amount 
compared to when they were treated as a micro business. He 
claimed that most SMEs they currently serve used to be micro-
business, but now they have moved up to SME and they also 
expand their outlets. 
 
SME 6 commented based on his experience about loans from 
microfinance banks. He explained that MFI is a source through 
which his business can get cash and inject the same into the 
business to meet demand. He did not completely want to agree 
that the growth he is experiencing is down to loan alone and 
partly due to the quality of his work.  
 
SME 7’s meaning-making regarding the kind of growth his 
business experienced, referred to the acquisition of more assets 
such as a generator, renovation of factory buildings, and 
second-hand machinery. He made a statement about having 
improved access with lesser preconditions and reduced interest 
rates. This, he believes, will make life easier for manufacturing 
SMEs. After the interview, the researcher was taken around the 
factory, and he saw many machines that were not utilised. The 
question that came to the researcher’s mind was, why? Is there 
a problem? Since he told the researcher that his business is 
growing and he has a loan from the commercial bank, why are 
there unused machines? Maybe he is struggling with the 
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payment? From his earlier explanation, the researcher also 
learned that he gets support from his son, who makes financial 
contributions to his business.  
 
The relevance of the support SME 7 gets from his son may have 
helped his business, compared to if there was no one to assist. 
In this case, there was no particular loan precondition expected 
to be met apart from the existing cordial relationship between 
father and son. The money was used to purchase a machine, 
and that qualifies as growth.  
 
According to SME 8, who has in the past access loan from a 
commercial bank, claimed to have experienced growth in 
working capital and productivity. However, further questions 
revealed doubts about her business growth occurring as a result 
of access to a commercial and microfinance bank. It was 
mentioned that the loan helped address the problem of working 
capital. Furthermore, there is improved cash strength. 
Nevertheless, at some point when repayment reaches 60%, 
cash begins to dry up, and productivity diminishes at this point. 
There seems to be a relationship between the stagnation of cash 
flow and interest rate. SME 8 commented: 
 
“The cash started to diminish. Cash diminishes 
because she has to pay more. The loan interest is 
very high at 60 something 68% per annum” and 
“productivity will slow down”. 
 
It was explained that there is usually a period in which 
there is a decline in the fortune of the business. 
According to SME 8:“this started happeningon the 8th 
instalment when the tenure is for a year,” “You will get 
trapped, you just find out that the remaining money 
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(principal) will be used to pay off the loan and be 
struggling to stay afloat”. 
 
As captured in the narrative presented by SME 8, the business 
would have used up all liquid cash to keep up with her 
repayments. The account reveals that a loan with more 
favourable terms would be better. It was suggested that a “5 -
10% interest rate per annum as best for the manufacturing 
sector, a tenor of three years and a moratorium of three months”. 
 
Drawing from SME 10 narrative, it appears if the only source of 
financing is from the informal financial lenders, i.e. Cooperative 
society, they may end up using it for working capital.  
 
When SME 10 was asked about what she uses the loan for, what 
she said was: 
 
   “It is working capital”. 
 
Coop Expert was interviewed during the pilot study. Likewise, 
some SMEs who are beneficiaries of a cooperative society’s 
loan was interview during the main study. It was gathered that 
most of them use cooperative loans for working capital. This is 
not because the Cooperative society wants them to use it for that 
purpose but because the amount they are given is not enough 
to do other things rather than working capital. In a cooperative 
society, the amount of loan you get is mostly determined by the 
person’s contributions. As observed by participants, you can 
only get 200% of what you have contributed. In support of this 
claim, see SME 10 account below: 
 
“If I say I want to get a loan, they’ll give me 120 
thousand Naira because they will give me twice the 
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money, I have with them. If you have 400 thousand 
Naira (N186,463 based Oanda currency conversion 
dated 10th of Feb 2020), you are eligible to collect 800 
thousand Naira (N372,927 based Oando currency 
conversion dated 10th of Feb 2020)”. 
 
In some rare instances, you can get 300% of what you 
contributed, and that can only happen when you have paid back 
your first and second loan within the terms agreed, then it stays 
that way.  
 
SME 4 commented that through the loan from Cooperative 
society and DFI, acquiring assets, including buying stock in bulk, 
was achieved. As a result, the business was able to increase its 
market share. For instance, access to cooperative society loan 
with its low interest and short tenure, and DFI with bigger loan 
amount and loan tenure is a good one. The loan attribute must 
have played a role in the magnitude of growth enjoyed.  
 
In summary, every participant has experienced at least one form 
of growth as a result of getting a loan, though there are some 
differences in the and magnitude of growth reported. The 
excerpts are direct and summarised statements made by 
participants, indicating the variation in growth experienced by 
SME because of access to loans. Even in the face of some 
growth indicators, especially in the case of the commercial bank 
and microfinance beneficiaries (see SME 8 excerpt above), 
there seem to be complaints revolving around repayment, high-
interest rates, and short-term tenure. Hence, see section 7.5 for 
suggestion on the reduction of interest rate and increase in loan 




5.10 Superordinate Theme: Impact of Routine Change 
This superordinate theme explores the effect of a routine change 
on SMEs due to meeting loan preconditions. This theme 
captures the participant’s understanding of the implication of 
routine change within the reality of their businesses.  
 
For instance, CB Expert’s narrative expressed the effect of 
record keeping: 
 
“It helps their businesses by preventing pilfering. 
Pilfering is the act of stealing by staff, and they will 
know the state of their businesses at any time”. 
 
As explained (in 2.6), routine change means SMEs have 
operationalised specific things that were not previously in place. 
The new practices put in place could mean the implementation 
of practices more common in large established organisations. 
The implication of routine change may be positive or negative on 
the business. 
 
The two subordinate themes that emerged, as a result, are: 
“Becoming formalised and efficiency”. 
 
5.10.1 Subordinate theme: becoming formalised 
The adoption and adherence to loan preconditions, which has 
led to new practices being put in place, has made it possible for 
SMEs to be transformed from operating informally to operating 
formally. Although, for example, SEF expert commented in a 





“Through the report provided by the BDSPs, we have insights 
into those that are doing really well and those whose operations 
are changing towards more formalisation and structuring”.  
 
This is very important because the assurance that a present and 
future loan request will be approved will be doubtful if when the 
formal lender’s officials visit the business premises of SMEs, 
they found there is no evidence to show records are existing. For 
example, if there is a lack of record-keeping and irregular bank 
deposits; evidence of registration of business; these conditions 
which they have to meet, amongst others. Such conditions could 
be argued to make organisations formal. Formality means 
businesses are now out of the shadow economy, they are now 
known through official channels, and they are making a tangible 
contribution to the economy such as business registration, 
payment of taxes or complying with regulatory requirements. 
Businesses in shadow economies are operating under the radar 
without being detected by the government or government 
agencies (Schneider, 2001). 
 
The kind of change experienced differs in nature between 
different players. Thus, there is a variation in routines as 
manifested in the way SMEs operate across the board. What this 
means is that the type of practice SME 1 adopts may be different 
from that of SME 5, yet they may all experience some changes 
that will be common to them all.  
 
To put this in proper context, commercial banks as part of their 
many preconditions, require SME to have a tax identification 
number; they are not interested in the payment of tax or any 
evidence of payment. Any SME that could obtain a loan from 
them may not likely have imbibed the practice of tax payment 
because they may not be motivated towards doing so at the point 
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of seeking a loan. On the other hand, Development financial 
institutions’ (DFI) and SEF beneficiaries will have to present 
evidence of paying tax. Evidence of payment of tax is part of the 
requirement for their loan. Thus, they may continue to adhere to 
this practice to acquire future loans from the DFI and SEF. They 
are also aware that the monitoring team can visit for evaluation. 
Therefore, any DFI and SEF beneficiaries must have their 
businesses registered, a bank account opened, a tax 
identification number processed and secured, and in possession 
of evidence of tax payment. 
 
None of the participants who obtained loans from informal 
lenders thought that tax payment and business registration are 
part of the loan requirements they have to meet. These two are 
the most likely routine that makes a business to be formalised. If 
these are absent in any business, they might likely remain in the 
shadow economy, and their source of financing would continue 
to be informal financial lenders. For instance, in the case of 
informal financial lenders, access will mean that the only change 
in the owner’s routine will be “meeting attendance” and “regular 
contributions”. These cannot be interpreted as the same 
organisational routines change that can lead to formalisation.  
 
All participants who have accessed loans from formal financial 
lenders have echoed similar experiences regarding what they 
have to do to obtain loans and also reasons why they continue 
to engage in such activities. For example, the registration of their 
businesses brings to the fore their existence, and the 
government can trace them if they act inappropriately. They can 
also attract government patronage and subsidies. Registration 
to get a tax identification number is another step after business 
registration; this is a one-off thing. For most informal SME, 
getting registered with CAC and for tax identification purpose is 
an outright development and operation of an entirely new 
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routine. Payment of tax is continuous, especially for SMEs 
interested in further loans from DFI and SEF. Therefore, one can 
conclude that formal financial lenders enable SMEs to migrate 
from informality or shadow economies to formality or the 
mainstream economy. Again, this conclusion is reached based 
on the researcher’s sense-making and construction of meaning 
from how the participants have narrated their reality. 
 
Monitoring by the formal financial lenders on beneficiary SMEs 
means that beneficiary SMEs must keep up with the practice of 
the new routines. If they stop practising the routines, future loan 
access may be jeopardised. According to IB expert (The excerpt 
by IB expert was borrowed from the pilot study because SME 9, 
a participant in the main study, had previously obtained a loan 
from them): 
 
“The SMEs will continue to keep proper books, 
because they know we may come any time to check 
their stock, sales records, and other things”.  
 
That was an official speaking here. Whenever bank officials visit 
SMEs’ business premises, they can inspect anything ranging 
from business incorporation, regulatory compliance like 
NAFDAC, Lagos State Residents Registration Agency 
(LASRRA) card, to TIN (tax identification number), evidence of 
tax payment, valid identity, e.g., national ID, and international 
passports. It is safer to keep to these preconditions because 
anything can be asked and checked. For instance, the DFI 
expert specifically talked about why tax payment is important to 
them, according to him: 
 
“Let us look at this through altruistic perspective; the 
loans we give out are taxpayers’ money. Without the 
taxpayers, we will not have funds to give out to 
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anyone. I think is just and fair for this benefit to also 
go back to the people who contributed it. Because of 
this principle, no one will be given a loan even if all 
other preconditions are met, but tax payment is not. 
Tax payment is the highest of all”. 
 
Going by the statement above, it is not surprising to see why 
most beneficiaries of DFI claimed to be paying taxes. This shows 
the high level of priority attached to it. However, accessing loans 
from informal financial lenders may not encourage the adoption 
of routines analogous to the one above. Informal lenders do not 
encourage this kind of routine. The only condition to be met is 
mostly relationship-based ones. This does not mean the 
relational approach is inadequate, but rather it may be serving a 
different purpose that works well for the informal financial 
lenders. Through the personal or relational approach adopted by 
informal financial lenders, they would know who the SMEs are, 
and trust can be built that way.  
 
To summarise, the sort of activities a relationship-based loan 
precondition promotes would encourage the SME to be acting 
towards meeting preconditions, such as physical attendance to 
meetings and making financial contributions to the cooperative 
society. Therefore, it can be concluded that informal financial 
lenders judging by the nature of their loan preconditions which is 
relationship inclined, may constrain beneficiary SMEs to remain 
informal and continue operating in the shadow economy. This is 
because there is no incentive to act towards formality. While, 
formal financial lenders enable SMEs to move out of the shadow 
economy into the formal economy because access to finance is 
tied to tax payment, registration of the business, regulatory 




5.10.2 Subordinate theme: efficiency 
This Subordinate theme conveys how adherence to formal 
lending rules enables routine change that impacts SMEs 
positively. It takes into consideration the implication of putting 
things in place, such as payment of tax, business registration, 
the keeping of relevant books of accounts. This sort of routines 
can aid SMEs in utilising their time and energy in a way that their 
business objectives can be achieved. This is because when 
proper records are kept, the owner would know the actual state 
of his or her business and can make sensible and well-informed 
decisions. Some participants observed that change in their 
routines had enabled them to experience efficiency in their 
operations. Below excerpt is SME 5’s comment about the way 
routine change has impacted his business: 
 
“We have been able to improve our efficiency 
because we used to get calls from customers 
complaining that they found stones in our Ofada rice16 
but now with the new machine purchased through the 
bank of industry we have been able to eliminate that. 
We now have a stone picker, and the time it takes to 
pick stones from the rice is quicker compared to 
before when we hand pick stones ourselves”. 
 
Similarly, the narrative of SME 4 matches a new state of 
efficiency that has been attained; as a result, leading to change 
in routine, which manifested through new processes put in place 




16 Ofada rice is a type of rice grown in some parts of Nigeria. 
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“It has removed the issue of not having proper 
accountability for each aspect of the business. Every 
aspect now has a cost centre, so we look at the cost 
centre when we are having an issue, unlike before, it 
has really improved, in terms of administration, it has 
really improved. Functions are now managed by a 
competent individual that has been employed”. 
 
From the narratives as captured in the excerpts above, it is 
evident that access to loans is an outcome of the preconditions 
that were satisfied which led to a change in the way SMEs 
operate. Thus, enabling efficient operation.  
 
According to SME 4, he linked some improvements experienced 
by the business to routine change as a result of meeting loan 
requirements: according to her: 
 
“It has actually increased our productivities, and it has 
removed the issue of not having proper 
accountability, every aspect now has a cost centre, 
so we look at the cost centre when we are having an 
issue, so now things have really improved, in terms of 
administration, it has really improved”. 
 
Similarly, he also linked the routine change they experienced to 
taxation reduction because they can employ an accountant who 
manages all financial matters, and with his skill, they are able to 
calculate what their tax payment will be. Prior to when a formal 
loan was sought, tax officials will come and demand arbitrary 
figures, but presently, they are in a position where they know 
what constitutes the right computation for tax, with knowledge of 
facts and figures about what was actually earned and expended. 
Accordingly, they are using this knowledge to their advantage by 
engaging with the tax authority if conflicts arise. The narrative of 
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the participant supports the notion that good accounting records 
could help in renegotiating tax rates, therefore informing SMEs 
of what they are due to pay. 
 
In summary, new routines developed helped sharpened skills. 
This is made possible as a result of putting the right practice in 
place, which is geared towards meeting loan preconditions. This 
comes into play by the way SMEs acquire and develop the right 
skills through training and employment of competent new 
employees who will pay attention to the right aspect of their 
operations and help improve quality, including the quantity of 
output and transaction cost. 
 
5.11 Superordinate Theme: Non-Compliance to Loan 
Preconditions 
As explained above, this superordinate theme has no 
subordinate theme. Non-compliance to loan preconditions 
captures the participant’s account of why SME may not meet 
loan preconditions. The probability of non-conformity to loan 
precondition cannot be verified in this study as the participants 
all attest to meeting loan preconditions before access was 
granted. However, the participants were of the opinion that if 
loan preconditions are not met, there will be no loan. Since the 
study only targeted loan beneficiaries, their accounts are the 
basis of this theme.  
 
One example of a narrative that captured this reality is the SEF 
expert account which stated that it is a requirement for all SMEs 




“These are processes we have put in place to ensure 
that the process is not circumvented. I can tell for a 
fact that our processes are merit driven” (SEF expert). 
 
He insisted that nothing else will change except preconditions 
are followed. Therefore, access denial can occur with formal and 
informal financial lenders if loan preconditions are not met.  
 
In summary, all the participants that have obtained loans from 
formal and informal financial lenders agreed that non-
compliance might lead SMEs to be denied access, and they may 
end up exploring options that might make them worse off. Also, 
access denial may lead to further delay. This is because to 
overcome denial, and they will have to put certain things in place, 
which would meet the loan requirement of lenders. For example, 
in the case of a formal lender, the prospective borrower will have 
to register their businesses, keep a proper record, register and 
payment of taxes.  
 
5.12 Superordinate Theme: No Routine Change 
As explained in 5.4 above, this superordinate theme has no 
subordinate theme. From the narratives of the participant who 
received one of the informal financial lenders’ loans only, it is 
clear that meeting loan preconditions for informal lender do not 
have a direct impact on change in routine. As prospective SMEs 
are not required to register their businesses, pay taxes, or have 
a tax identification number. This is understandable, as access to 
finance from informal financial lenders only require attendance 
to meetings and regular payment and these are not in any way 
sufficient to make them change operationally. These sorts of 
preconditions are reputation-based. However, SMEs that 
reported a routine change are those that have the desire to or 
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are able to get access to a loan from formal financial lenders in 
addition to informal financing. Therefore, access to informal 
financing alone does not guarantee routine change except if the 
SMEs have met loan preconditions of formal financial lenders or 
are currently enjoying access. For example, SME 10, who 
claimed she has only been approaching and gaining access to 
an informal lender in the past. In her narrative claimed: 
 
“I don’t deal with the bank. I get my loans from my 
cooperatives; at least, I’m running about three 
cooperatives”. 
 
When questions about the adoption of new routines, for 
example, ‘record-keeping’, were asked, the response was “no”. 
She seems not to see the need to do so in the future. She did 
not demonstrate from her narrative that her business adopts any 
new routine due to access to informal financial lenders’ loan. The 
dependence on informal financial lenders only and lack of 
aspiration to approach formal financial lenders may imply that 
informal rules do not enable the adoption of new routines and 
sound business practices (see explanation in sub section 6.3.3 
and 6.3.7). 
 
Similarly, SME 4 though he claimed to have experienced routine 
change, he linked the change to a formal lender: DFI. When the 
researcher asked him a question about routine change resulting 
from meeting loan preconditions from cooperative society and 
getting loans from them. He responded by saying: 
 
“No, there is nothing you are required to do than, to 
attend meetings, and be a financial member, which is 




Clearly from the excerpts, accessing a loan from informal 
financial lenders only can constrain the adoption of new routines 
except if the SME has the ambition to add more sources of 
financing from formal financial lenders, except registered 
cooperative society in the future. Registered cooperative and 
unregistered cooperative have similar relationship-based loan 
preconditions, which applies to all informal lenders. 
 
5.13 Superordinate Theme - The Interplay Between Formal 
and Informal Lenders on The Growth of SMEs 
From the narratives in the main study, it can be established that 
there are various accounts that show commonalities between 
formal and informal financial lenders, especially the changes 
mirroring routines that are traditionally seen as personal or 
relationship-based, which have found their way into the loan 
requirements of formal financial lenders. 
 
From the participants' narratives, it can be established that they 
obtained their loans through the recommendation of their 
respective cooperative societies (see excerpts below).  
 
“We have a cooperative, and we recommended 20 
people for the scheme in Lagos”. 
 
Before loans were made available through the recommendation 
of the cooperative society, the formal lender might have made 
contact with the cooperative society. During that encounter, the 
formal lender made a request to the cooperative society asking 
if they could recommend their best 20, who are trusted and 
tested. The excerpt above is a response to a formal lender’s 
request to the cooperative society. From the excerpt, it is 
239 
 
obvious the informal financial lenders provided the names of 
good members. The account was narrated by participants (SME 
1 and SME 2) who obtained a loan from the SEF.  
 
The cooperative was created by members who share the same 
goal and are into a similar line of business (manufacturing). The 
cooperative society has financed many members who qualified 
for loans to help them towards improving their businesses. Due 
to this reason, they know those who are creditworthy among 
their members. This made it possible for a cooperative society 
to know whom to recommend. The recommendation was relied 
upon by the formal financial lenders because they believe the 
cooperative society have a more direct relationship with the 
SMEs. This helps formal lenders to overcome information 
asymmetry.  
 
Informal financial lenders are managed based on rules and 
guidelines rooted in personal relationships, which can be 
referred to as informal rules. Exchanges are conducted on the 
basis of social affiliation, reputation and trust (see 2.3 and 2.4). 
For example, before a loan request is granted to any member, 
they must be known to the cooperative society. This is 
corroborated by SME 4 excerpt below: 
 
 “You must have been contributing into your account, 
and you must be six-month-old in the cooperative, if 
you enter the society in January, by June ending, you 
will be able to get something”. 
 
When a new member is seeking a loan, they must have been 
members for about six months; two members of the cooperative 
society must stand as guarantors for them. Membership of 
cooperatives society is part of the loan preconditions that form 
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part of the loan preconditions for SMEs. This allows a 
relationship to exist, and members get to know each other. 
 
Similarly, formal financial lenders like microfinance bank and 
commercial may expect an account to be opened by new SMEs 
as a way of creating a relationship through banking. The bank 
will advise them to ensure regular deposit of daily sales into their 
account. The size and frequency of the payment will be used as 
the basis of calculating the amount SMEs is qualified for when 
seeking future loan. From the time of account opening and when 
they are judged to have qualified for a loan will be six months or 
three months depending on the bank. This is more like a 
personal exchange mechanism. This accurately mirrors what an 
informal lender will expect from a new member. By asking them 
to be introduced by an existing member, who will give 
recommendations about their character and expect them to 
remain registered and make regular contributions for six months 
before access to a loan can be granted. The period of opening 
an account and operating it allows the formal financial lenders to 
get to know the customer; they will also conduct what is called 
KYC at the point of account opening. KYC is referred to as Know 
Your Customer (KYC). It involves knowing where formal lenders’ 
customer lives, the description of their houses, the size of their 
household, amongst others. 
 
Similarly, for the informal lender, members would have known 
your house at some point long before joining the cooperative 
society. After registration as members, you will be asked to 
attend meetings and make regular contributions. The period 
from registration to the time you qualify for a loan will be six 
months. 
 
Similarly,  an informal institution such as a cooperative society 
would want to provide access to only those known to them, so 
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also, the formal financial lenders, i.e. banks adopt the same 
approach by ensuring only customers known to them are 
considered for a loan. However, this is not to say the 
consideration is based on personal exchanges or a relationship-
based approach alone (for formal financial lenders, other 
conditions will still apply). However, it means being known will 
bring you closer to get access to a loan. 
 
From the discussion above, formal financial lenders such as 
microfinance institutions, commercial bank and development 
financial institutions require some element of relational 
approaches conditions to be fulfilled. This was evident from the 
experiences shared by the participants, which shows that if 
SMEs are organised into clusters or groups or cooperative 
groups, they will find it easy to meet other loan preconditions and 
access them. The relational approach adopted by formal 
financial lenders is devised to achieve the same thing as the 
informal financial lenders: to get to know the SMEs in person. 
Formal financial lenders may achieve the same through different 
strategies, e.g. the requirement of operating a bank account with 
the bank, getting the cooperatives to make a recommendation 
about their best and trusted members. This will help to reduce 
information asymmetry because the group will know their 
member’s character and are able to make judgements about 
who is of good conduct. It is likely they also know what their 
repayment history was. The cooperative also plays the role of a 
godfather or an influential personality, or an entity with influence. 
For example, SME 8 had obtained a loan from formal financial 
lenders in the past; when the researcher told her about other 





“Those ones are hard to get; you need to be 
connected. If I have anyone in government, it will be 
easy” [SME 8]. 
 
Nevertheless,  she had obtained loans before, thus explaining 
how she accomplished accessing previous loans, as most of the 
preconditions are similar. 
 
“I was able to access three million from a commercial 
bank because when they came here, and they saw 
the need for it, and they give it to us under the 
cooperative. We have a cooperative here, so 
because it is the cooperative that did it for its 
members; it was cooperative that access that money, 
they did not do it on an individual basis, but the 
cooperative ask each co-operator to provide his/her 
guarantors, the cooperative is like a screening body” 
[SME 8]. 
 
She had obtained a loan from a bank with similar conditions. 
According to her: 
 
“It is the same conditions, but it came through under 
the umbrella of the cooperative” [SME 8]. 
 
What can be understood from the responses is that there is a 
belief that if you are in contact with someone influential, access 
will be easy. This appears to be why she feels she cannot 
approach the DFI or SEF, which gives loans out on more 
favourable terms.  
 
Fortunately, the cooperative played the role of the influential 
personality that could take the place of a mediator between her 
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and the formal financial lenders. The previous loan she obtained 
was through the recommendation of the cooperative to the 
formal lender. The cooperatives may reach out to banks asking 
them to offer loans to group members, and the bank in turn 
listens and use the information provided by the cooperatives or 
groups as a starting point to evaluate the suitability of 
recommended SMEs. 
 
Hitherto, most of those who have obtained loans through 
cooperative society’s intervention had previously shared the 
view that access to loans from formal financial lenders would not 
be possible. They were later able to access it through the 
intervention of cooperative societies. In the real sense, the 
cooperative may not consciously act on the premise that they 
are stepping in to play the Godfather role, but they are indirectly 
acting in the interest of their members. In so doing, their actions 
have enabled access to formal lender easier for those who are 
struggling. Also, when access from formal financial lenders is 
achieved, elected leaders of informal financial lenders see it as 
an achievement and many times before their election, they 
include it on their agenda as part of their campaign promises. 
 
The feeling of insecurity and bias resides not only with formal 
lenders but with people in general. Similar to SME 8’s view, the 
DFI Expert excerpt agrees to the notion of the feeling of 
insecurity: 
 
“I understand that the way people see us being a 
government institution like a place where people do 
not come to work as at when due. In some 
government institutions, people will not come to the 
office on time. They feel it is business as usual where 
staff can do what they want. People feel you need to 
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have a Godfather in order to get a loan from us, which 
is untrue”. 
 
His account is a testament to the general bias towards SMEs by 
formal financial lenders. To overcome this, cooperatives 
(whether registered or not) may bridge the gap caused by bias 
and feeling of insecurity. 
 
For instance, SME 1 and SME 2 became beneficiaries after they 
were recommended by their own cooperative. The idea of 
having a Godfather figure, which matches the role cooperative 
seems to be playing, has somewhat paved the way for access. 
Non-compliance can be a result of the general understanding 
that loan preconditions are too stringent and cannot be met. This 
is related to the belief common among SMEs that loan 
preconditions are too hard to meet. Also, some bank officials 
believe that SMEs are risky ventures, which affects the way they 
(bank officials) relate with them when a loan is being sought. To 
reconcile the bias and unwillingness on both sides (formal 
lenders and SMEs), cooperatives play a significant role to bridge 
the gap. 
 
Three subordinate themes can be drawn from the narrative 
above: loan assessment, improved access and transparency. 
 
5.13.1: Subordinate Theme: Loan Assessment 
Loan assessment emerged from the main study data. It 
corresponds perfectly under the superordinate theme of the 
interplay of formal and informal financial lenders because there 
is reliance between different lenders when it comes to loan 
assessment. Narratives from participants confirm formal 
financial lenders are open to considering SMEs who belong to a 
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group, e.g. cooperative society. The cooperative society would 
know members and anyone whose past conduct falls short of 
the requirement of getting a loan and those individuals will not 
be recommended to formal lenders. 
 
The excerpt below confirms the informal lender’s role: 
 
“In fact, due to that, because we got the loan on the 
basis of belonging to a cooperative. Because we have 
a cooperative here and the cooperative was the 
collateral for the loan” [SME 6].  
 
From the excerpts, it can be seen that one of the participants 
observed that loans were obtained from a formal lender as a 
result of the role the cooperative society played. The cooperative 
played the role of an intermediary between the cooperative 
society members and the formal lender. Therefore, there is a 
likelihood that the membership of a cooperative society 
enhances one’s eligibility for a loan. 
 
However, that may not be enough. The excerpt below would 
demonstrate the overlap between formal and informal financial 
lenders. The excerpt captured the discussion that took place 
between the researcher and the respondent. 
 
Researcher:  What are the things you have to provide 
in addition to coming under cooperative because you 
said the cooperative was like your guarantor? 
 
“Respondent: Even before they went to the extent of 
awarding the loan and all that, they came, they 
inspected our books, they see what we have been 
doing, they asked how long we have been in the 
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business, is the business incorporated, things like 
that are the question they asked us” (SME 6). 
 
The narrative above shows the formal lenders do not limit their 
preconditions to the recommendation made by informal financial 
lenders alone. Also, they use it in addition to their existing 
personal approaches. This is treated as an additional layer of 
checks during the loan assessment stage as a way of managing 
risk.  
 
From the above, the formal lenders rely more on informal lender 
at the assessment stage when a decision about a loan is to be 
made.  
 
In summary, drawing from accounts from various participants, it 
is evident that there is an interplay between formal and informal 
financial lenders, and this interplay is bidirectional. It is 
bidirectional because formal financial lenders rely on informal 
financial lenders such as cooperative society during the loan 
application assessment stage. In contrast, informal financial 
lenders rely on formal rules later on in the lending process when 
a default has occurred. Their reliance on formal rules involves 
using law enforcement agencies in situations where members 
have defaulted and all relational mechanisms have failed. 
5.13.2 Subordinate Theme: Improved Access  
This subordinate theme here emerged from data. The narratives 
presented below points to how access to loan gets better. 
However, certain information about SMEs may be concealed 
and unknown to formal financial lenders. Nevertheless, they can 
become unveiled through the relationship that exists between 
some informal financial lenders. This sort of situation where 
information is concealed is called opaqueness in the literature 
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(Beck et al., 2014). When opaqueness occurs, it particularly 
undermines lending from institutions that engage in more 
impersonal or arms-length financing, which require hard, 
objective, and transparent information (Augusto de la Torre et 
al., 2010). By opaqueness, it means that something is not 
transparent. In context, it is difficult to ascertain which SMEs 
have the capacity to pay and/or the willingness to pay back the 
loan. The formal financial lenders lack the capacity to know the 
right information about their prospective customers, in this case, 
the SME. Nonetheless, the information can be provided through 
informal financial lenders because they are closer to the SMEs. 
This was supported by the SME 8 narrative. According to her 
experience: 
 
“The cooperative society is like a cover; they can say that, that 
person is okay, we know this person, and we know they are 
working. So, if there is any problem, they can tell you [the bank] 
this is where you can get him, carry her asset or go to Lagos 
state, tell them to seal off the place. They will give them 
information which ordinarily if the cooperative is not there, there 
is nobody that will give you such information about another 
person’s factory or business”. 
 
Similarly, as captured from the above excerpt, informal financial 
lenders, e.g. cooperative society, keeps a tab on members and 
make a lending decision based on what they know in relation to 
information at their disposal about members. In addition to other 
strategies put in place by formal financial lenders, they still rely 
on information available to some informal financial lenders, i.e. 
cooperative society, to sieve prospective loan applicants. 
Liaising with informal financial lenders seem to be an additional 
layer of checks and verification before a loan decision can be 
made about SMEs. Following this approach, formal financial 
lenders are able to limit the extent of opacity that may be existing 
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before. Therefore, borrowing elements of the relationship-
lending approach from informal financial lenders. Soft 
information about the business situation, repayment history, and 
business size can be provided by the cooperative society some 
SMEs belong to. This is because they must have been obtaining 
loans in the past from the cooperatives, and their record is 
readily available to the cooperative society. This may be a good 
reason for informal financial lenders to continue with their 
informal practice, and formal financial lenders would have to 
continue relying on them. SME 8 affirmed the role of the 
cooperative by stating that: 
 
“The cooperative was able to stand for us (members) 
because banks now believe more in cooperative and 
groups because they believe that if people come into 
cooperative or groups like this, they believe it will be 
easier for them to track or to work with their executive 
in case there is any problem than chasing individuals 
all over the place”. 
 
This excerpt above indicates that some banks grant loans to 
members on the strength of the cooperatives society’s 
recommendation.  
 
SME 8 belongs to a cooperative society and uses them to 
complement loans from DFI. He shared his experience 
regarding the personal relationship aspect of lending that 
cooperatives leverage on: 
 
“You must be a member of any cooperative that can 





Touching on what has been said from different participants; 
cooperative society (either registered or not) membership makes 
access to finance from formal financial lenders easier. 
Membership alone does not guarantee access. However, what 
determines access is good to conduct, and abide by the rules 
and conditions of the cooperative society (See explanation on 
social capital in section 2.6). Good conduct informs the 
recommendation from the cooperative society to the formal 
financial lenders. A cooperative society would only guarantee a 
trusted member. The relationship between formal and informal 
financial lenders leads to improved access to formal loan and 
that increase the credibility of the informal lender. The improved 
credibility will make cooperative membership to be appealing to 
others. 
5.13.3 Subordinate Theme: Transparency 
The relationship that exists between formal and informal lender 
can create some level of transparency through information 
sharing previously concealed. This concealment may be termed 
as opaqueness. Relying on the informal lender has enabled 
formal financial lenders to find a way to overcome this 
opaqueness by adopting elements of relationship lending 
enabled through the information they (cooperative society) 
possess. It is worthy of note that the issue of information 
asymmetry is prevalent in both formal and informal lending. 
However, it is better for informal financial lenders than formal 
ones (Beck et al., 2014). 
 
Information asymmetries exist when one party has more 
information than the other. The fact that the cooperatives have 
members that know each other might make information more 
accessible to them. Membership is determined by the 
recommendation of one another, and access to loans is possible 
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if other existing members guarantee a prospective borrower. 
Therefore, from this discussion, information appears to be 
widespread within the cooperative hierarchy. Soft information on 
the character of members, their conducts and repayment history 
can be communicated easily. From the accounts of SME 1, SME 
2 and SME 6, they both claimed that the cooperative society they 
belong to selected and recommended them to SEF. Although all 
other formal loan’s preconditions were applied, it all started from 
the cooperative’s recommendation.  
 
If SMEs on their own have gone to the formal financial lenders, 
they may not have scaled through because the formal lender 
would not know many things about the SME. Likewise, the SME 
may not be confident enough to make a good representation for 
themselves.  
 
Equally, as an individual, the SME may not also be able to get 
someone to present as a guarantor. A guarantor is someone 
who knows you. There must be some element of prior 
knowledge about the person to be guaranteed. 
 
According to excerpts from the SME 6: 
 
“It was the cooperative that obtains that money, they 
did not do it on an individual basis, but the cooperative 
ask each co-operator (cooperative members) to 
provide his/her guarantors, the cooperative is like a 
screening body”.  
 
From the account above, cooperative society’s recommendation 
led to access to the loan. They stood as guarantor for the 
members they recommended. The first criteria SEF requested 
from the cooperative society whose member was a participant 
(SME 2) was that they would want them to recommend their best 
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20, who must have been tested and trusted. Many things about 
the SME must be transparent to the cooperative society, which 
would be the origin of their confidence in the SME they 
guaranteed. These are individuals who are creditworthy and 
would not default.  
 
In summary, the superordinate theme, the interplay between 
formal and informal financial lenders, reveals the nature of the 
relationship existing between lenders. It highlights how they rely 
on each other. For instance, formal financial lenders rely on 
informal financial lenders’ recommendation at the early stage of 
the loan application process. This early stage can also be 
referred to as the loan application/assessment stage, where they 
sought the recommendation of creditworthy members from 
informal financial lenders who adopt personal approaches, i.e. 
cooperative society. Similarly, data shows that informal financial 
lenders, due to their lack of sufficient financial ability, do rely on 
formal financial lenders to obtain loan for their members. In the 
process, they stand as guarantors for such recommended 
members. On the other hand, drawing from the pilot study data, 
informal lenders rely on official channels as a last resort for 
enforcement purposes when social sanctions and other 
relational enforcement mechanisms have failed.  
 
5.14 Summary 
IPA was used to make sense and capture the lived experiences 
of participant’s narratives. The deployment of thematic analysis 
allowed for a systematic and orderly flow of idea, which led to 
the development of themes. These themes emerged from the 
data that was collected in the main study. Most, if not all, of the 
findings here are the outcome of the data collected during the 
main study. In total, six superordinate themes and eight 
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subordinate themes were developed to provide logical 
arguments, which is useful for addressing the research 
questions in the subsequent chapters. The next chapter 
presents the discussion chapter, which draws heavily from the 




CHAPTER SIX – DISCUSSION 
6.0. Overview 
This chapter consists of discussions that are chiefly geared 
towards addressing the research questions. Firstly,the research 
questions  focuses on how formal and informal lending affect  the 
growth of SMEs? Secondly, how formal and informal institutions 
impact routine change. And lastly, nature and the impacts of the 
interplay between formal and informal financial lenders on 
SMEs. 
6.1 Extent to which Formal and Informal Preconditions 
Impact SMEs Growth 
The question regarding the extent to which formal and informal 
preconditions impact SMEs’ growth is explored here. To 
adequately answer the research question correctly, growth as 
an impact of access to loan needs to be adequately evaluated. 
In doing so, the next paragraph explores what the impacts are, 
and followed by an examination of how these impacts were 
experienced by SMEs.  
 
Firstly, growth is captured as a subordinate theme, and it is an 
outcome that directly relates to obtaining both or either formal 
and informal loan. However, the key finding that surfaced from 
the experience shared by various SMEs that  obtained loans 
shows variation in the growth experienced. Detail explanation of 
the nature of growth is done in the next paragraphs and the 
following sections, i.e. 6.2.1 to 6.2.4.  
 
  In addressing the first question, it is crucial to start with how 
access is achieved. The need to borrow would lead an SME to 
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find out what it takes to get a loan. After knowing what it takes, 
the best option would be made, and an effort towards 
satisfaction of loan preconditions would follow. This mirrors the 
rationality theory of Becker (1993). The decision made would be 
determined by the behavioural disposition of the SME owners, 
shaped by history and experiences (Arthur, 1994).  
 
According to participants’ narratives, which was captured by the 
superordinate themes; sacrosanct nature of loan preconditions 
and the satisfaction of loan precondition and access; they 
demonstrated how compulsory it is for SMEs to comply with loan 
preconditions. These themes show that access to a loan is 
conditional on meeting loans preconditions. 
 
Most SMEs find it hard to adhere to formal financial lenders’ loan 
preconditions as it is adjudged stringent. This sort of belief its 
historical, and many SMEs are locked into this narrative. To 
make them deviate from this sort of predisposition, intervention 
from cooperative society was discovered as an enabler. The 
cooperative society plays the role of a godfather/intermediary 
(see section 5.14), using their position to negotiate improved 
lending terms with formal lenders. 
 
Even in the face of cooperative society’s intervention, it must be 
mentioned here that there could still be a possibility of denial to 
loan access, as this was captured in the excerpt of the SME 
representative in the pilot study. This may happen partly due to 
bias and feeling of insecurity on the part of the formal lenders 
mentioned in sections 4.10.2 and 4.10.3. The bias might prevent 
formal financial lenders from offering loans to SMEs based on 
the belief that they might not payback. Equally, based on the 
knowledge of this bias, SMEs may feel they can not measure up, 
or the loan preconditions are not easy to satisfy, and because of 
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that, they will not attempt to comply. Thus, assess will not be 
provided if loan preconditions are not met. 
 
From the narratives expressed, some respondents started 
preparing towards meeting loan’s preconditions of formal 
financial lenders ahead of time. However, no specific time was 
provided but judging from the context of responses, it takes more 
than a year, and for some, it takes less than that. Some SMEs 
got to know what it entails to get a loan due to their educational 
background or through experience gained as an employee of a 
bank or past business experience.  Therefore, the starting point 
for applicants is when the need for the loan has been 
established. This is the point where a prospective SME would 
start seeking ways to satisfy loan preconditions. Therefore, if 
SME can satisfy the impersonal based lending mechanism of 
formal financial lenders, as findings revealed, they would obtain 
loans and experience growth. Likewise, if SME can satisfy the 
personal/relational based preconditions of informal lenders, then 
they can obtain a loan, which could also lead to growth. Similarly, 
if SMEs are subjected to lending preconditions that have both 
personal and impersonal mechanisms, they will also experience 
growth. However, the only difference is that the growth reported 
by SMEs varies.  
 
The next section will explore what qualifies as growth and the 
nature of growth experienced by SMEs.  
6.2 Growth and the Variation Experienced 
What qualifies as growth is informed by the qualitative measure 
based on SMEs’ narratives about items or things they claimed 
to use their loans for. This is in line with the research philosophy 
guiding this study in which participant’s sense-making would be 
constructed to represent their reality. Secondly, the qualitative 
256 
 
measurement of growth based on narratives was adopted 
because the study did not request participants to present their 
financial statements or books containing figures of how they are 
performing. This approach was favoured in order to encourage 
them and make them feel free to express the experiences they 
have. Many SMEs may not be inclined to open their books as 
they might see the content as confidential. 
 
The extent of growth SME experience has been found to vary. 
The variation in growth is expatiated in the next subsections 
6.2.1 to 6.2.4. For ease of analysis, loan access from a single 
source - the formal lender will be explored first, followed by loan 
access from a single source - informal lender, followed by loan 
access from more than one lending sources and lastly, a 
summary on the variation of growth. 
6.2.1 Access to a Single Source – Formal Lenders 
The growth experienced by SMEs that accessed loans from only 
one source, such as a commercial bank, Islamic bank, and 
microfinance institutions, only appeared to be far lower than 
those experienced by SMEs that accessed loan from DFIs and 
SEF. For example, an SME (SME 9) who obtained a loan from 
an Islamic bank mentioned the ability to buy raw materials in 
bulk.  
 
He linked this bulk buying to increased productivity and 
improved product acceptance. Similarly, SME 8 (commercial 
loan beneficiary) reported growth in the form of an increase in 
working capital, which led to an increase in productivity. At the 
time of the interview, the researcher did not see much activity 
taking place in the participant’s factory. As the discussion 
progressed, it was revealed that the loans she has received 
came with high interest, and it becomes challenging for her when 
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repayment reaches 60 to 70%.  At this stage, repayment 
becomes problematic, as she has to dip her hand into the capital 
she has, which many times made it hard to replenish her stock 
or do other things.  
 
SME 6 experienced growth through increase profitability, which 
was linked to bulk buying as a result of access to a loan. The 
findings correspond with the work of Olutunla and Obamuyi 
(2008), which demonstrates that there is a relationship between 
SMEs profitability and loans. Profitability was mentioned in 
Chelimo and Sophia (2014) and Mañez et al. (2013) as a 
parameter through which growth can be measured. Therefore, 
for instance, its inclusion here is very relevant as he (SME 6) 
was able to achieve profitability due to the reduction in cost 
resulting from buying raw materials in bulk.  
 
From the narratives, it can be deduced that SMEs that access 
loans from commercial and microfinance banks seem not to 
grow at the same pace as those from DFI and SEF (see 5.1). 
There was an aura of stagnancy around one of the commercial 
bank beneficiaries, SME 8. This is because there was no visible 
productive or economic activity ongoing at the factory when the 
researcher visited. The other beneficiary of a commercial bank, 
namely SME 7, seemed to be better off. There were ongoing 
activities in his factory. As noted above, this is likely due to the 
additional financial assistance he got from his son.  
 
Some of the features of commercial and microfinance bank 
loans are high-interest rates, short-term loan tenure (one year), 
and smaller loan size. These may have contributed to the slower 
growth reported by beneficiaries of such loans. SME 8 
complained about high-interest rates and short loan tenure as 
limitations to profitability. Therefore, one can conclude that high-
interest rates of about 30% per annum, short loan tenure of one 
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year, and smaller loan size, which are characteristics of 
commercial, Islamic and microfinance banks’ loans, constrain 
beneficiary SMEs’ growth.  
 
DFI and SEF have a social and developmental mandate, and 
this may have manifested in the generous nature of their loans. 
For example, their interest rate is less than 10% per annum 
compared to CB and MFI, whose interest rates are about 30% 
per annum. Participants such as SME I, SME 2, SME 3, SME 4, 
and SME 5, who obtained loans from DFI and SEF, confirmed 
that they experienced growth in more areas such as the ability 
to employ more staff, asset acquisition, bulk purchasing, 
increased working capital, market expansion and development. 
For instance, employment is a parameter for measuring growth 
both for micro and macro purposes (Birch et al., 1994; Littunen 
and Tohmo, 2003), as well as an increase in turnover, higher 
sales volume, increase in market share, expansion into other 
geographical areas, bulk buying and acquisition of assets. 
Overall, they all believe the source from which they have 
obtained a loan has been beneficial. They were specific about 
things that helped their businesses, including sponsored 
training, lower interest rates (6%-9% per annum), access to 
larger sums of money, and longer tenure (minimum of three 
years).  
 
In summary, drawing from participants’ narratives, which has 
contributed immensely to the higher growth experienced is the 
generous loan attributes. These generous loan attributes include 
the low-interest rate of 5% to 9% per annum, longer-term tenure 
of three years and bigger loan sizes from 5m Naira (equivalent 
to about £10,465 - Oanda exchange rate of 15th of May2020) 




6.2.2 Access to a Single Source - Informal Lenders 
SMEs that obtain loans from lenders who operate on a 
personal/relational exchange basis such as cooperative society, 
Ajo, Money Lender reported growth in working capital and bulk 
buying (raw materials). Working capital and raw materials are 
current assets. These sorts of assets are used up in production 
and within a financing year in most cases. The loan attributes 
such as smaller loan size, lower interest rates and lower loan 
tenure may have contributed to the limited items that the loan 
was used for. 
 
What contributed to the smaller loan size of most cooperative 
societies and Ajo is their limited access to external funds. The 
only source of fund both have is the financial contributions made 
by members. In other words, members make contributions into 
a pool. Any loan they provide to members is drawn from this 
pool. Beneficiaries are restricted to 200% of the contribution 
made over a year. The short-term nature of these loans is to 
allow others to benefit from the loan. Each member has to wait 
for their turn. This explains why informal financial lenders such 
as cooperative society or Ajo have limited resources which may 
restrict the extent to which they can effectively and sustainably 
satisfy the credit needs of these SMEs. Accessing finance from 
other sources may help SMEs in need of credit to overcome the 
limitations they may experience if they are locked into only 
informal finance. 
  
Stringent loan preconditions of formal financial lenders scare 
away many SMEs, and as a result, some of them prefer informal 
lenders as substitutes. SMEs would be satisfied as long as they 
can obtain loan irrespective of the source. This relates to Helmke 
and Levistky’s 2004 model on substituting informal institution.  
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The above analysis has explored how various preconditions of 
loan could lead to various outcomes. It was observed that 
access to a single source of finance might lead to lower growth 
and vice versa.  
6.2.3 Loan Access to More Than One Lending Source  
The SMEs with access to loans from multiple sources such as 
SME 4, SME 5, SME 7 and SME 8 experienced a higher 
increase in working capital, acquisition of equipment, 
geographical expansion, new employment, market 
development, and diversification. This shows access from two or 
more lenders (irrespective of the type of lender) may result in 
more dimensions of growth, as recipients would have more 
financial resources to utilise. 
  
  For example, SME 4 and SME 7 experienced more dimensions 
of growth, such as increased working capital, turnover, and asset 
acquisition, including factory renovation carried out by SME 4. 
SME 4 obtained additional financial assistance from friends and 
family source (specifically from his son, who is based abroad).  
SME 7 acquired a Van, which was made possible by the loans 
he received from cooperative and DFI. When each of these 
SMEs are considered against what they used their loans for, it is 
evident that they experienced more growth than those who had 
only one source, such as SME 1, SME 2, SME 3, SME 6, SME 
9 and SME 10.  
6.2.4 Summary of Variation in Growth 
The result shows that growth experienced varies among the 
beneficiaries of loans. Borrowing from Generalised Darwin 
based on its principle of selection, Hull (1988: 409–410), stated: 
that “the interplay of among replicators and interactors can occur 
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in such a way that the differential success of interactors causes 
differential survival on the part of the relevant replicators”. This 
is relevant to the variation/differential in the growth experienced, 
as SMEs experienced differences in growth based on the 
sources of loans. The comparison of growth based on narratives 
shows beneficiaries of loans from formal lenders experienced 
more growth in comparison to informal lenders. Diagram 6.1 
show the key thematic connections between formal lending and 





Diagram 6. 1 – Variation in growth 
 
 
The growth experienced by SMEs that obtained loans vary. 
Some experienced more growth dimensions, while others 
experienced less. As shown in diagram 6.1, the theme 
compliance with loan preconditions is the precursor to access. 
The outcome of access was captured by the superordinate 
theme impact of access (see 4.8 and 5.10 for details): growth 
and routine change. When access happens, SMEs will be at 
liberty to use the loan for several things associated with their 
businesses. From the narratives, the attributes of these loans 




The underlining reason for this variation is the loan attribute of  
various lenders.  Specifically, narratives show beneficiaries from 
single formal sources such as CB, IB, and MFI experienced 
more diminutive growth dimensions compared to those that 
benefitted from DFI and SEF loans. On the other hand, they 
experienced more growth than those SME that obtained a loan 
from cooperative societies who only experienced growth in 
working capital and stock purchases.  
 
A comparison between those who had access to multiple 
sources and single sources shows that having access to more 
financing sources could lead to improved growth. Among those 
who had obtained access from multiple sources, some SMEs 
stood out based on the kind of growth they experienced. For 
example, SME 4, SME 5 seems to experience more growth 
dimension than SME 8. The reason for this may not be far from 
the fact that, in addition to formal and informal lenders, both had 
access to DFI and SEF loans, respectively. While SME 8 had 
access to formal loans such as CB and Friends and Families. 
 
Therefore, the more the loan you get, the more growth you 
achieve. The findings of Degryse et al. (2016) corroborates 
these findings through their study on co-funding. They provide 
supporting evidence for the benefits of co-funding, which they 
attributed to the information and incentive advantages of 
informal finance versus the scalability and cost advantages of 
formal finance. Furthermore, they suggested that beneficiaries 
of loans from multiple sources demonstrated more growth 
dimensions than those who obtained a loan from only one 
source. Similarly, Jain (1999), Lee and Persson(2016) and Allen 
et al. (2005) affirmed formal and informal financial lenders 
complement each other for small firms. This finding adds more 
to the debate about the logic of governmental efforts in some 
developing countries such as India to “repress” informal credit 
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and “promote” formal bank lending to the private sector (Bell, 
1990). It opens up the question of the benefit the informal sector 
can add to SMEs’ growth.  
 
Accordingly, from participant’s experiences, it can be 
established that in exception of those who benefited from co-
funding, there is higher growth in DFI and SEF-financed SMEs, 
followed by Islamic bank-financed SMEs, followed by 
commercial and microfinance and cooperatives. The disparity 
evident in their growth patterns can be explained by the 
attributes of the loans offered by each source an SME could 
obtain loan from, e.g., a source with generous attributes such as 
lower interest rates, longer loan tenure, higher loan amount, as 
shown in the case of DFI and SEF, facilitates more growth 
dimensions and indicates more substantial growth in SMEs. This 
is in contrast to the higher interest rates, lower loan sizes, and 
lower loan tenure, which characterised CB, MFI, and IB loans. 
These findings add to Emenalo (2014:182) “At the firm level, 
growth responds to access to credit and to the conditions that 
favour such access”. Therefore, what sets DFI and SEF apart is 
the fact that they offer better loan attributes, such as longer 
tenure, bigger loan size, lower interest rate.  
 
Conclusively, in answering the question to what extent formal 
and informal financial lenders impact SMEs growth. One could 
argue that having access to more than one sources of loan and 
the variation recorded is determined by loan attribute specific to 
the source from where the loan was obtained. A more generous 
loan attribute such as lower interest rate, large loan size and 
longer loan tenure will lead to more growth dimension than less 
generous loan attributes such as higher loan interest, smaller 
loan size and shorter loan tenure. 
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6.3 Extent to which Formal and Informal Preconditions 
Impact Routine Change 
From the respondents' narratives, the sacrosanct nature of loan 
preconditions, coupled with the no waiver policy of both formal 
and informal financial lenders, it could be argued that there are 
no alternatives, other than putting in place what will be required 
for SMEs to qualify for a loan.  
 
Therefore, SMEs would be constrained to finding ways to adapt. 
The decision to adapt will be influenced by what source they 
believe will lead to better access. The theory of reasoned action 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 1996), also termed the 
Fishbein ’s Behavioural Intentions Model or the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour suggest that people consider the 
implications of their actions before they decide to engage or not 
engage in a given behaviour. Its fundamental assumption is that 
any specific set of behaviours reflect not only the influence of 
underlying individual factors (i.e., traits and personality) but also 
the influence of other external factors unique to the situation in 
question (Fu et al., 2004). When confronted with the need to 
decide on a course of action, people consider their beliefs and 
past experiences. Additionally, they consider the likely 
consequences of available alternatives, beliefs about the 
normative expectations of important individuals or groups, and 
the required resources and potential impediments characterising 
the world in which they function. These beliefs result, 
respectively, in attitudes toward the behaviour, subjective norms 
with respect to the behaviour, and perceived behavioural control, 
which in turn influence behavioural intentions and actual 
behaviour (Fu et al., 2004). The continuation of this process 
permeates the whole organisation and make their routines 




Based on the narratives expressed in the study, the 
preconditions of loan from each lender are external impositions 
that dictate the organisational routines of these beneficiaries. All 
beneficiaries of formal financial lenders must have these 
routines in place due to compliance with loan preconditions. The 
argument on the external influence of organisational routine was 
also corroborated in the empirical studies by Szulanski and 
Jensen (2004) and Dollimore (2016). 
 
The manifestation of the external impact is processed and felt 
internally when the organisation complies with the external 
trigger, such as loan preconditions. Compliance is a function of 
adaptation involving loan preconditions, which rest on managers 
or SME owners. Their ability to adapt faster or slower is a 
product of their capabilities, i.e. experience, and expertise. 
Therefore, the preconditions are extrinsically influenced. The 
knowledge of how to adapt is intrinsic and must have been learnt 
from past experience or acquired newly. Drawing from the 
findings of this study, both external and internal environment 
play a role in shaping the development of organisational routine. 
The external environmental trigger does elicit change and but 
the adaptation of the internal components such as people, tools, 
systems are determined intrinsically by the type of knowledge 
existing within the organisation. 
 
 The RBV of the firm challenged the idea of environmental 
determinism. In an organisational variant of the nurture-versus-
nature debate, Data suggest that firms were not just products of 
their external circumstances. However, by the history and the 
path-dependent choices made by their managers, they were 
intrinsically heterogeneous (Penrose, 1959; Child, 1972; and 
Porter, 1991). Nevertheless, as indicated by findings here, the 
decision to change routines results from both internal and 




Drawing from evolutionary economic theory as argued by 
Nelson (1995:69), the routine of the firm can be explained using 
three models: first, those that might be called standard operating 
procedures,  secondly, those that determine the investment 
behaviour of the firm, the equations that govern its growth or 
decline (measured in terms of its capital stock) as a function of 
its profits, and perhaps other variables. Third, the deliberative 
processes of the firm, involving the search for better ways of 
doing things. All three models are relevant to routine within the 
context of this study. Preconditions attached to obtaining a loan 
are analogous to the standard operating procedures guiding 
loan processes. The second part of the model analogous to 
financing being judged as very important to SMEs’ growth and 
the researchers’ findings support the investment behaviour of 
the firm’s model that support growth or decline, depending on if 
access was achieved or not. Moreover, the third one, which is 
search for better ways of doing things which speaks to the 
expected initial or background work SMEs adopt in their quest 
toward seeking a loan Before making a decision and choose 
what best suits their needs/interest, they would have evaluated 
the available options. 
 
The basis of the decision to borrow and where to borrow would 
be determined by the need and ease of the loan application 
process. According to Hodgson (2009:12), an agent makes 
decisions through weighted combinations of ‘rational 
deliberation’ on current information and habitual dispositions. An 
example of a driver, driving a car was made by Hodgson  
(2009:13) where he relates the decision to drive on one side 
rather than on the other. Driving on the right side in the UK is 
conventional and institutionalised, likewise in Nigeria, where 
driving is on the left. The decision about buying a car would 
involve considering the environment where the car would be 
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used and any attempt to drive a car that uses the wrong side of 
the road may lead to arrest or traffic contravention and the 
satisfaction that comes from owning and driving one’s car would 
not be achieved.  
 
Hence, the concept of rational choice applies here. 
Theoretically, the rational choice theory is defined in terms of 
maximisation of utility (Becker, 1993; Coleman, 1990). 
Generally, the human problem-solving capacity that rational 
choice theory attributes to ‘rationality’, and Marxism to informed 
deliberation is explained in Darwinian terms by the knowledge of 
the world that is incorporated in rules or programs that guide 
behaviour(Hodgson, 2009). In current sociological theory, 
Ermakoff (2017:162–163) restated that rational choice theory is 
geared towards utility maximisation (Zafirovski, 2018:195).  
 
The outcome of this study justifies the rational utility maximisers, 
100% of SMEs who claimed they gained access to loans through 
formal lenders, as well as the various experts, confirmed the 
adoption of new routines and retaining them to enjoy future 
access to finance. The decision to adhere to loan preconditions 
is based on the motivation that adherence will lead to the reward 
of getting access to finance. This is likened to an investment 
decision, where monies are usually put into the business to 
explore future growth opportunities. Hence, the outcome here 
contradicts Hodgson, (1993) that decision may not always be 
determined by profit maximisation as the case seems to 
represent here.  The goal of getting further loans that are 
investment inclined is still related to profit, as profit is the ultimate 
goal of every business investment. 
 
In this regard, the formal financial lenders greatly influence 
SMEs interested in obtaining unhindered access to finance. 
Symbolically, finance is the bait to make SME act towards the 
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regulator’s goal. Campbell (1974:180) states that every single 
process that can be found on the lower levels of the hierarchy 
are curtailed and shaped in a manner harmonious with the laws 
of higher levels. In this context, the higher levels of authority are 
the formal financial lenders. The SMEs’ new behaviour is a 
product of what has been fostered down by the institutional 
structure external to the SMEs. This corroborates, Fu et al. 
(2004) assertion about adopting assertive strategy; which 
consists of persistence (repeated pleading with the target to 
carry out a request), pressure (using demands, threats, or 
persistent reminders to push the target), and upward appeal 
(seeking help from someone with higher authority). A formal 
lender may indirectly persuasively coerce or influence 
prospective SMEs desirous of gaining access to a loan. This the 
sort of coercion to influence suggested by Fu et al. (2004) as a 
persuasive strategy. This includes rational persuasion (using 
logical arguments and factual evidence to persuade the target), 
inspirational appeal (making an emotional appeal to the target’s 
values or ideals), and consultation (seeking the target’s input or 
participation in a task). When influencing the target, the manager 
using this strategy focuses on the merits of the request, provides 
logical arguments, or connects the request to the larger good (Fu 
et al., 2004). The larger good mentioned here is analogous to 
the benefits access loan brings as a consequence of adherence 
to formal rules. This is one of the major findings of this study 
because institutions simultaneously “depend upon the activities 
of individuals and constrain and mould them. Through this 
positive feedback, they have strong self-reinforcing and self-
perpetuating characteristics” (Hodgson, 2007). Institutions are 
“perpetuated not merely through the coordination rules that they 
offer, but because they confine and mould individual aspirations 




Sperry (1992) notion of downward causation was criticised and 
modified by Hodgson (2007) as reconstitutive downward 
causation; he further expanded on this concept by likening 
institutions to “social structures acting to some degree upon 
individual habits of thought and action” (Hodgson 2006:23). This 
resonates with the statement made by SME 4. He knew that 
getting a loan will require putting certain things in place. When 
the aspiration of starting a business became evident, he easily 
restricted his actions so that they are focused on getting 
necessary preconditions satisfied. Doing this makes his goal of 
getting a loan from formal financial lenders achievable.  
 
The existence of preconditions may be similar to a sort of 
bureaucracy; Weber (1952), contended that it was so efficient 
and a powerful means of controlling men and women that, once 
established. This study shows that as long as the SME is 
interested in a future loan, they would likely retain these new 
routines they have developed and abide by whatever the lender 
dictates. For instance, this was supported by MFI expert’s 
accounts: we have seen that the promise of a future loan makes 
a customer maintain consistent payment.  
 
Hence, prevailing higher-order level authority, in this case, is the 
formal lenders’ rule. It manifested its influence on SMEs by 
regulating their activities via preconditions expected when 
seeking a loan. This, in turn, shaped their practices and 
activities. Scott (1995) suggested in their work on how 
institutions shape behaviour by categorising the three main 
types of institutions: regulatory, normative, and cognitive. The 
regulatory pillar of an institutional system gives incentive and 
sanction to organisations and individuals from a government or 
other authoritative body that regulates individual and 
organisational action (Scott, 2007). Likewise, the normative and 
cognitive institutional pillars are socially constructed over time 
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and come to be “perceived as objective and external to the 
actors: not as man-made but a natural and factual order” (Scott 
,1995:xvii).  
 
Similarly, Powell and DiMaggio (1991:77) came up with their 
version of the three types of actions that affects behaviour which 
they describe using the term “institutional isomorphism”: 
coercive (external actors compel conformity mainly through law 
or regulation); mimetic (uncertainty motivates organisations to 
adopt the practices of their most successful competitors), and 
normative (strong professional interests drive the adoption of 
specific values and beliefs by all organisations in the field. 
Institutional isomorphism in simple terms is what makes 
organisations so similar (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:147). The 
role culture played was emphasised as the means by which both 
normative and cognitive structures are transmitted (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991; Jepperson, 1991). 
 
Within the context of this study, it is apparent SMEs experience 
some form of coercive change, which is extrinsically motivated 
(Schunk, 2012:389).  Similarly, the capabilities and resources 
that make that adaption possible are intrinsically enabled. The 
decision made and coupled with the choice of lender may have 
implications on the nature of routine change experienced. 
 
Therefore, the adoption of new routines or the adoption of good 
practices would be influenced by what constitute preconditions 
from the financing source and the genuineness of what was 
presented for loan application assessment. This means that if a 
business is expected to be registered, the SME will become 
registered because it is a requirement from the lender. Similarly, 
if payment of tax is expected to be in place, the prospective SME 
will start paying tax to get access to a loan because it is a 
compulsory requirement from the lender, and it cannot be 
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counterfeited. The extent to which routine change in relation to 
lenders is captured below. 
 
6.3.1 Routines Linked to Formal Lenders – CB, MFIs and IB 
According to the data, beneficiaries of the commercial bank, 
microfinance and Islamic bank appeared not to have engaged in 
the practice of tax payment. However, from their accounts, they 
took the first step by registering with the government through the 
corporate affairs commission and obtained tax identification 
numbers from the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). 
However, they did not start tax payment because the lenders 
they patronise never asked them to present evidence of tax 
payment as part of loan preconditions. They also, amongst other 
things, imbibed the routine of recording keeping, stock taking, 
the opening of bank accounts. Therefore, they only develop 
routines that mirror those preconditions they satisfied before the 
loan was given. These routines are possession of Tax 
Identification Number (TIN), recording keeping, stock taking, the 
opening of bank accounts, and company registration.  
6.3.2 Routines Linked to Formal Lenders – DFIs and SEF 
As reflected in 4.8.1 and 5.10.1, DFI and SEF require record-
keeping, auditing, the opening of bank accounts, possession of 
evidence of tax payments, payment of tax, evidence of a 
business plan, amongst others, as part of their loan 
preconditions. As a result, these are the routines beneficiaries of 




6.3.3 Informal Loan Preconditions and Non-Routine change 
As shown in the narratives, there are various ways in which 
routines are developed or changed. For instance, if the lender 
from where the loan was obtained had, as part of the 
preconditions, required beneficiaries to be registered with the 
corporate affairs commission, this means the SME will become 
registered. If tax payment is expected to be in place, the 
prospective SME must start paying tax to get access to the loan. 
For example, in the current study, unlike SMEs, who obtained 
loans from formal financial lenders, only the SME that obtained 
a loan from a cooperative society (SME 10) was an unregistered 
business. Another example is record keeping; all participants 
except this participant, SME 10, kept proper records.  
 
Therefore, for informal financial lenders, no specific routines or 
practices such as the opening of bank accounts, business 
registration, possession of tax identification number, evidence of 
tax payment are required except meeting attendance and 
regular contribution. SMEs that accessed loan from informal 
financial lenders did not make reference to having adopted any 
routine similar to what formal financial lenders have promoted 
and made mandatory. However, the only SME among 
participants who had obtained informal loan was also in receipt 
of a DFI loan, experienced routine change. He was not paying 
tax and had no reason to keep records when he used to access 
loan from money lenders and friends and family. This is because 
informal financial sources never cared about such practices. 
Instead, they are more concerned about personal 
approaches/relational mechanisms; this was confirmed by SME 
10 who does not have her business registered, nor was she in 
possession of a tax identification number; she had no evidence 
of tax payment and no proper records. From the above, it is 
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evident that informal lending preconditions cannot enable 
routine change in SME.  
 
The only exception to this is when the business owner has a 
future plan to obtain a loan from a formal lender. Hence, he may 
want to use the loan from informal sources to put necessary 
things in place. This is an interesting finding that concurs with 
the literature on entrepreneurship and Holland et al. (2006)’s 
work on intentions, which is that not all enterprises would grow 
beyond the owner’s particular income level and this ‘disposition’. 
This was recognised as a limiting factor for some business 
owners. This is the case of SME 5, who observed that there was 
no requirement under informal loan preconditions that require 
anything relating to routines to be put in place. There was no 
requirement to adhere to any specific good practices and the 
intention to change the existing routine is missing. As mentioned 
in section 4.7.1, what is expected is trust built through 
relationship.  Equally, the relationship is built through meeting 
attendance and regular contributions. There is no expectation of 
record-keeping, business registration, auditing before a loan can 
be accessed. Therefore, informal lending may not directly lead 
to a change in routines or the development of new routines. 
 
6.3.4 Superficial or Partial Compliance and Partial Routine 
Change  
Lack of sincerity on the part of SME may lead them to loosely or 
partially copy or comply with formal rules. The likelihood of this 
is higher when there are inadequate monitoring and 
enforcement. In formal lending, i.e., CB, MFI, IB, DFI and SEF, 
some routines such as the opening of a bank account, business 
registration and possession of tax identification number appear 
unavoidable. They are the first steps toward compliance. The 
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likelihood of doctoring these documents is less compared to 
other routines which are continuously expected to be replicated 
over time. For instance, tax payment, auditing, record keeping 
are not one-off routines but are continuously expected to be 
adhered to for future loan access. These documents could be 
doctored if proper monitoring and validation are not carried out, 
for example, cross-checking with the relevant agencies. 
 
When loose/partial routine change is experienced, the sort of 
routines affected are those that require one-off compliance, 
which mirrors best practices. An example of such a routine is 
business registration and possession of Tax Identification 
Number (TIN) SME representative corroborated this by stating 
that SMEs may not experience a routine change in many areas, 
because they might present deceptive documentation, to 
superficially evidence routine compliance. This affirms Scott 
(2008) suggestion on regulatory manipulation and decoupling. 
For example, financial records can be doctored to deceive bank 
officials. Therefore, the findings of this study suggest a similar 
trend. The deceits usually come in the form of presenting a very 
good statement that shows a fantastic financial health. In 
contrast, accurate financial records that show the true state of 
the business will be hidden or non-existent. They may also 
pretend to engage in auditing, but this may be done to get the 
loan.  
 
However, superficial or partial compliance/adherence is not 
general to all SMEs; there are genuine cases of compliance. 
Based on the narratives of participants, what constitute new 
routines adopted is based on what lenders required. As a result, 
this contributes to the variation and diversity of organisation 




6.3.5 Variation in Routine Change 
The variations in routine change experience are associated with 
the various loan preconditions of different lenders. For those 
who source loans from formal financial lenders, the sort of 
routine change they experience varies. Change in routine only 
applies to those who genuinely comply with loan preconditions. 
The result is new routines exactly mirrors the loan precondition 
of the source of their loans. Diagram 6.2 below show the key 
thematic connections between formal lending and informal 










Diagram 6.2 – Depiction of Variation in Routine 
 
 
The external influence on SMEs, as claimed by literature, is 
depicted in the diagram above. The lenders and their various 
loan preconditions are analogous to external environmental 
influence that shapes SMEs’ routine development. The nature of 
the external influence has been captured by the sacrosanct 
nature of loan preconditions. This indicates that compliance with 
loan preconditions cannot be avoided. These conditions are 
associated with all the lenders. However, all the lenders have 
various loan preconditions, and some are similar to others. For 
instance, DFI and SEF have similar loan conditions: this may be 
because they are both owned by the government. Informal 
lenders have similar loan preconditions: meeting attendance, 
reputation. 
  
The variation in routines noticed from the participants ‘narratives 
indicates the routine experienced by beneficiary SME’s are 
determined by the loan preconditions associated with each 
lender. For instance, the SMEs that obtain loan from DFI 
developed the routines listed above, i.e. bookkeeping, tax 
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registration, business registration, auditing and tax payment. In 
comparison, SMEs that obtain loans from informal sources 
developed no routines. This is because their loan preconditions 
are more reputation and social relationship-based and do not 
entail any practical routine that mirrors good practice.  
6.3.6 Implication of Routine Change on SME Growth 
Routine change may lead to good outcomes for SMEs who have 
adopted some good practices, as shown by accounts from the 
participants that genuine adoption of new routines impacts 
favourably on SMEs. This may explain how organisations reject 
old rules, learn new routines, and develop new capabilities 
(Baum and Oliver, 1996). According to this study, the need for 
survival and finance plays an important role to make this 
possible. This finding mirrors Hawley’s (1968) theory on the 
process of homogenisation or isomorphism. According to 
Hawley's (1968) description, isomorphism is a constraining 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions. The 
new behaviour adopted is analogous to what is obtainable in big 
organisations. This will be expanded further in the next section. 
6.3.7 Development of Good Business Practices as a Result 
of Routine Change 
Some practices that were developed suggest good business 
practices were adopted as a result of satisfying loan 
preconditions. This is not a concept directly mentioned by 
participants but was constructed through inductive reasoning, 
emanating from data. For example, record keeping was 
mentioned by participants as means through which they are 
abreast of the current state of their businesses. For example, 
knowing the periodic stock levels helps prevents pilfering from 
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staff. The practice of keeping accurate records of the business 
inventory makes it easier to record products and also enable the 
business owner to be aware of what is sold periodically (Chelimo 
and Sopia, 2014:434). As succinctly mentioned by one of the 
respondents, it is crucial to keep business records because 
without them, you would not know if you break even, or even 
how each different product is performing. Effective and efficient 
record-keeping practices secure your business against internal 
theft and dishonest employees. Additionally, tracking the 
transfer of money is important as it helps businesses keep track 
of their finances. Keeping accurate records is highly 
fundamental for a successful business to stay organised and 
profitable. Auditing is another factor mentioned which also helps 
to keep unaccountability of employees in check, and payment of 
tax which make SMEs more responsible and alive to their civic 
duties.  
 
According to SME 4, recording keeping help SMEs helps to be 
aware of the true worth of a business and informs computation 
of tax payment. For instance, when SMEs have no records, the 
calculation for payment of taxes will not be based on the profit 
made by the business but will be arbitrarily apportioned by tax 
officials. This is an unfair method adopted by the tax authorities 
in establishing tax figures. This encourages the extortion and 
exploitation of such SMEs by tax officials. This may be the case 
with many SMEs in Nigeria, and that might be why Ojeka 
(2011:9) found that “taxes are more harmful than beneficial to 
the growth of SMEs as they increase running costs and slow 
down growth”. He asserts further that there is a significant 
negative relationship between taxes and an enterprise’s  ability 
to sustain itself (Ojeka, 2011). However, this notion was not 
supported by the current study as participant claimed the 
adoption of record-keeping and good accounting practice was 
made possible through the employment of skilled personnel. 
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This led to the creation of an entire account department, and 
subsequent payment of taxes were reduced because they were 
calculated based on the profit realised. Unlike before, taxes are 
apportioned by tax officials because there was no record. 
 
Since SMEs are examples of social interactors (Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2006) and individual habits and organisational 
routines, qualify as replicators (Aldrich et al., 2008). The copying 
of routines by staff in an SME would be influenced by SME 
owners or managers through diffusion. Because SMEs are the 
interactor that “interacts as a cohesive whole with their 
environment in such a way that this interaction leads to the 
adoption of the new routines across the whole organisation” 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006:33). In other words, the new 
routine may reside in the memory of the SME owner or 
managers or even the employees, and it can easily be translated 
to physical behaviour at some point within the organisation. 
 
For replication to take place, it might take the form of training. 
When training is not possible as a result of high cost, or no one 
within the organisation has the capacity to learn the required 
practise, a new employee who has the expected skill , can be 
employed. For instance, as claimed by SME 4 - the creation of 
an accounting department led to the acquisition of accounting 
skill as part of the organisation routines. Which helped expose 
prior tax payments was wrongly and unfairly calculated. Armed 
with this, the participant was able to challenge the tax authority’s 
arbitrary computation and won. This led to a reduced tax rate 
based on actual figures from the new business record they keep. 
This was made possible by the acquisition of the right skills. 
Consequently, when the tax payment is reduced as a result of 
the improved routine, cost reduction and more savings may lead 




6.3.8 Efficiency as an Outcome of Routine Change 
Another interesting finding is the reduction in wastage. This 
reduction was achieved through the ability to employ efficient 
and effective workers who are skilled and possess relevant 
expertise that improves productivity. Respondents claimed the 
increase in efficiency was brought about by cost-cutting 
measures; others used different connotations to represent 
efficiency. The achievement of efficiency was described as 
employing skilled personnel, acquiring production equipment, 
and attendance to training, all of which reduced the incidence of 
wastage, improved expertise in production and reduction in 
defective products. Beneficiaries are now able to meet demand 
and improve the quality of their products. As noted by one 
respondent, “when customers are satisfied with your product, 
they will want to buy more, and that will increase your sales” 
(SME 5). This assertation is in line with Gupta et al. (2013:2) that 
qualified SMEs’ growth using qualitative features like the quality 
of the product and the goodwill of the customers. One hundred 
per cent (100%) of DFI and SEF’s beneficiaries claimed they 
experienced more sales because of better product quality and 
reduction in defective products. There are narratives about 
customers giving good reviews/rating on SMEs’ products and 
also widespread word of mouth regarding the quality of products. 
This made it possible for them to reach more markets and 
develop new ones. Thus, it can be concluded that routine 
change enables growth through improved production, reduction 
in wastage and acquisition of skilled labour. This support 
Solow's(1957) finding that “technical change was responsible for 
80 (or 85 or 75) per cent of experienced productivity growth 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982:197). Nelson and Winter (1982) 
likened efficiency to "total factor productivity" and explained that 
they could be seen as variables, not constants, within the 




To summarise, the impact reported by participants could be 
attributed to their access to loans and access to loans can be 
linked to the satisfaction of loan preconditions, and by satisfying 
loan preconditions, new routines and practices would be put in 
place which improves efficiency and productivity. Thereby, it can 
be said that getting access to a loan as a result of the meeting 
of loan preconditions may lead beneficiaries to imbibe new ways 
of doing things and improving their growth potentials through an 
improved level of efficiency.  
6.3.9 Development of Formalisation 
This development of new routines such as business registration, 
tax identification registration and payment, facilitates a shift from 
the shadow economy to the formal economy for SMEs. Business 
registration would make their status official and make them 
known to the official channels. Coincidentally, “in recent times, 
the focus of reforms in the developing countries has evolved 
from getting prices right to getting institutions right” (Rodrik, 
2008: 100), grounded on the expectation that developmental 
policies would help SMEs “formalise” their processes”(Gindis, 
2013:210). The policy of having preconditions in place has led 
to accelerating formality. Compliance with regulations leads to a 
reduction in the size of the shadow economy (Vasak, 2008). 
SMEs whose activities have been formalised would be compliant 
with tax payment, business incorporation or registration, tax 
identification number acquisition, and record keeping.  
 
Therefore, complying with formal rule enables formality. Such 
practices increase the visibility of SMEs, meaning they will not 
remain in the informal sector anymore but instead within the 
formal economy. This will be the point in which the full benefits 
of formality will be accessible to them and the government. The 
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full benefit of formality for the government is an increase in GDP 
as a result of additional tax revenue coming in. While for SMEs, 
it may lead to access to more funds as a result of more loans 
from formal lenders and make them qualify for government 
subsidies (Distinguin et al., 2016). This corresponds with Harvie, 
and Lee (2005), affirming the relationship between government 
intervention, i.e. subsidies and the growth of SMEs. Formality is 
one of the key requirements for SMEs to attract government 
support, and that support could enable growth. 
 
In summary, drawing from results, formal loan preconditions 
enable routine change, and when routines are genuinely 
changed, formality is achieved. 
6.4 Interplay between Formal and Informal Lenders and 
their Impact  
This section evaluates the nature and the implication of the 
interplay that exists between formal and informal lenders. Before 
exploring the implications, an introduction of the nature of formal 
and informal lending and some interplay in their operations is 
done below. 
 
As captured during the study, the Islamic, microfinance, 
commercial banks and registered cooperative represent the 
formal financial lenders. The formal loan preconditions are 
instituted, interpreted, enforced and administered by the 
government regulators, i.e. Central Bank of Nigeria, the court of 
law, police force, financial institutions (such as commercial 
banks, microfinance banks, development banks), respectively. 
The unregistered cooperative society represents the informal 
institution because their activities are governed by a group of 
private individuals, and they have not registered with the 
government. However, if they were registered, it is important to 
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note that there will be an element of government interven tion in 
their activities because they are mandated to accommodate a 
government official from the Ministry of Commerce to be present 
in their meetings. This government official is expected to keep 
details of every meeting.  
 
Irrespective of whether a cooperative is registered or not, their 
activities, especially lending decisions, are primarily based on 
relational or personal mechanisms. While formal financial 
lenders’ decisions are based on both impersonal and impersonal 
approaches, this goes to reinforce Ostrom (1990), view that no 
market could exist for long without some form of governmental 
support. Therefore, in reality, formal and informal sectors are 
intermeshed and depend on each other rather than existing in 
isolation (p.15).  
The effect of the interplay that exists between formal and 
informal lenders may lead to various outcomes. These are as 
follows; improved access, enforcement, savings and 
disbursement, helps banks to meet their lending target, ease the 
challenges of trust and quality relationships. 
6.4.1 Improved Access 
In diving into the discussion about the nature of the interplay 
between formal and informal preconditions and their impacts, 
references will be drawn from the superordinate theme: ‘the 
interplay between formal and informal financial lenders on the 
growth of SMEs’, which was explained in sections 4.11 and 5.10 
and other relevant aspects of the findings. All financial 
exchanges are conducted formally, relying on hard information 
such as financial statements, business registration, tax 
identification number possession, amongst others. All 
exchanges under informal lending practices are finalised based 
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on social affiliation, reputation, and trust. Informal financial 
lenders rely on soft information as it is easy to obtain as a result 
of prior relationships. Specifically, literature has identified soft 
information as synonymous with ‘‘relationship lending’’ and hard 
information with ‘‘transaction-based lending’’ (Berger and Udell, 
2002; Stein, 2002; Berger et al., 2005).  
 
In contrast to hard information, soft information is not easily 
codified and quantified. The knowledge of what we know about 
ourselves determines the level of trust we share. Polanyi takes 
an example from face - recognition: if we know a person’s face, 
then we can recognise it among thousands, even if we usually 
cannot explain how the recognition happens. The example of 
face recognition is analogous to tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge can be described as the knowledge that people ; 
therefore, it is difficult to access and share. Consequently, most 
tacit knowledge cannot be articulated appropriately (Polanyi, 
1966). It consists of information gathered over time through 
contact with the individual, firm, the firm’s management/ 
entrepreneur, the firm’s suppliers and customers, and other local 
sources. Accordingly, societies where the relational approach is 
prevalent are such that possess a culture of collectivism, which 
allows for interactions and the spirit of ‘WE’ (see section 2.5 for 
more on culture). They attend social functions together and play 
together. Through this interaction, relevant information will be 
shared. This makes people who deal with each other to be 
knowledgeable about themselves. Therefore, groups within 
those societies acquire knowledge about each other in like 
manner (Puusa and Eerikäinen, 2008), and this qualifies as a 
way of life, which in other words represent their culture. 
 
Culture implies some level of shared meaning in the way in 
which behaviour is appraised. However, an individual’s 
behaviour at any given moment ‘may or may not be congruent 
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with ‘shared’ cultural meanings, and personal desires may be 
incompatible with cu ltural norms’ (Rohner, 1984: 124). The 
beliefs held by individuals regardless of their “cultural 
backgrounds might, therefore, be among other factors that affect 
behaviour more directly than cultural values” (Fu et al., 
2004:285). A formal lender would subject a prospective lender 
to certain loan preconditions which are based on impersonal 
exchanges. In contrast, every prospective SME seeking a loan 
from an informal lender would be subjected to personal 
exchanges which are based on knowledge built over time, 
reflecting on the nature of relationships that have existed. This 
sort of personal exchanges is linked to informal lenders in 
general, while transactions based on impersonal exchanges are 
known to be the characteristics of formal financial lenders.  
 
Nevertheless, from the evidence gathered, some SMEs do have 
less belief in the formal financial lenders  than the informal ones. 
Furthermore, the strategy that seems to be changing that pattern 
of distrust is the activities of cooperative societies who have 
been acting as intermediaries and working towards securing 
more credit for their members who were hitherto not able to 
access loans from formal financial lenders (Sønderskov and 
Dinesen, 2014).  
 
As a result, SMEs who are members now have confidence in 
formal financial lenders, and as a result, they enjoy better access 
to loan than before. In the same breath, there is an element of 
accommodation, as suggested by Helme and Levisky (2004), 
when formal financial lenders rely on informal rules. This is 
necessary due to the nature of the environment in which formal 
financial lenders operate, where the culture of “WE” is prevalent. 
Formal financial lenders have to incorporate informal 
approaches synonymous with relational exchanges. This may 
involve allowing loan officers to maintain a cordial relationship 
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with customers and gather soft information for the formal 
lenders’ lending decision making. This soft information is used 
in combination with the hard information in their possession. 
Another approach is that some formal lenders deal directly with 
cooperative societies to gain access to their members. 
 
When SMEs achieve a similar outcome as those patronising 
formal lenders even when they are members of cooperative 
societies, then it can be said that convergence has occurred. 
The outcome referred to here is access to a loan. A convergence 
outcome typifies when similar outcomes like those subjected to 
formal rules are experienced by those subjected to informal rules 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). For example, in the case of social 
capital where membership of the cooperative society makes it 
easy to access formal loans via negotiation conducted by 
informal financial lenders, i.e. cooperative society. Therefore, 
when informal financial lenders are organised and playing the 
role of an intermediary, they can use the strength in their 
numbers to negotiate with banks, and they can act as guarantors 
for trusted and tested SMEs. 
 
From the findings, making a clear distinction between formal and 
informal institutions is not as straightforward as one might 
expect. However, what stands out is that there are overlaps and 
close interaction between the two. Thus, in summary, the impact 
of the interplay between formal and informal financial lenders 
speaks to the research question three by affirming that informal 
financial lenders influence formal financial lenders by making its 
operation more effective to meet its duty of providing more 





Formal lenders may borrow or adopt some relational 
approaches of informal lenders, and informal lenders at times 
rely on formal lender’s enforcement mechanisms when dealing 
with defaulting members. This usually happens when all social 
sanctions and relational approaches have failed. The reason 
why informal financial lenders may rely on the same process 
formal lenders adopt in the case of default is that the state may 
not permit private parties to use force (Polinsky and Shavell, 
2007:406). Thus, cooperative societies are subjected to relying 
on the state for such enforcement. When proceeding to enforce 
this, the assistance of the police is always sought. By using the 
police, it means an agent of the state is used as part of the 
enforcement process. It helps in the event of default, as erring 
members can be subjected to the state law which will constitute 
an additional debt recovery layer. Therefore, there is an overlap 
here as informal institutions rely on formal enforcement agencies 
to enforce repayments, particularly when defaults occur among 
members. As a result, this finding agrees with (Grzymala-Busse, 
2010:312) that while “informal institutions can be very effective 
at structuring expectations and behaviour”, their impact in most 
situations is not independent of formal institutions. This is 
another evidence of the interplay associated with the influence 
of formal lenders on the informal ones. 
6.4.3 Savings and Disbursement 
Informal financial lenders may rely on formal lenders to keep 
custody of their society’s money. In other words, a bank account 
will be opened with the formal financial lenders, and the money 
will be deposited for safekeeping. This is usually common with 
big cooperative societies. Again, at a later stage of the lending 
relationship, when loans are to be disbursed to beneficiaries, 
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informal lenders, i.e. cooperative may rely on formal lenders, i.e. 
commercial or microfinance banks to pay such monies into the 
beneficiary’s bank account. There is an exception to this: a small 
cooperative may distribute loans directly to SMEs by handing 
cash to their hands. Going by this finding, this service provided 
by formal financial lenders has nothing to do with the lending 
decisions of the informal financial lenders.  
 
In summary, formal lenders rely on informal mechanisms at the 
early stages of the lending process, and the purpose is to attract 
creditworthy cooperative members. While informal lender at a 
later stage for savings and disbursement.  
6.4.4 Helps Bank to Meet the Lending Target 
In response to the Federal Government’s concerns and policy 
measures for the promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) as vehicles for rapid industrialisation, sustainable 
economic development, poverty alleviation and employment 
generation, a scheme called Small and Medium Enterprises 
Equity Investment scheme was voluntary set up to assist the 
government in meeting SMEs needs. Under the scheme, ten per 
cent (10%) of the funds were set aside for lending to 
microfinance enterprises (Cbn.gov.ng 2020).  
 
The incorporation of cooperatives societies may have helped to 
open up more access to more SMEs. At the same time, the 
cooperation between the formal financial lenders and the 
cooperative societies have led to the advancing of loans to 
recommended cooperative SMEs. This speaks to the 
complementary role played by informal financial lenders, 
particularly cooperative societies. Hence, this kind of 
relationship corresponds with Helmke and Levitsky (2004:726), 
Lee and Persson (2016) and Allen et al. (2005) argument that 
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complementary informal institutions may serve as a foundation 
for formal institutions by creating a strengthening motivation for 
SMEs to comply with formal rules. 
 
The interplay between formal and informal lenders here is that 
customers that come through the cooperative must have been 
subjected to the relational mechanisms typical of the informal 
financial lenders. This interplay manifests as a form of 
relationship that eases exchanges of ideas that lead to positive 
outcomes for SMEs. 
 
Drawing from the social capital theory, membership of a group 
such as a cooperative society will improve the welfare of 
members; this is what social capital represents. Social capital 
has been defined as generalised trust, and it offers access to 
various types of networks, and norms of reciprocity (Rothstein 
and Stolle, 2008). This has led many SMEs to gain access, and 
their confidence to always seek access from formal lenders has 
grown. This study adds to the social capital argument of 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2008:457) regarding how it leads 
businesses into transitioning from seeking loans from informal 
lenders to seeking them from formal financial lenders. 
  
As depicted in the narrative of the cooperative society funded 
SME, before a loan request is granted to any member, they (the 
member) must be known to the cooperative society. Before they 
are known to the cooperative, two members must have 
introduced them. Equally, when a new member is seeking a 
loan, two cooperative members must stand as guarantors for 
them. This sort of process makes it easy for soft information to 
be transferred. This transfer also takes place between formal 
and informal financial lenders, and it is one-way: i.e. from 
informal lender to the formal ones. Many formal financial lenders 
also require the membership of cooperatives as part of the loan 
291 
 
preconditions for SMEs. SMEs that belong to a group, such as 
cooperative societies, find it easier to scale through the hurdle 
of meeting loan preconditions.  
 
As depicted by participants, informal lenders rarely rely on formal 
financial lenders to evaluate or seek recommendation about the 
suitability of members (SMEs) before reaching a lending 
decision. Instead, they base their decisions on the relationship 
that has been built over time, reflecting on conduct during 
meetings, consistency in payments, and duration of the 
membership. However, formal financial lenders rely on informal 
lenders, for instance, according to the narrative from some 
participants. It was observed that SEF requested from a 
cooperative society representing SMEs in manufacturing to 
provide names of their best members, who are SMEs. This is 
because they know the cooperative society possess soft 
information on their members, which in other words, means 
cooperative societies have information about their members as 
a result of the relationship they share. Through the information 
formal lenders get from informal lenders, they could provide 
loans to more SMEs.  
 
Conclusively, formal lenders rely on informal lenders and their 
approaches when they accept their recommendation on the 
tested and trusted members. This motivated the SMEs, and with 
the cooperative society’s support, they all work together towards 
meeting loan preconditions. This opens up the opportunity for 
more SMEs to gain access to formal loans. In the process, 
helping formal lenders meet the target set by the government.  
6.4.5 Ease the Challenges of Trust  
The expectation that the borrower will not default based on 
previous knowledge informed by the existing relationship will 
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make the lender lend again. This place the identity of the lender 
in the centre of this approach. The prospect of a future loan with 
a borrower who defaulted in the past is not feasible; 
notwithstanding the inherent profit that could emanate from the 
exchange because the identity of that particular borrower is 
established(Greif, 1998). For this reason, the relationship 
between a lender and borrower will determine the nature of trust 
that exists among them. 
 
For example, the cooperative expert in his narrative insisted that 
SMEs can access loan only if they satisfy the laid down 
preconditions. There was no aspect of the narrative that 
suggests that there was any feeling of insecurity and feeling of 
distrust among SMEs towards informal financial lenders. SMEs 
believe they will gain access as long as they meet the 
preconditions of loans of informal financial lenders. Whereas, for 
formal lenders, the feeling is otherwise, as excerpt confirms the 
likelihood of denial even in the face of meeting preconditions. 
This has been attributed to bias and insecurity. Unlike 
cooperative societies and other informal lenders whom SMEs 
find easy to believe and trust for their loan needs. The reason 
for this might be because of the procedural fairness of the 
informal institution, which influences members' institutional trust. 
More specifically, actors (i.e. SMEs and informal lenders) 
experience feelings of safety and protection and how they make 
inferences from the group based on the relationship they share 
(Rothstein and Teorell, 2008).  
 
The cooperative society is managed based on rules and 
guidelines that are rooted in personal relationships between 
members. Exchanges are conducted based on social affiliation, 
reputation and trust. For example, before a loan request is 
granted to any member, they must be known to the cooperative; 
before they are known to the cooperative, two members must 
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have introduced them. When a new member is seeking a loan, 
two members of the cooperative must stand as guarantors for 
him. Inability to be recommended by two existing members of 
the cooperative society may hamper the member’s chances of 
landing credit from the cooperative. Furthermore, periodic 
meetings provide members with an opportunity to communicate 
and network, demonstrating their relational and face-to-face 
nature. This type of relationship-based financing enables 
lenders to build trust and fund a narrow circle of close 
businesses without incurring too much cost (Giannetti and Yu, 
2008). 
 
Through the experiences of the cooperative expert, we see how 
new entrants become members of a cooperative society and 
how they qualify for loans. A cooperative society itself is similar 
to a network of close individuals who share something in 
common on a democratically agreed basis (Barry and Tacneng, 
2014). The role of networks was of great importance in 
understanding the initial recruitment processes experienced by 
SMEs (Nappon and Huddlestone, 1993). There is much 
emphasis on a relationship through which the character and 
integrity of members are known. In informal lending, this sort of 
relational approach is valuable. 
 
Formal access to resources such as finance is less difficult for 
SMEs with established relations because past performance 
‘itself’ often provides 17legitimacy and access to resources 
(Bruton et al., 2010). There will be more trust and satisfaction 
amongst members of cooperative society if they (Cooperative 
society) can leverage their goodwill with members to gain more 
 
17 Legitimacy confers the right to exist on an individual organisation and its activities (Stillman, 1974). It is 
important that entrepreneurial f irms legitimize their activities if  they are to secure resources and support 




loan access from formal lenders for their members’ sake. This 
will further shape a new disposition that can overcome the 
insecurity that once existed among SMEs. The confidence 
gained as a result of access made possible by the intermediary 
role of the cooperative society may lead SMEs to a belief that 
they are now good enough to be granted access by the formal 
financial lenders. Newton and Norris (1999) elaborate this 
causal flow when they found a strong positive correlation at the 
aggregate level in analysing the World Value Surveys in 
seventeen trilateral democracies. They interpret their findings as 
evidence that social capital "can help build effective social and 
political institutions, which can help governments perform 
effectively, and this, in turn, encourages confidence in civic 
institutions. If this is the case, social capital can help build up the 
confidence of SME in formal lenders. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that  SMEs can overcome pre-existing bias and distrust. 
 
The findings have contributed to understanding the roots of 
social trust, underpinned by the cultural dimension typical of a 
developing economy like Nigeria. Contrary to the cultural 
account, which argues that social trust is a deep-founded 
dispositional trait; the result of Rothstein and Stolle (2003) 
suggest that social trust is likely to change over time, and that 
experiences that shape trust in state institutions play an 
important part in most institutional context (Serritzlew et al., 
2014). This is good news in the sense that it testifies to levels of 
social trust not being set in stone, but rather something that can 
be built up by means of combatting corruption and other 
institutional malfunctions that lead citizens to distrust institutions 
and, subsequently, other people (Sønderskov and Dinesen, 
2014). From this study’s findings, it is surprising that there is no 
element of corruption that could be linked to the lending process 
of both formal and informal financial lenders. The question that 
should be asked is: has corruption been finally combatted? May 
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be lending practises have become so standardised that no 
lending precondition can be treated with levity. The overcoming 
of bias and change in the disposition of SMEs towards formal 
lending shows the accommodating role informal lenders play, 
and this echo the model of Helmke and Levistky (2004).  
 
In summary, the first super-ordinate theme (Sacrosanct nature 
of loan precondition) points to the importance of the various loan 
preconditions every SME must meet to qualify for a loan. The 
superordinate theme (which is the sacrosanct nature of loan 
precondition) led to the superordinate theme (satisfaction of loan 
preconditions). Similarly, the first subordinate theme led to the 
second subordinate theme (granting access to finance). It 
captures the narratives surrounding the uncompromising nature 
of each lender and what the lenders expect of them before 
access is granted. The understanding that gaining access after 
loan preconditions are satisfied, coupled with the support SME 
gets from their cooperative societies, the feeling of confidence 
that eases the bias and distrust justify the critical role of the 
interplay. This conforms with  Grzymala-Busse (2010:331) who 
claimed that the effectiveness of formal lenders is an outcome, 
not a precondition, of formal-informal lender’s interactions.  
6.4.6 Quality Relationships  
Narratives from participants regarding formal financial lenders 
reflect account opening, operating a bank account for at least six 
months and membership of a cooperative or cluster, amongst 
others, as part of their preconditions. The underlying idea behind 
requiring SMEs to open a bank account and maintain it for six 
months before they can qualify for formal lending is to create a 
relationship that allows the banks to get to know them. The usual 
way is for the banks to advise them to ensure regular deposit of 
daily sales into their accounts; after that, the size of the deposit 
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and the turnover on their accounts will be used as the basis for 
calculating the amount of loan they (SME) qualify for. This is the 
way a formal lender obtains hard information, and the 
cooperative or cluster membership part is to get soft information. 
The soft information part is mostly done via a loan or relationship 
officer: who is a key figure in the formal lenders’ interface with 
borrowers and their groups. This is more like copying the 
personal exchange mechanism used by informal lenders.  
 
A cooperative society will expect a prospective member to be 
introduced by an existing member, who will give a 
recommendation about their character. Also, they must spend at 
least six months before qualifying for a loan. This period creates 
an opportunity for other members to get to know the new 
member. Through this means, a relationship is created. From 
the narratives recorded during the pilot and the main study, it 
can be established that various accounts show commonalities 
between formal and informal financial lenders. There are 
adoptions of some practices that were traditionally seen as 
personal or relationship-based which have found their way into 
the loan requirements of the formal lender. Formal financial 
lenders at times liaise with informal financial lenders such as 
cooperatives to get names of trusted members. When this 
happens, a formal lender may not have to subject the SME to 
another round of relationship creation phase, which may involve 
opening and maintaining an account for more than six months 
and making a deposit into that account. In some cases, they may 
go-ahead to issue a loan if all other conditions are satisfied. 
Other conditions here refer, the registration of the business, 
evidence of payment of tax, evidence of tax identification 
number, possession of bank account. 
 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, cooperatives can be 
approached by a formal lender requesting their best five to 
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twenty members who are both trustworthy and creditworthy. This 
type of relationship between formal and informal financial 
lenders helps SMEs that do not have faith in formal financial 
lenders to overcome the feeling of insecurity they may previously 
have and result in helping them get onto the lending ladder of 
formal financial lenders.  
 
Amongst others, they use soft information from the informal 
financial lenders to evaluate the suitability of a loan request from 
SMEs who are their members. This will help to reduce the 
incidence of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry 
problems may be severe in situations whereby new SMEs are 
not known to formal lenders, and collateral may simply not be 
available. Cooperatives societies that have existing SME 
members with whom they have lending relationships, and know 
their track record may be in a better position to get 
recommended to formal lenders (Contessi and De Nicola, 
2012:24). Similarly, as one of the participants affirmed, 
cooperatives know their members and can make judgments 
about who is of good behaviour and the nature of their 
repayment history. 
 
Therefore, by adopting approaches used by the informal lender, 
the formal lender can overcome opaqueness. “By opaqueness, 
the literature means that it is difficult to ascertain if SMEs can 
pay and have the willingness to pay, which can be linked to 
moral hazard.” Moral hazard occurs basically because projects 
have identical mean returns but different degrees of risk, and 
lenders are unable to discern the borrowers’ actions (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Besley, 1994). The opaque nature of SMEs means 
information is hidden, which if available, may aid informed 
lending decisions. Consequently, by seeking the 
recommendations of cooperatives executives, in addition to 
other transaction-based and hard information they already 
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possess, formal financial lenders may have found a way to 
overcome opaqueness. This is achieved by relying on the direct 
information they provide while  adopting some relational and 
reputational lending approaches that are synonymous with 
informal financial lenders, which they do through the relationship 
officers that relate with SMEs and other prospective lenders. 
This finding is in agreement with (Uchida, 2011) who opined that 
formal lenders rely on subjective soft information and might use 
third- party information as a reference. 
 
From the aggregate perspective, it would be expected that in 
circumstances where people generally trust each other more, 
the supply of credit would be enhanced. Through informal 
finance, many SMEs have the opportunity to build “reputational 
collateral” by way of a proven repayment history (International 
Finance Corporation, 2010:72). The existence of a credit 
relationship may vest the custody of such information with the 
cooperatives, who may share such information about the 
business situation, repayment history, and business size with 
the banks. This is a role that informal financial lenders play to 
complement the formal ones.  
6.4.7 Summary 
The nature and implication of the interplay were explored in this 
chapter. The implications include improved access, 
enforcement, savings and disbursement, helping banks to meet 







CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSION 
7.0 Overview 
This chapter summarises the findings and conclusions reached 
in this study. It presents the main insights of the study and points 
to the practical and policy implications drawn from it. To achieve 
the goal of providing answers to the research questions, a 
qualitative methodology was employed. It deployed a purposive 
and snowballing sampling technique, which led to the 
interviewing of eighteen respondents. Out of the eighteen 
interviews, only seventeen were made sense of, and analysed 
using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) and 
Thematic Analysis (TA). Explanation of the rationale to exclude 
one of the interview transcripts is indicated in the first paragraph 
of section 5.2. 
The primary concern here is to substantiate a novel 
conceptualisation of narratives within the context of the 
participants’ explanations of their lived experiences instead of a 
predetermined theoretical view. This choice was informed by the 
desire to bridge the study gap identified in the introduction. It was 
established that there is advancement in the literature on the 
comparative importance of formal and informal financial 
institutional arrangement. However, an empirical investigation of 
the impact of formal and informal lending on SMEs’ growth and 
routine change (SMEs) remain vague.  
 
The gap was bridged by uncovering the extent to which formal 
and informal preconditions impact SME growth and routine 
change. Thus, the findings expose the variation both in growth 
and routine change experienced by beneficiaries SMEs as a 
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result of loan attributes and loan preconditions, respectively. 
Furthermore, the findings on the implications of the interplay 
between formal and informal financial lenders suggest that it 
leads to improved access to loans, better enforcement, savings 
and disbursement. Also, it helps the government to achieve its 
lending target and alleviates the challenges of trust and quality 
relationships. 
 
A summary of the findings, the significance of the study, practice 
and policy implications, research limitations and suggestions for 
future research are presented below.  
 
7.1 Summary of the Findings 
The summary of findings captures the outcomes in relation to 
the research aim and objectives. The aim of this research is to 
investigate the impact of formal and informal financial institutions 
on SMEs’ growth and routine change. The research objectives 
that were developed to attain the aim of the research are: firstly, 
the exploration of how formal and informal lenders affect  SME 
growth through lending preconditions. Secondly,  the 
examination of how formal and informal lenders affect SMEs’ 
routine change. Thirdly,  the investigation into the nature and 
impact of the interplay between formal and informal financial 
lenders on SMEs. 
7.1.1 Impact of Loan Preconditions on SME Growth 
 The satisfaction of the first research objective was achieved 
through sense-making and analysis of the respondent’s reality. 
Accordingly, findings show every SME that gained access 
complied with the loan preconditions associated with the type of 
lender they patronise. As the findings revealed, the variation in 
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growth experienced by SMEs in relation to the formal and 
informal preconditions they were subjected to, was influenced by 
three main determinants. These include loan tenure18, loan 
size19 and loan interest. Therefore, the longer the tenure, the 
higher the growth dimension experienced. Similarly, the higher 
the loan size, the better the growth experienced; and the lower 
the interest rate, the higher the dimension of growth 
experienced. 
 
This is a fundamental contribution of the study as it provides an 
explanation about SME growth through the amplification of the 
variations in outcomes experienced by SMEs in the Nigerian 
manufacturing sector. Thus, the presence of legitimate and 
recognised institutions defines and oversee business behaviour 
is critical for the long-term benefit (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
In this respect, institutions not only impose constraints but also 
provide opportunities (Oliver, 1997).  This contrasts with other 
studies such as Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Beck et 
al. (2005), Okpara (2011:167), Jibrilla (2013:125), Taiwo et al. 
(2016) that link growth to financing. However, did not explain 
how growth and routine change are linked and achieved within 
the loan preconditions and attributes context in a manufacturing 
setting of South-West Nigeria. This study has successfully 
achieved this by unveiling the underlying mechanism of growth 
and change in routines, using the loan precondition and 
attributes lenses within the Nigerian manufacturing context. 
7.1.2 The Extent and Variation in Routine Change. 
The finding which addresses the second research objective 
underscores the importance of compliance. The compliance to 
 
18 Loan tenure is the duration of  a loan. For example: it can be 6 months, one year or even f ive years.  
19 Loan size is the size of  the loan. For example: a loan of  200,000 naira (£452) can be the amount given 
out to an SME, and that represents the loan size.  
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formal lending preconditions is the result of adherence. It shapes 
the routines of SMEs by helping them inculcate new skills, 
practice and behaviour, which according to data, has led to 
efficiency in their operations, i.e. reduction of wastages, 
including improved bookkeeping. From narratives, it can be 
established that it has also led to better computation of tax. This 
was explained in the excerpts in section 6.3.7, where a new 
routine of accounting was developed through the hiring of an 
accountant.  
 
Formal financial lenders also indirectly impact informal SMEs, 
usually by making them overcome informality. For example, 
formal financial lenders would subject prospective SMEs to 
register their business with the government. This allows them to 
become known to the formal system and their activities may 
become regulated by the government. This is simply how 
formality happens. The mechanism involved in achieving 
formality is explored more in subsequent paragraphs. 
 
The nature of routine change experienced is not identical but 
varies according to the preconditions beneficiaries are subjected 
to. It is important to note that SMEs that obtain loan from the 
same lenders experience similar changes. Thus, the variation in 
routine change and the type of routine change (i.e., one-off 
routines or continuous routines - see 5.11.1) experienced by 
SMEs are determined by the source from where the loan was 
obtained. This mirrors Kostova and Roth (2002) suggestion that 
organisation that share the same environment will engage in 
similar practices and thus become ‘isomorphic’ with each other. 
This is in line with the process of homogenisation, which 
Hawley's (1968) referred to as isomorphism. According to him, 
at the population level, organisational features are altered to 




As mentioned above, another outcome of routine changes this 
research found is that getting a loan from formal financial lenders 
enables beneficiary SMEs to be formalised (see 6.3.9). This is 
as a result of new routines they have been motivated or forced 
to imbibe. An example of such routines is business registered 
with the government agency in charge of company registration 
(Corporate Affairs Commission). Business registration makes 
payment of tax possible. Practice like this automatically moves 
businesses out of the shadow economy into the formal 
economy. Nevertheless, this is a crucial part of the research, as 
it demonstrates the transitioning from informality to formality. 
Understanding the transitioning, as revealed by narratives, was 
aided by cognitive psychology theory, and shows the 
mechanisms of learning, acquisition of new habits and routine. 
More details on learning can be found in sections 2.8 and 2.9. 
 
Furthermore, in the case of formal lending - it was revealed from 
the findings, that the occurrence of routine change commences 
as soon as an SME decides to access a loan. This relates to the 
disposition of the SME owner. Some are more predisposed to 
seek informal finance, while some are predisposed to formal 
finance. That is the moment they start to put things in place, 
which may involve changing the way they operate. Knowing 
what is required is based on past educational background, 
experience in business and past relationships with lenders. To 
be compliant to lending precondition, the SME owner would pass 
this knowledge to members of staff directly or by hiring someone 
that has the skill needed. For example, the hiring of an 
accountant mentioned in the paragraph above is an example of 
how an organisation can develop new knowledge. They regard 
the process of adaptation as something that must be replicated 




Furthermore, it provides a useful perspective on the dynamics of 
organisational routines. Especially concerning the process of 
learning, there are some movements between the individual 
agent's level and the group to which the individual belongs. 
Before the new routine is developed and replicated across the 
organisation, the SME owner's habit must have changed. This 
translates to the fact that a change at the individual level 
represents a habit. When this change is replicated within the 
whole group or the organisation, i.e. the SMEs, represents a 
routine change. This is reflected in this research.  
 
For adaptation to happen, individual habits need to change. The 
concept of habit is crucial in learning and skill development 
(Dewey, 1922). Their persistence means that organisational 
development often inflexibly resists corporate or government 
initiatives. In this study, resistance to change was not a choice 
for most SME desirous of formal lending. If they resist change, 
they will not adapt to the preconditions of the loan. Moreover, 
that will prevent them from gaining access to formal loan and will 
constrain their ability to grow, but access to informal lenders will 
still be open to them.  
 
The idea about the mechanism of routine is synonymous with 
Dollimore (2016), which draw on cognitive psychology by 
contextualising behavioural dispositions as a result of either, 
personal challenges (goals and targets), bad experiences (failed 
business or failed strategy in current business) formal training, 
such as education, and the placed emphasis on intentions as it 
relates to the importance of change in the habitual behaviour of 
a business owner. According to Dollimore (2016), for an 
entrepreneur to change their habit, specific intentions need to be 
defined and implemented. New cues or ‘triggers’ would help 
establish new behaviours. Moreover, it provides similar findings 
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made in this study about SME lending decision being influenced 
by past work experiences and education.  
 
The institutional arrangement that defines the framework of how 
lenders operate entails a lot of social interactions, such as lender 
vs borrower and formal lender vs informal lenders. Furthermore, 
this adds to the theory on behaviour (Williamson et al., 1998) 
and organisational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 1995), by 
unravelling the endogenous manifestation of the effects of the 
external environment such as the higher-level order of loan 
precondition originating from lenders and how it leads to the 
alteration of internal processes. This was reflected in the 
narratives captured in the theme “impact of access”, which was 
linked to the external influence of rules (See section 2.8, 2.9, 4.8, 
5.10, and 6.1). 
 
Equally, the finding of this study echoes arguments from the 
literature on theoretical debates, reflecting on the routine 
theories of Feldman and Pentland (2003), Cohen and Backdayn, 
(1994), and Szulanski and Jensen (2004); downward causation 
of Sperry (1992); and finally, the reconstitutive downward 
causation of Hodgson (2007), as explained in Subsection 2.7 
and Section 6.3 -  where it was argued that routines could be 
impacted from a higher level authority. The lenders are higher-
level authority, under whose rule SMEs are subjected. 
 
Hence, this study believes learning aids new routines 
development, which occurs as a result of the social interaction 
within the organisation, which enables new habits to become 
new routines. SMEs’ acquire new routines because of their 
interaction and the relationships they share with others as 
defined by the existing institutional arrangements. As a result of 
the routine change, the structure of the organisation is 
transformed. As mentioned in the last two paragraphs, new roles 
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emerged, such as the role of an accountant who keeps records 
for the organisation (see excerpt in section 5.11.2). The latter 
echoes what Miner and Estler (1985) referred to as the 
redefinition of jobs. Prior to the hiring of an accountant, for 
instance; record-keeping responsibilities are performed by the 
owner. When the need for a loan becomes apparent, tax 
computation became an area of expertise that must be 
addressed. The hiring of an accountant addressed this need by 
combining record keeping with other technical areas such as tax 
computation. This is making changes to a particular existing 
routine. This has a profound effect on the structure of the 
organisation as the owner have more time to focus on more 
important things that may improve growth and manage other 
areas of work more efficiently and effectively. 
 
However, due to the nature of informal financial lenders, whose 
exchange mechanism is based on reputation, none of the SMEs 
who obtained loans from the informal lenders experienced 
routine change. Regardless of whether the level of compliance 
is partial or complete, beneficiaries of formal financial lenders 
would still experience routine change. This is because formal 
financial lenders hardly provide a loan if they do not see that all 
preconditions are met. Although untruthful SMEs might present 
superficial documents, it is essential to note that this may not be 
the case for all. As most SMEs would present valid and authentic 
documents. For those SMEs who genuinely satisfy loan 
precondition, their respective routine would change. 
Consequently, as captured in sections 6.3.4, and 6.3.5, the 
variation in routine change experienced, is often due to  the 
preconditions relating to the source of the loan. 
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7.1.3 The Interplay Between Formal and Informal Lenders 
 The third research objective, i.e., the implication of the interplay 
of formal and informal preconditions on SMEs, was addressed 
through participants’ narratives. This enabled analysis to be 
focused on the shared social contexts involving formal lenders 
relying on the personal exchange mechanism of informal 
financial lenders whilst retaining their impersonal approaches. 
Equally, the findings revealed that informal lenders also rely on 
the mechanism of formal lenders, especially when it comes to 
using law enforcement agents to seek repayments from 
defaulting customers. This was extensively explored in sections 
4.11.1, 6.4.2 and 6.4.4.  
 
The reliance of formal financial lenders on informal financial 
lenders help SMEs to overcome the feeling of insecurity, distrust 
they have about formal financial lenders and opaqueness 
respectively. This was explored extensively in sections 5.13.2, 
5.13.3 and 6.4.6.  Where it was shown that willing formal 
financial lenders rely on the informal financial lenders, to tap 
from the soft information in informal lender’s possession, which 
is facilitated by the social capital ideologies existing among 
them, this helps them to reduce the issues of opaqueness and 
information asymmetry that may exist. This resulted in the 
identification of credit worthy SMEs. Informal financial lenders 
were also found to rely on formal financial lenders for 
safekeeping the contribution of their members.  
 
The importance of the interplay was emphasised by Ayyagari et 
al. (2012). They highlighted the dominance of the relationship 
between formal financial lenders and informal financial lenders, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where they are serving the 
high end of the market. They also suggested the need for the 
strengthening of the linkage and relationships that exist between 
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formal and informal financial lenders and deepening it further. 
However, Ayyagari et al. (2013) did not consider SMEs in the 
manufacturing sector, as the authors were more interested in the 
high end of the market. 
 
Therefore, as revealed by the findings, it is important for formal 
financial lenders and informal financial lenders to tap into each 
other’s resources. This is evident in the effects of the interplay 
that exists between the two. More importantly, this study 
revealed that the formal sector is not in short supply of capital, 
and its reluctance to provide loan to SMEs is not hidden from the 
policymakers, as there have been policies to address this 
situation. If the relationship that encourages the sharing of 
information is prevalent between the two types of lenders, it is 
likely that more SMEs would be served. 
 
Conclusively, this study has been able to unravel the intervening 
role played by informal financial lenders in making formal 
financial lenders play their lending role better. In other words, the 
study has revealed how informal financial lenders’ roles 
influence the role of formal financial lenders. This is partly 
consistent with Helme and Levitsky (2004),  who claim that 
informal financial lending complements formal lending by filling 
the gaps for formal institutions and making them efficient. This is 
indicated in the findings, which revealed the capacity of 
relational mechanism to ease the challenges of trust, insecurity, 
quality relationships, the incidence of information asymmetry 
and opaqueness that may exist especially between SMEs and 
formal financial lenders.  The reliance of informal financial 
lenders on the formal enforcement channel, such as police, may 
improve default from their borrowers. 
 
Similarly, informal financial lenders’ relationship with formal 
financial lenders improves their ability to manage members’ 
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funds better. This is because members’ contribution kept in the 
bank is safer than when it is kept in another member’s house. 
When money is kept in the bank, the risk of theft is reduced. 
Furthermore, the safe keep of members’ contribution and 
efficient and effective disbursements of loans to beneficiaries 
can be linked to the effect of the interplay between formal and 
informal financial lenders. 
 
7.2 Significance of the Study 
The findings reveal the influence of loan preconditions and loan 
attributes. Indeed, adherence to loan preconditions makes 
access possible. Likewise, loan attributes associated with those 
loans were found to influence the growth of SMEs that gained 
access. Furthermore, adherence to loan preconditions leads to 
access to loans and the adoption of new routines. This shapes 
new practices and behaviours and ultimately make access to 
future loan possible. These findings offer useful empirical 
insights consistent with routine change literature in two ways: 
first, by showing how higher and lower organisational levels 
influence each other within the lens of lending preconditions, and 
reveals how new, existing and old routines are influenced and 
shaped by owners’ past knowledge and experience. Secondly, 
it identifies and explains the mechanism involved in routine 
change. In contrast with prior research on routine transfer and 
replication, with the use of templates adopted by top 
management and passed down to the various units within the 
organisation, and replication by the replicator, i.e. franchisee at 
various sites and amongst different organisations. Instead, this 
study focuses on the change in a routine within an organisational 
setting, which was expressed - using three dimensions; (a) 
changing a routine by operating (possibly dormant) routine X 
instead of former routine Y, (b) making changes to a particular 
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existing routine, and (c) developing and operating an entirely 
new routine. All these could be described as “routine change”.  
 
Lastly, findings reveal the nature of the interplay between formal 
and informal financial lenders and its consequence. By 
uncovering the underpinnings of the interplay between formal 
and informal lending and illuminating the reliance of commercial 
banks on recommendations of cooperative societies’ tested and 
trusted members. Equally, the role of formal lenders such as the 
provision of banking services to the cooperative members as a 
whole and helping them to allocate loans approved by the 
cooperative management. Due to these overlaps, the implication 
that was revealed, include improved access to loans, better 
enforcement, savings and disbursement, while also helping the 
banks to achieve its lending target and easing the challenges of 
trust and quality relationships.  
 
Overall, these results contribute to the theoretical debate 
regarding routines origin, mechanisms and change, SME 
financing, institutional economics literature, particularly the 
dualistic, and inseparable nature of formal and informal 
institutions. They also point in directions that further quantitative 
studies would need to explore to be relevant for policy.  
 
It presents the result of an original piece of empirical research 
on formal and informal financing of SMEs in the Nigerian 
manufacturing sector, while at the same time addresses the 
research objectives.  This study offers appropriate coverage of 
the evolutionary framework in the literature review and improved 
handling of routines with a more suitable definition and 
categorisation of routine change. It drew on the modern 
institutional theory (North, 1990; Hodgson, 2007), for the 
definition of key terms and conceptual framework, evolutionary 
approach (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010; Hodgson, 2012b) and 
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routines literature (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Becker et al., 
2005; D’Adderio, 2008; Dollimore, 2016), which amplifies the 
place of learning and the information-carrying and adaptive role 
of routines in organisations,  institutional economics (Williamson, 
2009; Hodgson, 2006) where the distinction between formal and 
informal institutions was laid bare and cognitive psychology 
studies (Mayer, 1977 Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994) magnify the 
role of language in cognitive processes and transfer of 
knowledge transfer. The insight gathered include the role of 
external triggers, in the form of formal lenders’ loan 
preconditions, which SMEs have to adhere to if they desire to 
access loans.  
 
Starting from the first objective, it identified how different types 
of lenders impact growth. By relating it to variation , which is 
linked to loan attributes. The SMEs that show more growth are 
those that gained access to longer tenure loan, bigger loan size 
and lower interest rate. Based on the reviewed literature, the 
research findings and the researcher’s knowledge; this is the 
only study that has investigated this phenomenon in this context. 
Also, it has pushed forward the argument on SMEs’ growth 
within the loan attributes lens.  
 
It was also discovered that co-funding enables SMEs to 
experience higher growth than when the loan was obtained from 
a single source. This result corresponds with Degryse et al. 
(2016) findings on co-funding, which concludes it is an optimal 
choice for small firms.  
 
The second objective of this study relating to examining how 
formal and informal financial lenders’ preconditions impact 
routine change was met, as findings obtained revealed the 
exogenous influence of rules from various types of lenders as 
triggers for change in routines and growth. This echoes 
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Dollimore (2016:2), whose study concludes that the influence of 
environmental pressure serves as a trigger that alters 
behavioural responses. This study may not appear to cover or 
include most of the areas her study covered as her work was 
interested in how entrepreneurs’ historical and acquired habits 
play a significant role in shaping routines in new and fledging 
organisations. However, this study was interested in the effect 
of present and past SMEs’ borrowing/lending efforts but found 
that historical and acquired experienced help SMEs make sense 
of the preconditions they have to meet. Similarly, it exposes the 
issue of trigger for change by specifically identifying SMEs’ need 
for a loan, the reward, sanction and outcomes that come with 
compliance/adherence, and non-compliance/non-adherence to 
loan preconditions. An elaborate explanation is provided in 
subsections 4.7, 4.10 and 6.3.3 on the reward for compliance, 
which is access to loan, and the sanction for non-compliance is 
access denial. 
 
Additionally, this study has unveiled the way SME owners and 
managers act towards compliance and choosing to adhere to 
loan preconditions of formal financial lenders. Their decision is 
influenced by their experience and prior knowledge. An example 
was the respondent who mentioned he knew about loan 
precondition as a result of his education.  
 
Likewise, the findings of this study reinforce the conclusion that 
routine change occurs through conscious intervention, echoing 
the findings of Holland et al. (2006). This is because the need 
for a loan would require deliberate steps towards approaching a 
lender of choice and acting towards abiding by its stipulated 
preconditions. As Wood and Neal (2009:579) explain, “habits 
are learned largely as people pursue goals in daily life, and 
habits are the basis of strategic deployment of effortful self -
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control”. When this is replicated across the organisation, 
resulting in routine change. 
 
The type of routine change identified includes those that entail 
changes to a particular existing routine and those that involve 
the development and operation of an entirely new routine. 
Furthermore, another crucial finding is that routine change can 
lead to formality. This may aid developmental policies, which, 
according to Rodrik (2008:100) is meaningful for both the 
historical and contemporary perspectives because it contributes 
towards answering the reform questions in the developing world 
where the focus has moved “from getting prices right to getting 
institutions right”. This is hinged on the belief that development 
policies should facilitate the formalisation of enterprises. 
Therefore, the route to formalisation has been made more 
apparent with information that helps illuminate the type of 
reliable obligations required. The exposition on the social 
relationship between loan preconditions as a crucial determinant 
for routine change for SMEs.s This advances evolutionary 
theory in the field of socio-economics . 
 
Findings that address the third research objective improves the 
understanding of the interplay. This was done by the thorough 
investigation conducted on the interplay between formal and 
informal financial lenders and their impact on SMEs. The 
outcome reveals the behavioural impact the interplay has on 
SME; which confirms the confidence, financial advantage and 
improved knowledge it bestows about how and what is required 
to meet loan preconditions of formal financial lenders. The 
interplay between formal and informal lenders results in 
improved access as a result of informal lenders stepping-in to 
negotiate and stand as guarantors on behalf of their members. 
This outcome adds to the social capital argument of Rothstein 
and Stolle (2003) on how it leads businesses into transitioning 
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from seeking a loan from an informal lender to seeking a loan 
from formal financial lenders. 
 
Furthermore, it unravels the role of informal financial lenders as 
complementary to formal financial lenders in a clear (Helmke 
and Levistky, 2004), systematic, and comprehensive manner. 
By exposing how formal financial lenders rely on informal 
financial lenders to gain access to informal financial lenders’ 
members. This outcome mirrors Madestam's (2014:158) 
assertion on informal finance being complementary to the formal 
financial lenders. This addresses the question raised by Zhou et 
al. (2003:365), which suggested that it is not clear whether 
formal institutions substitute or complement informal institutions. 
To play the complementary role, as shown by the result, 
meaningful engagement of formal financial lenders with informal 
financial lenders is required, which will necessitate a 
considerable amount of social skill for the informal lenders' 
representatives to negotiate and achieve access for members of 
their cooperative societies. With this, they can inspire 
cooperation with other players by giving them common 
meanings, confidence and identities in which actions can be 
undertaken and rewarded.  
 
Equally, the study goes a step beyond Fainshmidt et al. (2018), 
who only observed the role of wealthy families in shaping 
economic context by incorporating families and friends, 
cooperatives societies and money lender contexts. It unravelled 
the role they play individually and the interplay that exist in 
enabling and constraining beneficiary SMEs to ascend the 
formal and informal lending ladder.  
 
The findings on differentials in growth and routine change satisfy 
the spirit of Darwinian principles. Because it recognises survival 
as crucial in the argument on the growth experienced by the 
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SMEs. Also, the findings suggest that growth is associated with 
business survival as a result of adaptation. This is the type of 
lesson that shed light on the nature and implication of 
adaptation, and it is beneficial to evolutionary researchers, 
businesses and policymakers. This study relates evolutionary 
thinking to social and economic study. This has helped enrich 
the study’s outcomes by unravelling the benefit of adherence to 
loan preconditions of various lenders and type of lender. Also, 
the occurrence of variations found across each SME has helped 
to reveal the role sources of lending play.  
Lenders are analogous to external triggers. Therefore, from an 
evolutionary perspective, the nature and implication of the 
dispositions of SMEs can be determined by their past 
experiences and will inform their adaptation pattern. This guides 
SMEs on where to go for loans based on what they believe in 
representing their best interest. This finding, with the help of the 
qualitative research method adopted, has enabled the 
uncovering of the underlying causes of routine change and 
growth and the associated variations, which would have been 
missed if a quantitative method was used. Equally, it 
demonstrated the nature and the implication of formal and 
informal lending and their interplay and has brought about clarity 
by exposing the underlying causes and mechanisms of interplay 
and their implications on SME.  
7.3 Practice Implications and Recommendations 
The current research highlights the experiences of SMEs in the 
Nigerian manufacturing sector, touching on their (SME) 
relationship/interaction with formal and informal lenders. The 
experiences described by participants on how growth was 
achieved as a result of access and the variation that was 
revealed shows that loan attributes play a significant role in the 
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dimension of growth experienced. In line with this, banking 
professionals should consider how these loan attributes work in 
a broader context. Formal financial lenders should also consider 
the effect they have and how they can be managed by 
accommodating the needs of manufacturing SMEs which have 
been noted to be different from SMEs who are involved in 
trading. This is because, in manufacturing, it takes a longer time 
to procure raw material, process it into finish goods and make it 
available to the final consumer. However, in trading, it is different 
as it takes less time to make goods available to the consumer, 
and it does not involve the processing of raw material; therefore, 
turnover is usually fast. Also, depending on the nature of 
manufacturing, incentives like moratorium that consider the 
peculiarity of the prospective SME such that they do not have to 
start paying back immediately until when they started generating 
income should be provided.  
 
Furthermore, from the participants’ narratives, the power of 
social capital was explored, and the place of trust and insecurity 
within it was analysed and presented in sub section 5.14.2, 
6.4.1, 6.4.4 and 6.4.5. These concepts are essential for any 
lending relationship, most especially in informal lending. Hence, 
it is advisable that SME owners should be open enough to seek 
membership in informal groups such that they can come under 
the umbrella of cooperative societies. This will permit them to 
leverage the group's strength and harness the advantage they 
bring to bear on formal lenders. SMEs may also rely on the 
advice from other members who had obtained a loan from formal 
lenders and use their experience as a basis for putting the right 
things in place. The information gained would go a long way in 





Given the relatively abundant financial resources of formal 
lenders compared to informal lenders, there is a need for policy 
measures to increase access to informal SMEs by channelling 
such financial resources through informal lenders. An attempt 
should also be made to expand the capacity of informal financial 
lenders to enable them to increase their potential to lend to 
SMEs. The kind of capacity expansion and regulation 
recommended will require direct government funding, and the 
fund would be best managed and administered by 
developmental banks that are not solely profit-driven.  
7.4 Policy Implications and Recommendations 
Policymakers should endeavour to create policies that value soft 
information that emanates from trust and relationships, and 
formally recognise it as part of the substantial loan preconditions 
that can count towards access to a loan. This can be done if a 
method of codification is introduced. Therefore, instead of the 
increased focus on reduction or elimination of the informal 
sector, it will be more beneficial to make the sector an equal 
partner towards achieving a progressive development in the 
economy. This may take the form of creating a point-based 
system that recognises the historical borrowing and the 
repayments behaviour of informal SMEs, and recommendation 
from reliable people in their network. These actions will reflect 
the collectivism orientation embedded in those SMEs' culture 
and other forms of registration. For example, registration with 
clusters, cooperative societies and ROSCAs should be valued 
and recognised for lending purposes irrespective of the lender.  
 
Valuing and incorporating relational mechanism strategies as a 
replacement to some of the impersonal mechanisms, would lead 
to more financial liberalisation. It would intensify financial flow. 
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By improving efficiency, lower spreads between borrowing and 
lending rates, improved the flow of funds between sectors, 
enabling improved access to formal finance for those formerly 
marginalised and embolden all SMEs to play their 
developmental roles without fear. 
 
Most federal government policies designed to increase SMEs' 
loan access are intended only to cater to formal SMEs. Osuji and 
Nwani (2020) confirm that the government's monetary policy 
actions do not sufficiently accommodate SMEs in general. 
However, current policies such as the Small and Medium 
Enterprises Credit Guarantee Scheme (SMECGS) has brought 
about a shift. Still, the shift does not extend to address the needs 
of those in the informal sector.  For instance, through the CBN, 
the federal government of Nigeria has established a N200 billion 
Small and Medium Enterprises Credit Guarantee Scheme 
(SMECGS) for promoting access to credit by SMEs in Nigeria. 
The preconditions employed by banks administering the loan 
has no provision to recognise the trust and social capital 
associated with informal lenders. For instance, to qualify for a 
loan under this scheme and other schemes, currently, in 
operation to address financial inclusion, interested SMEs are still 
expected to be registered with CAC, possess a bank account, 
provide collateral before access to a reasonable amount of 
money, amongst others. These preconditions are targeted at 
formal lending whilst the informal SMEs are left out.  
 
To cater to the need of informal SMEs and to emphasise the 
relevance of the study in the context of the dual nature of the 
Nigerian economy, rather than giving prominence to increasing 
formalisation of informal SMEs and discouraging informal 
lending practices, emphasis should be given to initiatives that 
could maximise outcomes from best practices (e.g., trust, 
relationships) relating to informal and formal lending. The so-
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called informal lending practices can be normalised and 
standardised for access to formal lending, thereby helping and 
supporting more SMEs (whether formal or informal) to grow their 
businesses. 
 
The findings on formal and informal lenders interplay 
demonstrate how important it is for policymakers to take into 
account some aspect of informal rules when creating formal 
financial policies. This includes both cultural values that are 
prevalent within the Nigerian society and norms and customs 
guiding social network, i.e. cooperative society. What this means 
is that, culturally, African societies have a collectivism spirit, 
which advocates and promotes a ‘We’ attitude. This ought to be 
represented in any future lending policy. This representation can 
be achieved by promoting and recognising the importance of 
groups, networks or clusters. In crafting such policies, similar 
recognition accorded impersonal preconditions such as 
business registration, tax identification and payment, should be 
extended to personal mechanism approaches such as 
recommendation made by members of registered or recognised 
groups. Good business practice routines which are analogous to 
impersonal mechanisms such as record keeping and auditing 
should be encouraged. Regulators and policy makers should 
provide appropriate training to SMEs and their groups on  how 
best to apply these good practices. Also, access to government 
subsidies, contract and additional future loan opportunities 
should be made open to beneficiaries, in order to motivate and 
encourage them to retain routines which they have developed. 
 
Regulation should be less burdensome for meaningful economic 
growth to be realised. Having a burdensome regulation regime 
breeds restriction and makes procedural regime, time-
consuming and costly for businesses (Etim and Daramola, 
2020). Accordingly, SMEs would be less likely to abide by them, 
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and the shadow economy would remain desirable to them. As a 
result, the government lose out on potential revenues when 
levels of informality are high (Doingbusiness.org 2018). To 
soften preconditions, outright relational approaches should be 
permitted, but it must be accompanied by one or two impersonal 
mechanisms such as business registration, bank account 
opening and auditing. For instance, the opening of an account 
would permit hard information to be built for prospective 
borrowers.  Equally, as a way of softening regulations, elements 
of relational mechanism, especially recommendation from tested 
and trusted groups, i.e. registered cooperative societies, should 
replace preconditions such as the need for bank guarantees and 
collateral. The reason for suggesting the removal of collateral in 
place of some relational approaches such as group 
recommendation is because many SMEs would be locked out of 
getting access as they will always find it hard to get collateral for 
loan purposes. If this is implemented, it will reduce transaction 
costs associated with gathering hard information, i.e. the cost of 
working hours used in verifying collateral.  
 
To this end, the government should seize the opportunity for 
comprehensive and high-impact reforms through the 
strengthening of informal lending, for example, cooperatives 
society by enabling it to safeguard the soft information at its 
disposal.  
The government should make it a matter of urgency to 
incentivise formal financial lenders to engage more with informal 
financial lenders. The increased collaboration will address the 
existing trust issues. More openness will be created between 
formal and informal financial lenders, which will trickle down to 
SMEs who belong to informal lending groups. For example, a 
special fund could be created for formal financial lenders who 
engage with SMEs through informal groups. 
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7.5 Future Research 
This chapter proposes an alternative approach for future 
research that can shed more light on lending, using different 
methods and approaches, which can lead to better analyses and 
policy recommendations that could translate to better lending 
outcomes for SMEs. 
 
Further research is needed to confirm the novel findings on 
variation in growth, routine change and the extent of the 
influence of the interplay between formal and informal lending. 
Especially if a different research method, such as a quantitative 
method, is applied, this could provide a good starting point for 
discussion and further research. 
 
Donors, investors and policymakers would be able to make 
informed decisions if they know which type of lender guarantees 
better returns. The occurrence of default may threaten donors 
and investors. However, when the default level is known, donors 
and governments will be informed of the best way to channel 
resources appropriately and provide proper support to counter 
defaults. However, this study did not investigate the default rate 
of SMEs in relation to the lenders, a study that investigates the 
impact of the relationship between formal and informal lending 
on default and repayment rate may bridge that gap. 
 
Furthermore, variables such as business registration, auditing, 
and tax payment can be evaluated to determine their effect on 
SME within the manufacturing sector. Though the study 
evaluated the effect of adoption and adherence to loan 
precondition on SMEs, it did not exclusively look at how each 
element of loan preconditions impacts growth. Although, some 
of the aspects of business routines were explored in the 
literature review, for example, tax payment. Ojeka (2011), in his 
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study conducted in Nigeria, found that taxes are more harmful 
than beneficial to the growth of SMEs as they increase running 
costs and slow down SME growth. This is because SMEs are 
subjected to the same tax rate and similar regulatory conditions 
as bigger businesses. He asserts further that there is a 
significant negative relationship between taxes and the 
business’ ability to sustain itself and to expand. However, this 
notion was countered by the findings of this research in 6.4.1. 
The subsection argued that changes in routine brought about 
better computation of tax payment, which resulted in reduced tax 
payment. However, a detailed study can be done to assess a 
large sample size of SMEs who have been paying tax and 
explore how it impacts them.  
 
Above all, since this study is focused on unravelling the 
underling impact of formal and informal lending on SMEs in the 
Nigerian manufacturing sector, it must be stressed that the 
results found, may not be generalisable to other contexts, such 
as different sectors, i.e. services, mining and big scale 
enterprises. Generalisation was not the aim of this research but 
to uncover the impact of formal and informal lending on SMEs’ 
growth and routine change. The adoption of a qualitative 
methodology made that possible. Equally, previous chapters 
have discussed in detail its efficacy in doing so (see especially 
Chapter 3). This qualitative study offers firm foundations for 
future quantitative studies, especially if larger samples, different 
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Appendix 1 – Examples of excerpts covering themes such as 
access denial, level of relationship and Bias (Full excerpts 
covering all the themes is available on request). 
 
Superordinate theme - access denial 
Researcher: Do cooperatives consider factors like religious 
practises, norms, friends and family factors and code of 
conducts) when administering loan policies. 
 
Respondent (Coop Expert): Every member is treated on the 
basis of the laid down rules guiding the operations of the 
cooperative. No religion, ethnic, culture or any other factors are 
considered. The main thing is you must be someone that can be 
trusted.  We used to have two Igbo (Igbos are from the eastern 
part of Nigeria) friends, one introduced the other, the first one 
uses to get loan regularly and he was a good payer. For some 
reasons, he had to move to another part of the country, and he 
requested that he needs to withdraw from the cooperative. 
Anyone planning to withdraw their funds will have to give six 
months’ notice. This policy was applied to him and his money 
was paid back to him in full. It now remained his friend, 
unfortunately his friend couldn’t get anyone to stand as 
guarantor for him because no one knows him. The only person 
that knows him had left. He approached other members, 
requesting if they can stand for him but those ones were scared 
because they don’t know him well. This made it impossible for 
him to get a loan and he withdrew his membership. 
 
Researcher: What about those that don’t (those that do not 
adhere to loan preconditions)?  
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Respondent (Microfinance Institution - Expert): We cannot 
advance loan to those that don’t imbibe good business practice 
e.g. keeping of record. 
 
Respondent (SME Expert): If SMEs do not meet loan 
preconditions, they may end up not getting a bank loan. This 
may affect their performance negatively.  
 
Subordinate theme - the level of relationship 
Researcher: Does meeting loan preconditions guarantees 
getting access to finance? 
 
Respondent (Commercial Bank-Expert): A customer must have 
opened an account with the branch for at least three months, 
 
Respondent (Microfinance Institution - Expert): The business is 
also building their credit history which includes capacity building 
training. We are having forums together. This creates a big 
opportunity for us to get to know you and your business better. 
 
Respondent (SME 10): You must have been contributing into 
your account and you must be six-month-old in the cooperative, 
if you enter the society in January, by June ending, you will be 
able to get. 
 
Respondent (SME 8): They may come and may not come, if you 
have an account with them, they must have done their know your 
customer KYC, they know that you have an existing established 
office space, they know your operation is running there, and they 
know you have been banking with them because commercial 
banks will say you must be banking with them for like six months 




Subordinate theme – bias 
Researcher: Why formal lenders have hesitation towards 
lending to SMEs? 
 
Respondent (Islamic Bank-Expert): SMEs’ loan is one of the 
poor performing loans. Some will take fund and run away. 
 
Respondent (SME 6): Somebody like me and some others 
discovered that they are not sincere with us, although I was the 
first person to meet up their final payment. Similarly, people are 
fond of not paying back and they will be feeling comfortable with 
it. 
 
Researcher: Does meeting loan precondition guarantees 
access? 
Respondent (SME Expert): In some cases, meeting the 
preconditions of a loan does not guarantee access, as most 
SMEs believe that even if they meet loan preconditions, banks 
may not still give them the loan. They have conditioned their 
minds that they cannot meet the conditions. They see the 
preconditions as an excuse for not trying to access a loan, 
thinking in their minds that it is not achievable. 
 
However, the preconditions are achievable. The guidelines are 
there, anyone that wants to meet it can do so, by putting in place 
all loans requirements. Most entrepreneur or business owners 
have the belief that it is impossible to get credit from the bank. 
So when they now see the guidelines/preconditions they will not 













Codes Text/ Narratives 
Impact of access Adoption of 
new routine 
<Files\\Islamic Bank-Expert> - § 
2 references coded  [10.14% 
Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 6.91% Coverage 
Researcher: If loan 
preconditions are made 
mandatory and no waiver is 
granted, would this in any way 
affect the way SMEs work and 
do things?  
Respondent: I think to a large 
extent since they are forced to 
keep proper books of account, 
pay attention to their daily 
operations, get their tax 
identification number(TIN), keep 
sales record etc. Therefore, it 
forces SMEs that are interested 
in getting a loan to keep those 
things in place and the 
expectation to apply for a loan 




<Files\\Coop Expert> - § 1 
reference coded  [2.91% 
Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 2.91% Coverage 
Researcher: When SMEs follow 
a/the bank’s laid down loan 
processes, would there be any 
effect on the acquisition of 
asset? 
Respondent: Yes, access to a 
loan may result in SMEs 
acquiring more infrastructure i.e. 
motor vehicles, machinery etc. 
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<Files\\DFI-Expert> - § 1 
reference coded  [0.20% 
Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.20% Coverage 
We are sure our fund finance 





<Files\\Coop Expert> - § 1 
reference coded  [3.55% 
Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 3.55% Coverage 
Researcher: Do you think 
meeting the preconditions of 
loan can make SMEs change or 
adopt new ways of doing things? 
Respondent: Not sure. 
Respondent: why are you not 
sure of this? 
Respondent: because it is not 
our focus. We are only 
interested in the growth of our 
members business. 
<Files\\SME 10> - § 3 
references coded  [5.96% 
Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 1.82% Coverage 
Researcher:  So now, because 
of the need for loan, are you 
compelled by your cooperative 
society to have a sales register? 
Respondent:  No 
Precondition Auditing of 
account 
<Files\\SME 4.> - § 1 reference 
coded  [0.23% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.23% Coverage 
you need to get them audited 
The interplay 




<Files\\Coop Expert> - § 1 
reference coded  [4.40% 
Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 4.40% Coverage 
Researcher: What do you do 
when there is a default? 
Respondent: We have the 
power to close members 
business premises with police 
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support, members would not 
want other neighbours to know 
that they are defaulting, this 
compels them to behave 
responsibly. If members are not 
adhering to laid down policies, 
they can be removed. Even 






Appendix 4 – Code 
Name Description 
Does not lead to 
growth 
Reference 1 - 3.16% Coverage 
Researcher: When SMEs follow a/the 
bank’s laid down loan processes, 
would there be any effect on the 
number of employees?  
Respondent: No, access to finance 
has no impact on the number of 
employees employed. 
Reference 2 - 6.58% Coverage 
 
Researcher: 
When SMEs follow a/the bank’s laid 
down loan processes, would there be 
any effect on geographical expansion? 
Respondent: No, access to finance 
has no impact on the geographical 
expansion of SMEs. 
 
Researcher: When SMEs follow a/the 
bank’s laid down loan processes, 
would there be any effect on 
diversification? 
Respondent: Diversification? No, 
access to finance has no impact on a 






Impact of access This speaks to the effects of access to 
financing have on beneficiaries. 
Growth Reference 1 - 2.91% Coverage 
Researcher: When SMEs follow a/the 
bank’s laid down loan processes, 
would there be any effect on the 
acquisition of asset? 
Respondent: Yes, access to a loan 
may result in SMEs acquiring more 




We are sure our fund finance 
equipment for them. 
Islamic Bank-Expert 
Researcher: When SMEs follow a/the 
bank’s laid down loan processes, 
would there be any effect on the 
acquisition of asset? 
Respondent: Yes, access to a loan 
may result in SMEs acquiring more 




So any time we want to do new 
packaging, we must get a new 
cylinder.  The cylinder has the capacity 
to print five colours and it cost #500.  
 
SME 4  
Researcher: What can you say your 
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business has enjoyed in terms of 
growth because of getting a 
cooperative loan? 
 
Respondent: When I wanted to get the 
loan from them, I told them I wanted to 
buy a distribution van. Which I did and 
that has helped the business 
tremendously. Anytime I want to take 








packaging, a new product line, or new 
packaging. I will have to go to a proper 
bank like the Bank of Industry or a 
bank that can do asset financing, and 
they will buy the equipment and then I 
will be paying. The equipment will 
stand as a backup or guarantee, but I 
will have to make sure the equipment 
must be able to generate income; it will 
give my business a bit of ceiling in 
customer clientele, turnover and 
acceptability.  
 
SME 9  
We got our showroom upgraded to 








bought more equipment 
 
SME Expert 
Researcher: When SMEs follow a/the 
bank’s laid down loan processes, 
would there be any effect on 
acquisition of asset? 
 
Respondent: Yes, access to loan may 
result in SMEs acquiring more 




Appendix 5 – Interview schedule – the pilot study 
The following are the typical questions asked, but some were 
tweaked in order to make them relevant to each respondent: 
1. What loan preconditions SMEs must meet before a loan is 
granted? 
2. Is there any flexibility in meeting the preconditions/Is there 
roomfor a waiver? 
3. What alternative would SMEs adopt, if they do not want to or 
cannot adopt the bank’s laid down condition when seeking a 
loan? 
4. What would make SMEs not to adhere to the bank’s laid down 
processes when seeking a loan? 
5. Do you think meeting the precondition of loan can make SMEs 
change or adopt new ways of doing things? 
6. When SMEs follow a/the bank’s laid down loan processes, 
would there be any effect on growth? 
7. When SMEs do not follow a/the banks’ laid down loan 
processes, would there be any effect on growth? 
8. The parameter used for growth in this study are: 
a. increase or decrease in the number of employees,  
b. increase/decrease in turnover,  
c. increase or decrease in volume of sales,  
d. increase or decrease in geographical expansion and  
e. diversification, amongst others. 
9. Does your financial institution (i.e. banks, cooperative society) 
consider regional conditions (i.e. religious practises, norms, 
friends and family factors and code of conducts) when 
administering loan policies? 
10. Can loan application be granted based on their relationship with 
family members or friends that work in a bank, or through the 







Appendix 6 – Interview schedule – main Study 
1. What loan preconditions must you meet before a loan is 
granted? 
2. What sources of financing do you usually adopt when seeking a 
loan?  
• Esusu collectors or ajo  
• Cooperative society 
• Development banks,  
• Commercial banks 
• Islamic bank 
• Microfinance banks 
 
3. How many times have you been able to obtain a loan, from when 
you started your business until now? 
4. What are the sources of loan you have obtained a loan from in 
the past?  
5. What source(s) of finance did you get your first loan from? 
6. What source(s) of the loan (formal and informal financial 
institution) did you get your second loan from? 
7. What source(s) of the loan (formal and informal financial 
institution) did you get your third loan from… amongst others? 
8. What are the preconditions of loan for each of the loans you have 
obtained to date? 
9. Do you think meeting the preconditions of a loan can make you 
change or adopt new ways of doing things? 
10. Did any of the sources of loan offer you any flexibility in meeting 
the preconditions? 
11. What alternatives can you or other manufacturer’s adopt, if you 
do not want to or cannot meet loan preconditions? 
12. When you meet loan preconditions, what effect does it has on 
your enterprise 
13. When you / SMEs do not meet loan preconditions, would there 
be any effect on: 
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• increase or decrease in the number of employees,  
• increase/decrease in turnover,  
• increase or decrease in volume of sales,  
• increase or decrease in geographical expansion and  
• diversification, amongst others. 
14. Does meeting loan preconditions guarantees getting access to 
finance? 
15. How does getting access to finance affect your business? 
16. What factors have made you to defaults in the past? 
17. How were you treated by the financial institution? 






Appendix 7 – Excerpts coded as preconditions 
Researcher: What loan preconditions must SMEs meet before a 
loan is granted?  
 
Respondents: - 
Coop expert:  
They have to become members of the cooperative before they 
become members, they must be introduced by two old members, 
two guarantors will be required from you before the loan is 
provided- and they must be able to stand for them when the loan 
is being sought, after six months of regular contribution new 
members will be eligible for the loan, if the loan is paid back 
within six months, a new loan request will be approved which will 
be times three of the borrower's deposit, completion of the loan 
application form, etc. 
 
SME 5: 
What I have to put in place include the registration as a Limited 
Liability Company, National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) registration, employing a 
biochemist, business plan, a structure that house the factory 
including its Photocopy of title documents to project site 
(Statutory Certificate of Occupancy or Deed of Assignment), 
Collateral Security- Legal mortgage on a landed property. The 
property must be duly registered with a Certificate of Occupancy. 
Other requirements include:  
1. formal Letter of Application. 
3.Photocopies of the Certified True Copy of Forms C02 and C07. 
4. Business Plan.  
5. Approved Building Plan (If new building). 
6. Bill of Quantities or Contractor’s Estimate of Cost to be 
incurred on Factory Building. 
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7.Valuation Reports on Factory Building(s) (for existing projects) 
and property offered as Collateral Security. 
8.Quotations for items of plant and machinery (at least 3 
quotations from different sources). 
9.Three (3) years most recent Audited Accounts of the company 
(for existing company). 
10. Three (3) years most recent Tax Clearance Certificate for the 
Company and two (2) Directors. 
11. Four (4) recent passport photographs of the business owner 
12. Evidence of appointment of a Company 
Researcher: Why do you need a Biochemist? 
Respondent: Operationally, I have to get a Biochemist (this is a 
NAFDAC condition).  
 
SME 9 
we gave them our account, statement of account of the bank's 
guarantors, two guarantors which we were able to provide. They 
sent a letter, a guarantor needs to state their account details, 
their net worth of their assets, I think the letter guarantee that we 





Appendix 8 - SME Assigned Names And Sources Of Finance                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Participants assigned 
names) 
Lenders No of sources 
SME 1 SEF 1 
SME 2 SEF 1 
SME 3 SEF 1 




SME 5 Money Lender, 
Friends and 
Family, & DFI 
3 
SME 6 MFI 1 
SME 7 Commercial 
Bank 
1 
SME 8 Commercial 
Bank and MFI 
2 
SME 9 Islamic Bank 1 
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Appendix 11 – Consent Form 
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OF HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 
 
FORM EC3 
CONSENT FORM FOR STUDIES INVOLVING HUMAN 
PARTICIPANTS 
 





of  [please give contact details here, sufficient to enable the 





hereby freely agree to take part in the study entitled [insert name 





(UH Protocol number …………………………………………) 
 
1 I confirm that I have been given a Participant Information Sheet 
(a copy of which is attached to this form) giving particulars of the 
study, including its aim(s), methods and design, the names and 
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contact details of key people and, as appropriate, the risks and 
potential benefits, how the information collected will be stored 
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involve further approaches to participants.  I have also been 
informed of how my personal information on this form will be 
stored and for how long.  I have been given details of my 
involvement in the study.  I have been told that in the event of 
any significant change to the aim(s) or design of the study I will 
be informed and asked to renew my consent to participate in it.  
 
2 I have been assured that I may withdraw from the study at any 
time without disadvantage or having to give a reason. 
 
3 In giving my consent to participate in this study, I understand that 
voice, video or photo-recording will take place and I have been 
informed of how/whether this recording will be 
transmitted/displayed. 
 
4 I have been told how information relating to me (data obtained 
in the course of the study, and data provided by me about 
myself) will be handled: how it will be kept secure, who will have 
access to it, and how it will or may be used.   
5 I understand that if there is any revelation of unlawful activity or 
circumstances that would or has put others at risk, the University 

































and assets from 
unreported work 

























Trade in stolen goods; drug 
dealing and manufacturing; 
prostitution; gambling; 
smuggling; fraud. 
Barter of drugs, stolen, 
or smuggled goods. 
Producing or growing 
drugs for own use. Theft 
for own use. 
Structure of table from Lippert and Walker, The Underground 
Economy: Global Evidence of its Size and Impact. Vancouver, 
B.C., The Frazer Institute, 1997. 
 
 
Appendix 13 - SME participant profiles 
 
Participants  Profile Lenders No of 
sources 









National Ass of 
Small-Scale 
Industrialists 




















society & DFI 
2 







lenders & DFI 
3 











bank & friends 
and family 
2 





bank & MFI 
2 
SME 9 Male. Owner. 




Islamic bank 1 














Appendix 14 - Themes that emerged during the pilot and 
main study 















































Growth   
 
  Impact of 
routine change 









    
 




















the growth of 
SMEs 
    Improved 
access 
 
Loan 
assessment 
 
Transparency 
 
 
 
